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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation is to describe how one 
particular community, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, was transformed 
from a religious commune into an industrial city between 
1741 and 1920. The focus of this essay is on social change, 
for industrialization i~~~olved more than just economic 
development; it also affected the social institutions and 
value systems ~y which people lived. Moreover, since none 
of the events which comprise Bethlehem's history took place 
in isolation, local developments are considered in the 
light of the national experience. Thus, this examination 
of Bethlehem's past should be viewed as more than just an 
exercise in local history: it should be seen as a case 
study in the industrialization of the United States. 
vi 
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Introduction 
The theme of this dissertation is social change. Its focus is the 
experience of a particular American community, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, 
during the period 1850 to 1920--a period which marked the emergence of 
the United States as a modern industrial nation. Although Bethlehem is 
the subject of this essay, the intent is not to present a local history 
~~· Rather, Bethlehem is to be seen as a microcosm of the national 
experience. In other words, it should be viewed as a case study in the 
impact of industrialization. 
All discussion of social change, ~·1hether it be of a national or a 
community orientation, cannot escape the debt owed to the work of 
Ferdinand Tennies. Tennies' classic Gemeinschaft -- Gesellschaft 
typology has been the theoretical starting point for all discussion of 
social organization since he first presented his ideas in 1887. In 
fact, although a number of theorists have subsequently attempted to 
supplant Tennies' theories with their own, none have succeeded. For 
the most part, they have merely modified his ideas in regard to 
specific problems; Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft remain as a relevant 
-=-
1 
conceptual framework for the study of social change. 
1John c. McKinney and Charles P. Loomis, "The Application of 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as Related to Other Typologies," 
in Ferdinand Tennies, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft), Charles P. Loomis, Ed., (Harper Torchbooks 
Edition), New York, 1963, PP• 12-29, Colin Bell and Howard 
2. 
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3. 
Tonnies' theories grew out of his attempts to place those changes, 
which he saw taking place in'Western society during a period of rapid 
industrialization, in a coherent conceptual framework. As he saw it, 
alterations in societal organization occurred along a continuum whose 
opposite poles he labelled Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, terms which 
are usually translated as community and society. Tennies stressed 
that these were theoretical types and, in their pure forms, would not 
be found in the real world. As constructs, howeverD they could be 
employed as models against which any existing society might be measured. 
Thus, for Tonnies, Gemeinschaft was approximated by the small pre-_ ........ .._....,._ 
industrial village, and Gesellschaft by the modern industrial state. 
Moreover, since Tonnies posited these two types as comprising opposite 
ends of a spectrwn, all existing societies fall somewhere in between, 
and incorporate, to greater or lesser degrees, elements of both 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. It should be pointed out, however, 
that Tonnies did not feel that the mere existence of a continuum, in 
which any given society could be placed, meant that social change 
developed in a linear fashion. Social change, he was careful to point 
out, did not proceed uniformly, but varied in its details according to 
time and place. 2 
Because of the importance of Tennies' concepts to this essay, a 
Newby, Community Studies: An Intrfduction to the Sociology of 
the Local Community, New York, 1972, p. 25. In this context see 
also Samuel P. Hays, "A Systematic Social History," in George A. 
Billias and Gerald N. Grob, Eds., American History: Retrospect and 
Prospe~~ New York, c. 1971, pp. 338-340. 
2This and the following pa~agraphs are based on Tennies, Community 
and Society, passim. 
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4. 
b~ief discussion of what the Gemeinschaft and Gesellachaft typology 
involves is in order at this point. In Gemeinschaft, then, the basic 
social unit is seen to be the group itself, not the individual. Indi-
vidual identity is· derived from membership in the group, not from 
personal achievement. The group is viewed by its members as an organic 
whole, and they have internalized its values and goals. There is 
little or no room for individual striving or success at the expense of 
the community, and social relationships are based on a clear under-
standing of each person's place in the social order. Ties of kinship 
and religion are usually quite strong, and, as such, reinforce the 
group's moral codes. The community tends to be homogeneous and rooted 
in a specific locality. The tribe, village, and town are, in degrees 
of increasing social complexity, examples of Gemcinschaft. The town is 
its highest form of development, and as it increases in size and 
complexity, it gradually loses the characteristics of Gemeinschaft, and 
acquires those of Gesellschaft. 
If the village typified Gemeingchaft, Gesellschaft is typified 
b:· the capitalistic society. It develops out of Gemeinschaft, and its 
presence is marked by the widespread acceptance of a philosophy of 
individualism. The basic social unit is no longer the group, but the 
individual. In Gesellschaft, every man strives for his own advantage, 
and membership in the larger society presupposes no preexisting condition 
of unity. Convention replaces mutual understanding as the means by 
which Gesell.schaft maintains its continued existence. 
In ~sellschaft, economic activity is assumed to be the most 
important aspect of human behavior. Quoting Adam Smith, Tennies notes 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
s. 
. 3 
that "Every man ••• becomes in some measure a merchant, .... " As the 
town develops the characteristics of Gesellschaft, it becomes a 
commet·cial town, and as commerce dominates its productive labor 11 a 
factory town. Increasingly 11 human relationships becomra contractual 
ones. 
The development of Gesellschaft is neither a uniform nor a coherent 
process. Elements of Gemeinschaft often continue to exist within the 
industrial city. Neighborhoods and voluntary social organizations pro-
vide a sense of community which many feel to be otherwise lacking in 
their social environment. In fact, it is Tennies contention that only 
the upper strata of society have the opportunity to take advantage of 
the possibilities of freedom and individual development inherent in 
Gesellschaft. They set the standards to which the lower classes con-
form, and the lower classes conform out of a desire to achieve the 
power and independence which the upper classes already possess. 
Although Gesellschaft is based upon a philosophy of individualism, 
it eventually develops a need for rational organization. The con-
tractual nature of relationships in the capitalistic society leads to 
the emergence of a number of associations whose goals, like those of 
the single individuals, are to maximize profit. Because Gesellschaft 
is based on economic conflict, or at least competition, there exists a 
large degree of uncertaintyo By permitting individuals to pool their 
resources, the corporation reduces risk and uncertainty, and replaces 
them with order and predictability. 
31~e qubtation from Adam Smith is to be found in~., p. 76. 
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6. 
Society's concern with order and stability, which Tennies saw as 
giving rise to the modern corporation, led him to ~redict that the state 
would eventually emerge as the most powerful guardian of order in 
society. Only the authority of a powerful state could produce harmony 
in a society of individuals whose main preoccupation was economic gain. 
Eventually, all aspects of life, not just the economic, would be 
regulated by the state, because it alone would have the capacity to 
produce order out of disorder. It was Tennies' belief that the 
ultimate form of Gesellschaft would be socialism of a national, and 
4 
eventually, an international variety. 
Tonnies' theories of social change have been dealt with here at 
some length because they provide the basic conceptual framework for 
our examination of Bethlehem as a case study in the industrialization 
of the United States. However, before examining Bethlehem's develop-
ment in detail, it becomes necessary to indicate how our conceptual 
structure can be applied to changes in American society prior to 1920 
in order to place local events in proper perspective. 
Americans of the mid-nineteenth century were separated from their 
colonial forebearers by a gulf of ideology as well as one of time. A 
value system based on individualism formed the basis of their live~, while 
a belief in the importance of community had structured the thinking of 
4rt is interesting to note that Alexis de Tocqueville, after 
visiting the highly egalitaria~ and individualistic American 
society of the 1830's, also predicted the rise of the state to 
a position of great power. Tocqueville, however, was far less 
sanguine about the meaning of this development than was Tennies. 
See Tonnies, Community and Society, pp. 216-218, and Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, J.P. Mayer and Max Lerner 
Eds., New York, c. 1966, pp. 665-669. 
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7. 
most colonists. For them, religion, politics, the relief of the poor, 
and the punishment of the wicked took place within the context of the 
local community. Even expansion of the areas of settlement usually 
occurred in terms of group e~~erience. Thus, while the family farm-
stead was not unknown in the colonial period, it usually existed within 
5 
a community framework. In a word, the dominant form of social 
organization for most of the colonial period came close to approximating 
Gemeinschaft. 
The eighteenth century saw the gradual replacement of the values 
appropriate to Gemeinschaft by those of Gesellschaft. The intellectual 
current of the Enlightenment with its stress on progress, individual 
dignity, and hostility to revealed religion certainly made inroads into 
the established values of the time. However, the Great Awakening, with 
its emphasis on the importance of individual religious experience, and 
the aggressive republicanism of the American Revolution were crucial 
factors in making individualism a major part of the American value 
6 
system. Indeed, the later social and political turmoil of the so-called 
5see, Michael Zuckerman, Peaceable Kin doms: New En land Towns in 
the Eighteenth Century, Vintage Books Edition , New Yor~, c. 1970, 
pp. 46-84, David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social 
Order and Disorder in the New Republic, Boston, c. 1971, pp. 11-20, 
Kenneth A. Lockridge, A New England Town; the First Hundred Years: 
Dedham, Massachusetts, 1636-1736, New York ,c. 1970, pp. 93-102. 
James T. Lemon, The nest !oor Man's Count!Y: A Geographical Study 
of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania, Baltimore, c. 1972, pp. 98-102, 
109-117. 
6Lockridge, A New England Town, pp. 167-180, Sam Bass Warner, Jr., 
The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth, 
Philadelphia c. 1968, pp. 3-45, Dietmar Rothermund, The Layman's 
Progress: Religious and Political Experience in Colonial Pennsyl-
vania; 1740-1770, Philadelphia, c. 1961, p. 137, Gordon s. Wood, 
TI1e Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1787, Chapel Rill, c. 
1969, pp. 60-61, 70-73. 
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8. 
Jacksonian period of American history can be seen as marking the point 
at which individualism finally triumphed over a communal ethic. The 
egalitarian society so vividly described by Alexis de Tocqueville in 
his classic work Democracy in America bears an unmistakable resemblance 
7 
to Tennies' Gesellschaft. 
Even though most Americans of 1850 lived in small towns, much as 
their colonial predecessors had, they nevertheless rejected the belief 
that the community, rather than the individual, formed the basis of 
society. The colonial practice of denying strangers access to a town 
if the residents disapproved would have seemed :i.nconceivable to most 
Americana of 1850. On the contrary, individual mobility, whether social 
or geographic, appeared worthy of praise. Each individual was expe~ted 
to make every effort to attain economic success. Mobility indicated the 
individual's efforts to do so. Indeed, the prevailing beliefs assumed 
that acceptance of one's lot in life indicated weakness of character 
8 
and moral failure. 
Individualism, and its accompanying belief in laissez faire 
economics, encouraged the industrialization of the United States, but 
industrialization itself eventually gave rise to an ethic hostile to 
7Rothman, Discovery of the Asylum, pp. xviii, 125-127, Marvin Meyers, 
The Jacksonian·Persuasion: Politics and·Belief, (Vintage Books 
Edition), New York, c. 1960, pp. 11-12, Edward Pessen, Jacksonian 
America: Society, Personality, and Politics, Homewood, Ill., 1969, 
pp. 59-92, Tocqueville, ·nemocracy in·America, pp. 387-473. 
8 ~., pp. 522-527, 603-607, Robert H. Wiebe,~ Search for Order: 
1877-1920, (American Century Series Edition), New York, 1968, pp. 
135-138, Louis M. Hacker, The World of Artdrew Carnegie: 1865-190~, 
Philadelphia, c. 1968, pp. 68-75, 84. Warner, Private City, p. x. 
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individualism. The value system of 1920 differed from that of 1850 in 
that it stressed the necessity of order and regularity as crucial to 
the smooth functioning of society. 
In the course of seventy years, the nation had been once again • 
transformed. A nation-wide railroad network and the mass production 
of both consumer and industrial goods proclaimed the United States an 
industrial society. Moreover, as the nation had industrialized, it 
had become a truly national society, and 0 as such, tremendously complex. 
Con~ributing to the complexity had been enormous increases in the growth 
rates of urbanization and immigration. The social mechanisms which had 
sufficed to regulate behavior when most Americane lived in small towns, 
and shared similar cultural and ethnic backgrounds, no longer see~ed to 
apply. To those Americans concerned with the apparent instability of 
their society, the prevalent belief in the value of an unrestricted 
individualiam seemed to be leading the country toward destruction. A 
9 
rational organization of society seemed to offer the only hope. 
The factory and the new industrial corporation of the late nine-
teenth century offered disturbed Americans a model for the proper 
organization of society. The corporations had developed new methods 
of management to regulate their increasingly complicated and far-flung 
operations. These new methods were, in a word, bureaucratic. They 
involved the centralization of decision-making, hierarchical chains of 
command, specialization of tasks, and, above all, a rational and logical 
9
wiebe, Search for Order, pp. 62-66, 145-146, Samuel P. Hays, 
The Response to Industrialism: 1885-1914, Chicago, 1957, PP• 48-70. 
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10. 
ordering of activity by means of impersonal rules and sanctions. 
Scientific management, as the organizational techniques were known, 
made for predictability and continuity in operations, and this, in 
turn, made for profit. Then as now, the majority of Americans 
have looked with favor upon economic success. Consequently, it was not 
long before the techniques of scientific management were being advocated 
as the solution to the ills of society. A proper management of society 
would, it seemed, resolve the tensions and uncertainties created by 
10 
complexity. 
The first two decades of the twentieth century, the so-called 
Progressive Era, witnessed an outpouring of p~oposals to reform various 
aspects of American life. Most, if not all, of the reforms involved 
the application of some form of bureaucratic procedures to the problems 
facing the country. Thus, the regulation of economic activity by the 
federal government, the rationalization and professionalization of 
teaching and social work, efforts to Americanize immigrants, as well 
as political reforms on the local, state, and national levels, all 
proceeded out of a desire to introduce rationality and order in 
11 American society. 
10wieee, Search for Order, p. 156, James Weinstein, The Corporate 
Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918, Boston, c. 1968, pp. x-xi, 
Samuel Haber, Efficienci and Uplift: Scientific Management in 
the Progressive Era; 18 0-1920, Chicago c. 1964, pp. 59, 102. 
11 Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of 
American History, 1900-1916, London, c. 1963, pp .1-10, Roy 
Lubove, The Professional Altruist: The Emersence of Social Work 
as a Career, 1880-1930, (Atheneum Edition)p Boston, 1969, pp. 118-
156, Haber, Scientific Management, p. llO,Gerd Korman, 
Industrialization, Immigrants and Americanizers: The View From 
Milwaukee, 1866-1921, Madison, Wise., 1967, p. 136. 
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11. 
Many of the leaders of the various reform movements came from the 
ranks of the country's business elite. As a group, the most admired 
people in American society have been the economically successful. In 
the absence of an established church or an hereditary aristocracy, 
Americans have often turned to the business community for their leaders. 
Moreover, the familiarity of businessmen with the techniques of manage-
ment encouraged them to take the lead in many of the reform movements. 
To be sure, not all businessmen were reformers, nor were all reformers 
businessmen. However, many of the reform-minded members of society 
shared similar approaches to their different areas of concern, and felt 
that the methods of organization applicable to business activities could 
be used to regulate social activities as well. Even those reformers 
hostile to business interests had no quat.rel with the ideas of order 
and efficiency. 
The involvement of businessmen in reform movements grew out of 
an awareness that economics was not a sphere of life separate from 
social or political activities. Although some business-oriented re-
formers clearly sought reforms beneficial to their own interests, 
there is no need to impute sinister motives to them. Such reformers 
often sincerely felt that the actions they advocated would benefit the 
nation all l.YeJ.l as business. To bring order out of chaos 11 and forestall 
social collapse by creating a stable society would improve the quality 
12 
of life for all. 
12Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the 
Progressive Movement, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, pp. 206-224. 
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12. 
The First World War marked the triumph of the new bureaucratic 
value system. Businessmen devoted themselves wholeheartedly to the 
war effort, and, in the process, familiarized the country with the 
techniques of scientific management. Moreover, they showed that these 
techniques worked. In a sense, the war ended the Progressive Era, not 
because all the nation's problems had been solved, but because the 
methods of problem-solving had become a permanent part of the 
American scene. All that seemed to remain was to put those methods 
13 into wider practice. Indeed, it can be argued that American history 
since tlte end of the First World War has involved just that; the 
application of bureaucratic methods of management to larger and larger 
14 
segments of American life. By 1920, in any case, Tonnies' pre-
dictions as to the tendencies inherent in Gesellschaft seemed to have 
borne fruit. 
If Tennies' Gemeinschaft--Gesellschaft continuum can be applied 
to the study of national societies, it can be used as a means to study 
local communities as well. Both sociologists and historians have 
viewed the development of the local community as a process involving 
its increasing integration into the national society. Indeed, some 
sociologists have claimed that as a result of the related processes 
of urbanization, bureaucratization, and industrialization, there no 
longer exists, at present, true local communities with unique 
identities, but only local manifestations of a national, mass 
13 Wiebe, Search for Orde~ pp. 287-297, 300-301. 
14John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Boston, 1967. 
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15 
society. Whether, this be the case or not is far beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. What is relevant here, however, is the use of 
the Gemeinschaft--Gesellschaft typology as a conceptual tool, because 
~ ....... _ 
it is within this framework that our examination of Bethlehem is 
placed. The developments described as taking place in Bethlehem must 
therefore be seen as occurring within the context e~f an emergi.ng national 
society, and being related to it. 
Although this dissertation covers nearly two centuries of 
Bethlehem's history, the core of our discussion is devoted to an 
examination of a movement to reform Bethlehem's municipal government 
in 1917. As such, it is an attempt to study the te;ndency to apply the 
newly emergent bureaucratic value system to local problems, and can 
therefore be approached as a case study in municipal reform during the 
Progressive Era. It should be noted, however, that this reform movement 
must be examined as the culmination of a process of social change which 
had taken place over a long period of time. Consequently,the chapters 
which precede the discussion of the reform movement are tc be considered 
as an indication of the specific milieu in which the reform movement 
originated. At the same time, these chapters on Bethlehem's Moravian 
origins, its economic growth, ethnic composition, social hierarchy, 
and labor conflicts, are intended to show how developments relating to 
industrialization on the national scene manifested themselves in the 
15Maurice R. Stein, The Eclipse of Community: An Interpretation of 
American Studies, (Harper Torchbooks Editions), New York, 1964, 
pp. 94-113, Roland L. Warren, The Community in America, Chicago, 
1963, pp. 5-6, Page Smith, As a City Upon a Hill: The Town in 
American History, New York, 1966, p. 107, Arthur J. Vedich and 
Joseph Bensman, Small Town in }mas SocieJY: Class, Power and 
Religion in a Rural Community, (Anchor Books Edition), New York, 
1966, PP• 88-107. 
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experience of one particular community. Chronologically, the 
dissertation ends at a point where locally, as nationally, the 
business-oriented techniques of scientific managemen~ had been applied 
to political activity with the hope of producing a stable and orderly 
society. By 1920, then, in Bethlehem as elsP.where 1 the values of 
Gesellschaft had achieved maturity. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
MORAVIAN BETHLEHEM: 1741-1845 
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania was founded in the 1740's by members of 
the Moravian Church. Only in the 1840's, after a century of exis-
tence, did the community permit non-Moravians to settle within the 
town's limits. The reversal of a century-long policy of exclusion 
did not herald a radical change in behavior on the part of the 
community's residents. What it did mark was the culmination of a 
series of changes which had already transformed Bethlehem from a 
religious settlement into a secular town. In the years between 1741 
and 1845, the inhabitants of Bethlehem had exchanged an ethic of 
religious communalism for a value syatem based on secular individu-
alism. A Gemeinschaft orientation h~d been exchanged for a value 
orientati.on appropriate to a Gesellschaft. It is the purpose of 
this chapter to indicate how this alteration in values came about. 
Bethlehem's early history car. only be understood in the light 
of the background and beliefs of its Moravian founders. They belonged 
to the Unitas Fratrum, as the Church is officially known. It is a 
Church which traces its origins to Jan Hus, a pre-Reformation opponent 
of the Roman papacy. Hus' followers formally seceded from Rome in 
1467, and acquired an episcopacy for themselves through the agency of 
the Waldensians, another anti-papal group. The Brethren then settled 
15. 
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near Prague to devote themselves to lives which stressed piety and 
moral conduct, but not doctrinal orthodoxy. Although the Church had 
many adherents at the start of the seventeenth century, it was almost 
totally destroyed during the Thirty Years War. For the next century 
or so, a period of dispersion known to Moravian historians as the 
Time of the Hidden Seed, the Church barely managed to survive. Only 
in the eighteenth century did the Moravian Church once again experience 
1 growth. 
The revival of the Moravian Church can be laid to the efforts of 
one man: Count Nickolas Ludwig von Zinzindorf. The Count, a devout 
Lutheran of a pietist inclination, permitted members of the Moravian 
Brethren to settle on his estates in Saxony where, in 1722, they 
established the village of Hermhut, meaning "in the Lord's care." 
Zinzindorf had originally hoped to convert the Moravians to his own 
beliefs, but found himself converted to theirs instead. He received 
ordination as a bishop of the church, and, in fact, became its 
2 
unofficial, but very real, head. 
Under Zinzindorf's leadership, the revived Moravian Church 
developed a strong pietistic orientation. Emotion, not reason, dominated 
lGillian Lindt Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds: A Study of 
Changing Communities, New York, 1967 pp. 1-7, Joseph Mortir.ter 
Levering, A History of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania: 1741-1892, 
Bethlehem, Pa., 1903, pp. 10-11. 
2Arthur J. Lewis, Zinzindorf, The Ecumenical Pioneer: A Stu2Y 
in the Mor.avian Contribution to Christian Mission and Uuity, 
Phila. c. 1962, PP• 111-114. 
John Ro Weinlicke, Count Zinzindorf, New York c. 1956, pp. 
114-127. 
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the Morsvians' view of religion. God, they felt, could not be under-
stood by use of rational thought processes alone. Indeed, God had 
only become comprehensible to mankind when He chose to reveal Himself 
in the person of Jesus. God thus became accessible to man through 
Jesus, and Jesus, through his sufferings on the Cross, had atoned for 
man's sins. The Atonement made it ?OSsible for men now to love and 
adore God without undergoing a painful process of guilt, pain and sin. 
For Zinzindorf, the worship of God expressed itself in a profound 
3 
emotional experience in which man became joyously united with Christ. 
In all this, however, Zinzindorf and his followers laid a strong 
emphasis on interpreting man's comprehension of God as a communal 
4 
rather than an individual experience. 
A world-wide missionary activity developed as an outgrowth 
of the Moravians' stress on community as the basis of religious 
enthusiasm. The Moravians viewed their Church as an ecumenical 
movement to promote religious experience, not merely a denomination. 
To maintain both church discipline, and inter-denominational 
cooperation, Zinzindor£ created a system of "tropes" as forms of 
worship. Under this system, members of other churches, which, in 
Germany, meant primarily the Lutheran and Reformed, could associate 
5 
with the Moravian Church without abandoning their previous affiliations. 
3 Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds, pp. 10-11. 
4
nietmar Rotherruund, The Layman's Progress; Religious and Political 
Experience in Colonial Pennsylvania: '1740•1770 1 Phila., c. 1961, 
P• 20. 
5 Lewis, Zinzindorf, PP• 139-161. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18. 
Such missionary activity soon spread all over Germany, and, from 
there, to the American colonies, where large numbers of German immi-
grants lived without ministerial leaders. Attr~ctive, too, were the 
many heathens to be brought into the fold. By 1741, there already 
existed Moravian missionary communities in such widely separated 
. 6 places as Greenland and the West Indies. 
The establishment of Bethlehem in 1741 grew out of an attempt 
by the Moravians to create a settlement in Georgia in 1735. The 
outbreak of war b~tween Spain and England subjected the Moravians 
to harassment because of their pacifist stand. In 1740, the Moravians 
7 
abandoned their settlement. The survivors traveled north to 
Pennsylvania where they purchased a tract of land along the Lehigh 
River in Northampton County from a friend of Zinzindorf's, George 
Whitefield, the famous Methodist preacher. On Christmas Day 1741, 
8 
with Zinzindorf in attendance, the site was named Bethlehem. 
From the start 5 Moravian Bethlehem reflected its founders' con-
cern with the communal experience of religion. Planning, not chance, 
characterized the town's development. The Moravians laid out streets 
and squares with an eye toward orderly growth. They placed the dormi-
tory-like choir residences and other community structures in patterns 
9 based on the buildings' functional relation to one another. Such 
6 
Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds, p. 155. 
7 Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 35-37. 
8~., p. 79. M.S. Henry, History of the Lehigh Valley, Easton, 
Pa., 1860, pp. 178-179. 
9william J. MuTtagh, Moravian Architecture and Town Planning, 
Chapel Hill, c. 1967, PP• 12-14. 
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planning and regulated growth could only o~cur in a closed environment 
where economic, social, and political goals could be subordinated to 
religion. To permit non-Moravians to settle permanently in Bethlehem 
would threaten the whole reason for the town's existence. Conse-
quentlyD Bethlehem remained an exclusive community for more than a 
century after its founding. It did not become incorporated as a 
political unit, and thus open to residence by anyoner but remained 
10 
a private estate owned by the Moravian Church. 
Living in a closed religious community, Bethlehem's Moravian 
residents felt little need to separate religious and s~cular activities. 
Within their communal framework, nothing existed to distj.nguish one 
sphere of life from the other. Indeed, because Jesus had been declared 
the community's Chief Elder, theocratic authority prevailed~ However, 
Jesus' membership in the community did not mean that village authorities 
had the opportunity to make their own decisions, and then to declare 
them to be God's will. On the contrary, in order to ascertain Jesus' 
verdict on a given issue the Moravians resorted, not only to prayer, 
but also to the device of the lot. Use of the lot involved the 
drawing of a slip of paper from a box which usually held three ballots: 
one affirmative, one negative, and one blank. Moravians resorted to 
the lot to ascertain God's will in a wide variety of situations ranging 
from questions of community policy to matters affecting only a few 
individuals. Thus, the admittance of a new member to the community, 
the new member's decision to marry, as well as the name of his spouse, 
10Levering, Bethlehem, p. 269. 
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the selection of individuals to staff missionary or political posts, 
erection of new buildings, economic policies, or establislting the 
11 date of a synod were matters often submitted to the lot, 
In the day to day administration of Bethlehem, when the lot did 
not come into service, the Moravians practiced rule by committee. The 
Elders' Conference stood at the top, This consisted of the Chief 
Ordinarius, who was the main administrative officer, his deputy, the 
supervisors of the choirs--the basic social unit--and the general 
overseer of economic affairs, Below this lay a general supervisory 
council whose members represented the various branches of the 
community's economy and dealt with its routine matters. A community 
council of all adult church members formed the bottom of the committee 
structure. However, this council had only advisory powers, and did 
12 
not participate in decision-making, Religion, not democracy, gave 
direction to the community's decisions, 
Bethlehem's social organization reflected the Moravians' desire 
to subordinate individual desires to the maintenance of religious 
community, Thus, the family did not constitute the basic social unit 
in Bethlehem. Instead, this role belonged to the choir (from the German 
£h2r, a group organized to sing the praises of God), The choir served 
as a family surrogate, and functioned so as to replace distracting 
11Gillian Lindt Gollin, "Bethlehem Transformed: The 
Secularization of a Moravian Settlement," Pennsylvania History, 
Vol. XXXI, Jan., 1970, pp, 58-59, Gollin, Moravians in Two 
Worlds, pp. 67-89. 
12Ibid,, 39-40, 
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familial loyalties with communal ones. Indeed, the choir system 
stratified the community in terms of age, sex,and marital status. 
Ideally, an individual would spend his entire life, from birth to 
death, belonging_~o one choir or another.. Separate choirs existed 
for infants, boys, girls, single men, single women, married couples, 
widows,and widowers. The choirs provided their members with food, 
clothing, and communal housing, as well as taking care of the raising 
and education of children. No one who lived in Bethlehem could 
13 
rcmsin outside the choir system. 
Communal organization dominated Bethlehem'B economic life in much 
the same fashion as it did social life. In fact, the choirs, which 
served as the basic social units, carried on economic functions as 
well. A communal sharing of property,labor, production,and consumption 
14 
characterized Bethlehem's economic life. Moreover, the community 
had the right to determine which occupation an individual should pursue. 
This, of course,_reflected the Moravian belief that all labor belonged 
to God, and that the community's spiritual welfare demanded the sub-
ordination of the individual's desires to the group's. ~1e idea of 
private property never received official condemnation by church 
authorities, but conditions, as they existed in Bethlehem, prevented 
individuals from effectively making use of whatever private possessions 
13w. Ross Yates, Bethlehem of Pennsylvania: The First Hundred 
Years, Bethlehem, Pa. c. 1968, p. 40-41, Gollin, Moravians 
in Two Worlds, pp. 67-89. 
14 Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 178-181. Gollin, Moravians in Two 
Worlds, pp. 138-147. 
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15 they may have had. In any case, neither profits nor wages accrued 
to the benefit of the individual. The choirs provided their members 
with all their material needs, and all profits from the community's 
enterprises went to the Church. 
Economic activity in Bethlehem revolved around manufacturing 
rather than agriculture. Nearly half of the community's labor force 
in 1750 devoted itself to skilled crafts while only about a quarter 
16 
engaged in farming. T.he .:ommunity had been designed as a manu-
facturing center from which surrounding mission posts, itinerant 
missionaries, as well as the residents of Bethlehem, would receive 
the necessities of life. In fact, the third building erected in 
Bethlehem was a tannery, built in 1743. The same year saw the 
completion of a grist mill, and a second mill followed ten years 
later. Textiles and clothing made up another significant part of 
the town's economy:• A fulling mill and a dye works came into being 
in the 1750's. Several of the trades practiced in Bethlehem- those 
of stocking weaver, baker, chandler, locksmith, nailsmith, fuller and 
dyer--had not been followed in Northampton County before the arrival 
17 
of the Moravians. This, plus a '.IOt'k ethic similar to Calvinism, in 
15 
16 
17 
Edmund de Schweinitz, The Financial History of the American 
Province of the Unitas Fratrum and of Its Sustentation Fund, 
Bethlehem, Pa., 1877, p. 15. 
Gollin, "Secularization," p. 57. 
Murtagh, Moravian Architecture, pp. 13, 30-34, Henry, Lehigh 
Valley, p. 205, Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 144-153. 
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that devotion to work was essential to one's state of grace, helped 
18 
Bethlehem to prosper. 
By the 1750's, ~ethlehem had become a regional manufacturing 
19 
center. Its location on the frontier gave it a near-monopoly on 
the sale of manufactured goods in.that part of eastern Pennsylvania. 
Settlers from the nearby agricultural regions came to Bethlehem to 
have their grain milled as well as to purchase needed articles. To 
accommodate them, as well as to enhance the community's treasury, 
the Moravians in Bethlehem opened up the first general store in 
Northampton county where goods of local manufacture could be pur-
chased as well as items imported from Philadelphia. The Moravian.s 
had, by this time, established a thriving trade with certain 
Philadelphia merchants who supplied them with such things as glass, 
20 
salt, and gun powder in exchange for textiles, pottery, and hardware. 
Indeed, by 1760, after twenty years of existence, Bethlehem appeared 
to have accomplished its founder's every dream. lt throve spiritually 
and economically, providing for its own needs as well aa those of the 
missionaries it supported. Unfortunately, appearances are often 
deceptive, and in Bethlehem's case, success and failure came hand in 
hand. 
The Bethlehem of the 1740's and 1750's clearly comes quite close 
18 Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds, p. 222. 
19James T. Lemon, The Best Poor Man's Country: A Geosraphical 
Histora of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania, Baltimore, c. 1972, 
PP• 13 , 147. 
20 Murtagh, Moravian Architecture, pp. 69-73, Gollin, Moravians 
in Two Worlds, pp. 178-179, Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 286-289. 
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to the classic description of Gemeinschaft. The community of goods 
and labor, and the social and religious bonds which united the 
inhabitants of Bethlehem clearly belong in the same category of 
mechanism which Tennies found to be the operative factors producing 
a Gemeinschaft.21 Unfortunately for the Moravians, eighteenth century 
Pennsylvania proved to be the wrong time and the wrong place to esta-
blish such a community. Pennsylvania, not to mention the rest of the 
Western World, was a society whose value system reflected a growing 
shift away from the attitt1des of Gemeinschaft in the direction of 
Gesellschaft. ', • .ls change in values would soon make itself felt in 
Bethlehem and gradually trans~orm it. 
In a social sense, the values of community, as expressed by 
Bethlehem's Moravian residents, appeared to most Pennsylvanians as 
22 
belonging to a system of beliefs rapidly becoming obsolete. The word 
which can best be used to describe Moravian Bethlehem's relation to 
contemporary Pennsylvania society is anachronism. The Moravian Church 
placed great stress on the importance of community in the lives of its 
members, but among other residents of Pennsylvania, the concept of 
community received a great deal less veneration. Pennsylvania was a 
liberal society in the classic sense of placing greater emphasis on 
individual freedom and material gain than on the public interest. By 
mid-century, this philosophy of individualism had come to dominate the 
21Ferdinand Tonnies, Communit and Societ (Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft) Charles P. Lonnies Ed., Harper Torchbooks 
Editions) New York, 1963, p. 47. 
22Lemon 1 Best Poor Man's Country, p. 98ff. 
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value system of Pennsylvanians, whether they lived in the commercial 
metropolis of Philadelphia, the few county seats and commercial 
centers like Reading, Carlisle or York, or in the province's rural 
24 
area. This reflected a trend taking place, since the seventeenth 
century, all over rural western Europe. As feudalism declined in 
Europe, the idea of the peasant village as the social basj.s for the 
organization of agriculture began to disappear as well. The agri-
cultural village had had meaning only in the feudal open-field system 
which accompanied a social ethic that encouraged an equitable distri-
bution of all qualities of land. With the disappearance of the 
medieval ethic of social justice, a rise in individualism encouraged 
25 
the creation of family farms operated by the heads of nuclear families. 
This, in turn, encouraged the further individualization of opinion 
and decision-making which would eventually turn Western society into 
a Gesellschaft. 
Given the conditions of its settleme~t, Pe~.nsylvania can easily 
be described as the most liberal society in the world of the mid-
eighteenth century. The agricultural villages, linked together in a 
series of townships, which William Penn envisioned when he established 
his colony, failed to materialize. Instead, family farmsteads became 
24tbid., pp. 118-119, 134, Sam Bass Warner Jr., The Private City: 
Philadelphia in Three Periods of its Growth, Phila. c. 1968, 
P• 4. 
25Lemon, Best Poor Man's Country, pp. 108-109. For a description 
of a similar process in New England see, Kenneth A.Lockridge, A 
New England Town: The First Hundred Years; Dedham, Massachusetts, 
1636-1736, New York, c. 1970, pp. 93-118. 
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dispersed over the countrysidee and indiscriminate settlement led to 
irregular holdings. Townships existed, but only as political units 
26 
which had few claims on their residents in terms of community. 
Moreover, the system which Penn had desired had been an idealized 
version of feudal England, but few peasants could afford to migrate 
and few aristocrats wanted to, The bulk of the migrants to Penn's 
p~ovince came mostly from the ranks of the skilled and the middle 
classes whu had been the very elements in European society bene-
27 
fitting from the rise of individualism. They were not about to 
abandon a philosophy which they found encouraging. 
Besides being an individualistic society, Pennsylvania also had 
the distinction of being a pluralistic one as well. The social map 
of the province described a mosaic of different ethnic and religious 
28 
groups most of whom felt somewhat suspicious of their neighbors. The 
necessity of mutual tolerance as well as the lack of the necessary 
ministerial leadership, prevented the rise of strong parishes which 
could serve as the basis for community. The township likewise failed 
to serve as the nucleus for community even though many had been settled 
almost exclusively by members of one or another ethnic or religious 
group. This resulted from the location of political authority on the 
29 
county level, not on that of the township. As a result, only a very 
Z6Lemon, Best Poor Man's Country, pp. 98-106, 
27 Ibid., p. 6. Philip S, Klein and Ari Hoogenboom, A History 
~ennsylvania, New York, c. 1973, pp. 39-40. 
28 Rothermund, Layman's Progress, pp. 14, 30, 
29~., p. 69, Lemon, Best Poor Man's Country, pp. 110-111. 
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few groups, such as the Moravians, who possessed strong social 
organization to begin with, managed to create a real sense of 
community. 
The Moravians established Bethlehem with the purpose of using it 
as a center of missionary activity among the inhabitants of Pennsyl-
vania, Lacking Lutheran and Reformed ministers, the German church 
people of the province appeared to offer an open field for eager 
missionaries, and Zinzindorf hoped to create a sense of ecumenical 
30 
unity among themo For several years Moravian missionaries pursued 
a course of almost feverish activity among the Germans, Moravian 
ministers established Lutheran and Reformed "tropes" to provide for 
their charges. All this was in vain, however, for this missionary 
activity took place during the religious revival of the Great 
Awake~ing, the immediate effect of which was an increase in denominational 
consciousness. By 1748, in fact, the Moravians found that they could no 
longer compete with the ministerial efforts of the various revived 
churches. They retreated to their headquarters in Bethlehem, and 
abandoned the interdenominational congregations they had established. 
From the 1750's on, the Moravians concentrated their missionary efforts 
31 
solely on the Indians--efforts which had a great deal of success. 
If the Great Awakening increased denominational consciousness in 
Pennsylvania, it also had the paradoxical effect of iucreasing the 
secularization of provincial society. The Moravians had failed in their 
30Rothermund, Layman's Progress, P• 30. 
31 ~·• pp. 30-34, Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 119-123, 141. 
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missionary efforts because of their emphasis on ecumenical unity, 
and on the communal nature of religious experience. For most 
Pennsylvanians, however, the significance of the Great Awakening 
lay 1n the fact that it emphasized the importance of an individual 
religious experience. This, in turn, meant an emancipation of the 
individual from the judgment of authority and dogma. Denominations 
became voluntary societies for personal identification and salvation 
rather than institutions which gave direction and focus to the 
totality of life. The religious enthusiasm soon vanished but the 
32 
emphasis on individualism remained. The encouragement given to 
individualism in time gave rise to a spirit of secularization and 
participation in politics. The squabbles and controversies accompanying 
the Great Awakening had heightened disrespect for figures of religious 
authority and their political supporters. Individual judgment and 
enthusiasm gradually shifted from religion to politics. A secular, 
rather than a religious, commonwealth of individuals became the goal. 
Party politics developed an intensity in Pennsylvania, during the 
1750's and 1760's, which had not been seen before. As one historian has 
noted, "The new piety was patriotism." In the course of the thirty years 
between 1740 and 1770, the consciousness of Pennsylvanians had been 
transformed. The American Revolution would emerge as the secular heir 
32 
Rothermund, Layman's Progress, ~P~ 60, 116-117, 137, Lemon, 
Best Poor Man 1s Country, PPo 112-113Q Michael Kammen, Peop~ 
of Paradox: An Inquiry Concerning the Origins of American 
Civilization, New York, 1972, pp. 46, 83. 
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of the Great Awakening. 
29. 
The increasing secularization of Pennsylvania society in general 
made itself felt in Bethlehem. The long range effect of the Gree.t 
Awakening would be the transformation of Bethlehem from a religious 
community to a secular town. The change, however, would be gradual, 
for social change is neither continuous development nor mere 
mechanical response to the impact of events on people or institutions. 
Rather, it results from the reaction of individuals to changes in 
their environment, and the way they attempt to cope with them in terms 
of the conceptual, institutional, and social frameworks they a~e already 
familiar with. In Bethlehem change would come, but it would come 
34 
slowly; its pace would be gradual, but its effect would be total. 
The 1760's marked the start of Bethlehem's decline as a religious 
community. Despite their exclusiveness, the Moravians found themselves 
unable to resist the effects of being located in the midst of an 
individualistic society. With the decline of missionary activity 
came a decline in religious enthusiasm, and a corresponding rise in 
the spirit of secular individualism. This new spirit first made itself 
33william G. McLoughlin,'"The Role of Religion in the Revolution: 
Liberty of Conscience and Cultural Cohesion in the New Nation," 
in Stephen G. Kuntz and James H. Hutson, Eds., Essays on The 
American Revolution,(Norton Paperback Edition,)New York, c. 1973, 
p. 198, Rothermund, J•ayman' s Progres!, pp. 62, 137. 
34
seymour Mart1.n Lipset, "A Changing American Character?", in 
Seymour Martin Lipset and L. Lowentha, Eds., Culture and Social 
Character: The Work of David Riesman Reviewed, New York, c. 1961, 
p. 158, Robert A. Nisbet, Community and Power (Formerly The Quest 
for Community)(Galaxy Books Edition) New York, 1962, pp. 87-88. 
Lawrence A. Cremin, American ~ducation: The Colonial Experience; 
1607-1783, New York, c. 1970, p. 265. 
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felt in the economic area. The choir system of social and economic 
organization had made Bethlehem prosper. By the 1760's~ a growing 
number of the town's residents began to demand a share in that 
prosperity, not as members of a religious community, but as 
individuals. To permit the individnAls in a given enterprise to 
operate according to a profit system, they argued, would increase 
productivity and thus benefit everyone. By 1761, the clamor for a 
profit system had become so great that the church authorities, fear-
ful of the community's secession from the Unitas Fratrum, agreed to 
35 
the abolition of the General Economy in that year. 
Abolition of the General Economy did not mean the overnight 
transformation of Bethlehem into a aecular community. That trans-
formation would indeed take place, but it would take place within 
the framework of the institutions Bethlehem's residents were already 
familiar with. Thus, the end of the General Economy meant that 
many who had worked for the Church-owned enterprises, in return for 
their matezial needs, would now receive wages instead. Others were 
36 permitted to set themselves up as independent craftsmen. In all 
this, however, the ehurch still retained a say in the community's 
economic affairs. The businesses and industries given up by the Church 
were not sold, but leased to private individuals, and all land within 
the boundaries of the town continued to remain the property of the 
35Rothermund, Layman's Progress, p. 44, de Schweinitz, Financial 
History, p. 18. 
36 Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds, p. 202. 
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church. Under a perpetual lease system, the purchaser of a house as 
well as his heirs, had to respect the right of the owner of the land, 
the Church, to approve of all transactions involving such property. 
Moreover, no business could be started or expanded without official 
37 permission. In other words, the Church authorities attempted to 
maintain Bethlehem's character as a religious community by permitting 
private economic activity, but under strict communal supervision. They 
hoped that in this way the forces of secularism could be excluded from 
Bethlehem. In this they erred. 
The end of Bethlehem's General Economy also spelled the end for 
its choir system of social organization. Without a communal economy, 
it made little sense to maintain the social organization which 
accompanied it. In any case, married couples began to regard communal 
living as an encumbrance, and demanded the right to raise their own 
children. The Church authorities yielded to their requests, and, by 
the late 1760's, the construction of individua~ family housing had 
begun. By the time of the American Revolution, the married couples' 
38 
choir no longer retained any viability. The choirs for single men 
and women had degenera~ed to the status of boarding houses whose 
lodgers paid rent. The Single Brethrens' Choir and the Single Sisters' 
Choir went out of existence in 1817 and 1841 respectively. The Widows' 
and Widowers' Choirs remained in existence but as pension societies 
not as communes; an indication of the decline in the religious zeal of 
37Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 379-80. 
38Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds, pp. 96-98. 
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The American Revolution hastened the t~ansformation of Bethlehem 
into a secular community. In many respects, the Revolution had the 
appearance of a secular crusade: its adherents sought the creation 
40 
of an earthly commonwealth both republican and egalitarian. Aware 
of the Revolution's nature, and, aware too, of its possible deleterous 
effects on Bethlehem, the Moravian authorities sought to remain neutral, 
but this proved impossible. Rumors, news, refugees, and, eventually, 
armies arrived in Bethlehem, bringing with them ideas and attitudes 
inimical to the continued existence of an exclusive community. From 
December of 1776 to June of 1778, Bethlehem served as the General 
Hospital for the Continental Army. Try as they might, the Church 
authorities could not keep the world from Bethlehem's doors. More-
over, cut off from contact with the Church's headquarters in Europe, 
41 Bethlehem's residents grew more American and less Moravian. 
The resumption of peace did not mark a return to the conditions 
of Bethlehem's early days. On t.he contrary, the post-war years saw 
the decline already apparent before the Revolution continue at an 
accelerated pace, The authorities' policy of limiting the number of 
39Ibid,, p. 98. Augustus H, Leibert, "Historical and Statistical 
Matters Relating to the Widow's Society", Transactions of the 
Moravian Historical Society 0 Vol, X, 1917, pp. 41-104. 
4°Gordon s. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, Chapel 
Hill, 1969, pp. 53-57, 70-75. Bernard Bailyn, Pamphlets vf 
the American Revolution: 1750-1776, Vol. I, Cambridge, Mass., 
1965, PP• 190-202. 
4lyates, Bethlehem, pp. 97-121. 
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individuals who might engage in a particular trade created antagonisms. 
Many of Bethlehem's younger residents left the town in search of 
greater economic opportunity, and the bustling metropolis of Philadel-
phia lured many with the freedom it presented for an individual to 
choose his own destiny. Population also declined. In 1750 1 Bethlehem 
42 had supported 1,000 inhabitants; in 1800 there were only 543. Most 
serious of all, from the point of view of the Church 1 was the abatement 
of religious zeal. In the early days all had felt themselves to be a 
part of the missionary community. Everyone could feel that whatever 
activity he engaged in had a religious purpose; the craftsman or the 
agriculturalist saw himself as part of a band of heroic Christians 
laboring in the wilderness to spread the Word of God. Now, however, 
few inhabitants felt that the support of missionary activity was the 
direct and immediate concern of all Moravians. So much had religious 
zeal abated, that, in 1787, the Church authorities fo~nd it necessary 
to create a Society for Propagating the Gospel Among the Heathen to 
encourage laymen to support such matters. By the start of the 
nineteenth century, Bethlehem had deteriorated to the point where 
visitors would describe it as a "quaint church village". E'l.lthusiasm 
43 had become stagnation. 
If Bethlehem appeared to observers as an economic and social back-
water, American society at large did not, and the same forces which 
42Ibid. 1 p. 167 1 Gollin, "Secularization", P• 57. 
43yates, Bethlehem, P• 173. 
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operated on tbe larger national stage would eventually manifest them-
selves in Bethlehem. The first half of the nineteenth century has been 
labeled the "era of the common man" in American history. Accounts of 
this period have laid stress on its loudly proclaimed egalitarianism, 
44 
either to glorify it or to deny its reality. To argue w'a.tether or 
not American society had truly become egalitarian during the Jacksonian 
period is not the issue at hand. What is important to note here is 
that the vehemently proclaimed social equality marked the triumph of 
individualism. Individualism and equality are no~ identical, of 
course, but they are related in the sense that individualism cannot 
operate in a society in which inequality is considered a natural or a 
desirable state of affairs. The egalitarianism of the Jacksonian era 
did not necessarily reflect a belief that all men were equal, but it 
did reflect a belief that, given the absence of restrictions, the 
45 
superior individual would improve his lot in life. Moreover, in a 
secular society economic ach:l.evement became the most demonstrable 
indication of superiority. As a res~lt, the successful businessmen 
emerged as the most respectable members of society and thus. as its 
leaders. They had proven themselves to be above the common run of 
44tee Benson, "Middle Period Historiography: What is to be done?" 
in George A. Billias and Gerald N. Grob 0 Eds., American History: 
Retrospect and Prospect. New York, c. 1971, pp. 174-190, 
Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States 
in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Anchor Books EditionJ 
Garden City, N.Y., 1967, PP• 115-158. 
45Rowland BerChoff, An Unsettled People: Social Order and Disorder 
·in American History, New York, c. 1971, pp. 177-180. David J. 
Rothman, ]he Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder 
in the New Republic, Boston, 1971, pp. 58-71, 125-127. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3~. 
mankind. 
Major economic change accompanied the egalitarianism, social 
mobility, and political turmoil of the Jacksonian period. Between 
1800 and 1850, thE! outlines of a national economy began to emerge. 
Production of goods for market became a major factor in the economy, 
replacing the traditional household manufacture of goods for personal 
consumption. By mid-century 1 improvements in the technique, 
organization, and scale of production had culminated in the emergence 
of the factory system as the most efficient means of organizing labor 
and capital for production. Regional isolation decreased with the 
growth of a national transportation network based on turnpikes, 
canals, and later, railroads. Improved transportation facilities 
reduced the cost of moving goods over long distances, and this, in 
turn, stimulated the growth of manufacturing. The rise and spread of 
banks and other financial institutions likewise indicated a burgeoning 
economy. Indeed, the financial panic of 1837, and the depression which 
followed in its wake, which had resulted from speculation and unsound 
fiscal policies can be seen as a sign of the emergence of a national 
economy. Had a national economy not been in existence, the depression's 
46 
effects would never have been so widespread. 
The economic expansion of the first half of the ninet~enth cen-
tury drew Bethlehem out of its isolation and stagnation. The con-
struction of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company's canal along the 
46George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution: 1815-1860, 
(Harper Torchbook Edition), New York, 1968, pp. 38-42, 74-84, 
135-138, 215, 338-344. 
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Lehigh River brought Bethlehem into extensive contact with the outside 
world. 47 The canal reached Bethlehem in 1829, Local businessmen wel-
comed the canal, for they recognized the opportunities which it 
presented, Bethlehem, after all, was more in tune with the commercial 
and industrial revolutions of the period than its official policy of 
exclusion might indicate. The town had never depended heavily on 
agriculture for its existence, but, rather, on craft industries and 
trade. Indeed, from the start of its existence until the time the 
canal reac:1ed Bet~lehem, the community functioned as a regional 
manufacturing center. By no~, of course, most of the old Moravian 
industries were in the hands of local businessmen not those of the 
church. These businessmen recognized much more quickly than did the 
church authorities that prosperity for the town would depend on the 
48 
operation of outside forces, now more than ever before. Businessmen 
would be the specific agents of change in removing from Bethlehem the 
last vestiges of its exclusively Moravian character. 
Pressure from businessmen led church authorities to remove the 
restrictions which they had placed on economic activities. Aware that 
the Church did not have the resources to ensure the material well-
being of the community, the Moravian authorities agreed to the demands 
of the businessmen for a modification of the lease system. As a result, 
47w. Ross Yates, History of the Lehigh Valley Region, n.p. 1963, 
pp. 60-67. 
48 Yates, Bethlehem, p. 204, Levering, Bethlehem, p. 653. 
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tbe church began selling off businesses and industries which had 
previously been leased to individuals. Among the sales made in 1829 
and 1830, for example, were the tannery and the grist mill. The 
church authod.ties made such sales in the hope that the purchasers, 
all Moravians, would continue to act in a spirit beneficial to the 
community, for they were well aware of the destructive effects of an 
49 
unrestrained economic individualism. 
The fears of some of the church authorities about the dangers 
of economic individualism for Bethlehem soon appeared justified. 
The presence of the canal and the modification of the lease system 
encouraged most businessmen to expand their activities, and led some 
50 
to engage in speculations that soon proved unwise. The panic of 
1837, and the subsequent depression which lasted until 1844, found 
local businessmen over-extended. Some were forced to sell out, while 
others went bankrupt. To prevent several businesses from falling into 
the hands of non-Moravians through sheriff's sales, the Church found 
it necessary to purchase these enterprises from their owners. As a 
result, the church's indebtedness increased dramatically. The year 
1842 saw Bethlehem hit by a series of economic disasters which com-
pounded the problem. The tannery closed down, and the mercantile enter-
prises of Owen Rice, the town's most important businessman, failed. 
49 Yates, Bethlehem, p. 205, the question of restraining business-
men arises in Kammen, People of Paradox, p. 261, see also 
Rothman, Discovery of the Asylum, pp. 125-127. 
50 Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 648-650. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
·38. 
The Lehigh River's spring floods of that year destroyed Lewis Doster's 
woolen mills as well as other local enterprises. For the Church to 
continue its policy of rescuing its members frL~t business failures 
would mean the Church's financial ruine The Church simply did not 
have the wealth to subsidize local businesses during periods of 
51 
economic depression. As a result, local church authorities began 
to listen more favorably to the petitions of Bethlehem's residents 
for a total abolition of the lease system, and the opening up of the 
community to settlement by non-Moravians. 
The demands for the abandonment of exclusiveness were not new; 
they had been growing in intensity from the start of the nineteenth 
century. In all but name, Bethlehem had already developed into a 
secular community. By the 1840's, in fact, the Church authorities 
no longer controlled the town's political affairs. A democratic 
system of elections similar to that in purely secular communities 
had replaced Church Administrators in determining the course of non-
religious affairs. Elections were held every January by voters 
assembled in a congregation council. After 1819 they chose a secular 
administrator who, with the title of Burgomaster, combined the duties 
of street supervisor, chief of police and health supervisor. Along 
with the members of the tax board, and the Overseers of the Poor, the 
Burgomaster was elected annually, and like them, had to present the 
council with annual reports and explanations of their policies. These 
positions, along with those of a public school board which came into 
51Ibid., P• 677, de Schweinitz, Financial History, p. 25. 
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existence in 1836, were staffed primarily by businessmen, not church 
52 
leaders. Given this spirit of secularization, the abandonment of 
exclusivism became merely a matter of time. 
The fully developed spirit of secular individualism as well as 
the Church's financial difficulties ended the policy of religious 
exclusiveness for all time. A Church committee, formed in 1843 to 
study the Church's financial problems, unanimously recommended the 
abolition of the lease system, and, by implication, exclusiveness. 
When the leaders of the Moravian Church in Europe declared their 
unwillingness to advance the Bethlehem congregation money to maintain 
53 
the old system, the end was at hand. On January 11, 1844, the 
congregation voted to abolish the lease system, and the old church 
village was dissolved. On March 6, 1845, the governor of Pennsyl-
vania approved an Act of Assembly incorporating the Borough of 
Bethlehem. From now on, the Moravian congregation would no longer be 
identical with the town. Bethlehem was no longer "a company of heroic 
54 Christians and enthusiastic evangelists." 
In the course of a century, Bethlehem had undergone a trans-
formation in values. The original settlers had possessed an ethic not 
unlike that of the Puritans in 17th century New England. One's occupa-
tion was related to one's salvation. Hard work was a virtue, and to 
52Yates, Bethlehem, pp. 208-209. 
53 Levering, Bethlehem, p. 677. 
54Ibid., P• 678. 
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follow diligently at a-calling was a religious duty. In the early 
communal days, this ethi.c had been the major factor in Bethlehem's 
economic success. To the degree that Bethlehem ceased to function 
as an active missionary center, religious zeal declined, and a 
secular spirit arose. Gradually, the values of an individualistic 
society replaced the communal ethic formerly held by Bethlehem's 
inhabitants. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the achieve-
ment of economic success had ceased to function as a means to an end; 
it had become an end in itself. The Bethlehem of 1850 had ceased to 
be a Moravian communal settlement, it had become a secular town some 
of whose residents belonged to the Moravian Church. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE BOROUGH OF BETHLEHEM: 1850-1900 
Change came slowly to Bethlehem in the years after 1845, but come 
it did, and, by 1900, Bethlehem would no longer be a homogeneous, 
tightly-knit commun~ty, but a town reflecting the growing social 
complexities of a modern nation. To be sure, Bethlehem would be 
dominated for years by the Moravians, who were concerned lest 
Bethlehem be destroyed by an unrestrained industrial growth. They 
succeeded in preserving Bethlehem's aesthetic charms, and maintaining 
a peaceful residential character. Even after the arrival of non-
Moravians with their diverse needs and wants, Bethlehem remained a 
rather sedate community rather than developing into an industrial 
center. 
When Bethlehem became a borough in 1845, the influence of the 
Moravian Church did not disappear. Bethlehem's business and political 
leadership remained almost entirely in Moravian hands for several 
decades after the abolition of exclusivism. Between 1845 and 1879, 
for example, fifteen men filled the annually elected office of Chief 
Burgess, and all but one, who served a one-year term, belonged to the 
Moravian Congregation. During the same thirty-five year period, eight 
of these former Chief Burgesses were elected to seats on the borough 
council. Taken together, these eight served a t~tal of forty-seven 
41. 
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years as councilmen. With the exception of one Moravian minister, 
1 
all were businessmen. 
The citizens of Bethlehem who had voted for the abolition of 
exclusivism in 1844, held great hopes for the future of the new 
42. 
Bethlehem. They felt sure that secularization would bring prosperity 
to a community whose recent past had been marked by economic woes. 
At the same time, they likewise believed that the businessmen who had 
led the move for secularization would remember their responsibilities 
to the community as they carried out their affairs. This did not 
appear to be merely an idle dream, for, although the end of exclusive-
ness had marked the triumph of a spirit of individualism, this 
individualism had to find its expression within the context of a local 
culture influenced by a century of Moravian experience. Businessmen 
were expected to act like Moravian businessmen. In other words, the 
awareness of their Moravian heritage should temper the entrepreneurial 
2 
spirit of the town's economic leaders. Such expectations did not 
go totally unrealized, and Bethlehem found 1tself spared the worst 
ravages of industrialization. 
Although Bethlehem experienced a measure of prosperity in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, it never developed into a major 
Lw. Ross Yates, History of the Lehigh Valley Region, n.p., 1963, 
pp. 122-123, w. Ross Yates, Bethlehem of Pennsylvania: The First 
Hundred Years, Bethlehem, Pa., c. 1968, pp. 210-212, 215. For 
a list of Burgesses and councilmen of Bethlehem, see, Ordinances 
of Town Council of the Borough of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1896, 
PP• 169-186. 
2Yates, Lehigh Valley, p. 123. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43. 
industrial center. For the rest of the century it continued pretty 
much as a residential and commercial community. For the most part, 
this was due to choice. Both Church and community leaders preferred 
to retain the natural beauty of the town at the expense of attracting 
new industry. The Moravian Church, being the largest individual 
property owner in the borough, used its economic powers to thwart 
unrestricted expansion. In 1849, for example, the Church prevented 
the erection of several anthracite furnaces along the north shore of 
3 
the Lehigh River. Even among business leaders, many of the older 
traditions held strong sway. "Although," as one writer has noted, "at 
times, the influence of men who attach no value to any interests or 
activities beyond those covered by the word business, bore down hard 
on the town, there were always more people than in most Pennsylvania 
communities of like size who welcomed what the men of literature and 
4 
science, the musicians and the artists had to despense." Boosterism, 
so common to many similarly-sized towns of the period, was remarkable in 
Bethlehem mostly by its absence. 
If the inhabitants of Bethlehem had no desire to see the town 
subjected to unrestricted industrialization, they had no quarrel with 
manufacturing per !!• Indeed, Bethlehem had served the agricultural 
areas of the Lehigh Valley as a regional manufacturing center since its 
5 
establishment in the 1740's. The Bethlehem of the post-Moravian period 
3Ibid. 
-4 Joseph Mortim£r Levering, A History of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, 
1741-1892, Bethlehem, Pa., 1903, p. 708. 
5James T. Lemon, The Best Poor Man's Country: A Geographical History 
of Early ~outheastern Pennsylvania, Baltimore, c. 1972, p. 147. 
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continued to provide for the material needs of the town as well as 
the surrounding rural areas. Three flour mills, a tannery" a brass 
foundry, a distillery, a piano factory, a brewery, and three carriage 
tactories were to be found within the borough's limits in 1860, 
Technically outside the town's boundaries, but nevertheless part of 
the community's economic life, were a woolen mill, a barrel factory, 
a sawmill, an agricultural implements factory, and an iron foundry. 
Bethlehem also possessed a number of mercantile establishments both 
wholesale and retaii, The town thus enjoyed a modest, but very real, 
prosperity: a prosperity indicated by the existence of three banks. 
6 
all established before 1877, 
Bethlehem did no~ suffer economically from its failure to en-
courage extensive industrialization; in fact, it benefitted, The 
charms which the Moravians sought to preserve encouraged Bethlehem's 
7 
development as a summer resort during the second half of the century. 
To be sure, Bethlehem had attracted tourists ever since its foundation. 
Travellers, both famous and forgotten had visited Bethlehem through 
the years, and European travellers considered a visit to the Moravian 
community a "must." Moreover, a boarding school for girls, established 
in 1788, resulted in members of the country's elite f m .. llies coming to 
6M,S, Henry, History of the Lehigh Valley, Easton, Pa., 1860, pp. 
234-235, F. Ellis, History of Northampton County, Pennsylvania, 
Phila., 1877, pp. 203-204, H.T. Clauder, Clauder's Year-Book and 
Home Almanac for 1879, Bethlehem, Pa,, 1879, pp. 87-88, 
7 Yates, Lehigh Valley, p. 123, E, Gordon Alderfer, North~mpton 
Heritage: The Story of an American County, Easton, Pa,, 1953, 
p. 219. 
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Bethlehem, This, in turn, had made Bethlehem a summering place for 
8 . 
some ante-bellum southern gentry. However, in the post-Civil War 
period, Bethlehem saw the annual summer arrival of "hundreds of the 
9 best families of Philadelphia, Boston, and New York," They came 
each year to sample the quiet charms of Bethlehem, and spent their 
time in promenades along shady streets, visits to spots of local 
histvric interest, boat and canoe rides on the Lehigh River, and 
10 picnics in the local parks or on the river islands. Such sedate 
pleasures would have been inconceivable in a town which stressed the 
importance of industry and economic expansion, As late as 1890, a 
Guide to the Industry and Wealth of the Principal Points in North-
eastern Pennsylvania conaidered Bethlehem's most economically 
significant interest to be the business offices of Weston Dodson and 
Company, an anthracite mining firm whose nearest colleries were forty 
11 
miles away. 
8For examples of traveller's accounts see, Johann David Schoepf, 
Travels in the Confederation: 1783-1784, 2 vola. New York, 1968, 
Vol, I, pp. 134-135, 136-183, Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in 
North America in the Years, 1780 1 17811 and 1782, 2 Vola. Chapel 
Hill, c. 1963, Vol, II, pp. 520-528, For an account of life at 
the school for girls see, C,B. Mortimer, Bethlehem and Bethlehem 
School, New York, 1858, passim, For Bethlehem as an ante-bellum 
resort town see Charles B. Trego, A Geography of Pennsylvania, 
Phila., 1843, p. 307, John Hill Martin, Historical Sketch of 
Bethlehem in Pennsylvania, Phila., 1872, p. 73, and Anne Royall, 
Mrs. Royall 1s Pentlsylvania, or Travels continued in the United 
States; 2 Vola,, Washington, 1829, Vol, I, pp. 114-122. 
9Ellis, Northampton County, p. 203, 
lOibid., and also Clauder, Almanac, pp. 45-46, 54, 
llNew York, 1890, p. 121. 
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If Bethlehem's inhabitants looked askance at industrialization, 
they did not oppose innovations of ob·11ious benefit to the communit)l·. 
Thus, they welcomed the formation of a gas company whose lampr began 
illuminating streets and homes in 1854. Macadamized road surfaces 
made their appearance in 1884 with the purchase of a steam stone-
crusher by the borough. The following year saw the introduction of 
electric street lighting, and in 1890 Bethlehem acquired its own 
12 
telephone exchange. Withot't becoming an industrial center, 
Bethlehem was nevertheless quick to accept technological improve-
ments. In so doing it slowly but surely came under the influence 
of an emerging industrial culture. 
For several decades after becoming a secular borough, Bethlehem 
retain(1d much of the semblance of b(~ing a rather closely-knit 
community. For one thing, population growth, although respectable, 
was not excessive. In 1845, the population numbered 1,050, In 1890 
the federal census listed 6,762 inhabitants. Moreover, the population 
was relatively homogeneous. Only sixty-seven Negroes lived in the 
borough in 1890, and only 478 members of the white population were 
13 
foreign-born. In spite of this seeming homogeneity, Bethlehem had 
nevertheless, developed a population of varied interests. 
Ethnic diversity did not characterize Bethlehem in the years 
after secularization. On the contrary, people of German background 
12 Yates, Lehigh Valley, p. 123, Henry, ·Lehigh Valley, p. 234, 
Ellis, Northampton County, P• 203. 
13 Levering, Bethlehem, P• 680, Eleventh Census of the United 
States, Vol. IV, Washington, 1895, p. 479. 
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comprised the majority of the town's population for decades after 
1845. Bethlehem had been established by Germans, and Germans had also 
been the original settlers in that part of Pennsylvania. Until well 
into the twentieth century, German served a~ a primary language for 
many people in the area, and large numbers of people spoke it as a 
second. Many of the Moravians spoke German fluently, and German 
served as the language of ordinary discourse in Bethlehem for years 
after secularization. The use of Gerrean in Bethlehem was not limited 
to Moravians, however. Many of the people who settled in Bethlehem 
after 1845 likewise spoke German, but this did not necessarily con-
tribute to feelings of solidarity on the part of the old and new 
residents of the community. On the contrary, it led to an increaae 
in stratification, for the newcomers could be distinguished from the 
Moravians by their dialect. Because of the close ties the Moravians 
had maintained with their European co-religionists, they mostly 
spoke the continental variety of high German. On the other hand, the 
newcomers, and the local German dialect they spoke, have both been 
given the label Pennsylvania Dutch. Thus, rather than being united by 
use of a common language, the two groups were made aware of their 
differences. Moreover, most of the newer inhabitants of the town had 
just recently left the farm, and had brought with them the age-old 
14 
suspicion of rural peoples for town-dwellers. Only as English 
gradually replaced German as the most commonly heard language, did 
14yates, Lehigh Valley, pp. 101-102, 123-124. 
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antagonisms between the two groups melt away. By then, however, the 
original sense of community had suffered a degree of strain. 
The establishment of congregations by a variety of religious 
denominations marked the growth of an increasingly stratified local 
community. In American society, the various denominations have not 
drawn their membership from all social classes, but have generally 
reflected the outlook and status of particular groups within the 
15 
social hierarchy. In Bethlehem, the establishment of churches by 
non-Moravians indicated a growing diversity of interests among the 
town's inhabitants, and indicated the degree to which Bethlehem, in 
spite of its conservative character, had moved toward a greater 
acceptance of the values commo~ to the national society. 
The Pennsylvania Dutch were the first non-Moravians to settle 
in Bethlehem, and they brought with them a desire to establish their 
own Lutheran and Reformed congregations. Lutheran services were held 
in Bethlehem as early as 1849 in a rented hall known as the Armory. 
The congregation remained fairly small for a number of years and could 
not afford the construction of its own church building. As a result, 
. 
the Lutherans united with a Reformed congregation, which had likewise 
begun to hold services in Bethlehem, to build jointly and share what 
became known as Salem Church. The two congregations used the church 
on alternate Sundays until 1868, By that year, both the Salem 
Lutheran and Christ Reformed congregations had grown to the point 
where the same building could not serve both. They consequently 
15Page Smith, As a City Upon & Hill: The Town in American History, 
New York, 1966, pp. 3, 31-32, 33, 35, 74, 175, Seymour Martin 
Lipset, ~he First New Nation: The United States in Historical 
and Comparative Perspective, (Anchor Books Edition) Garden City, 
N,Y, 1967, P• 190, 
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separated, with the Lutheran congregation purchasing the Reformed 
16 Church's interest in the building. 
49. 
E~th congregations held services in German, but by the 1870's, 
a growing proport~on of the Lutheran congregation began to demand 
that English be used. Alternating the use of English and German 
satisfied no one, and in 1872 1 the English-language, Graue 
Evangelical Congregation, was formed out of Salem Lutheran. According 
to an 1877 account, only one other Lutheran church in Northampton 
County used English in its services, and that was in Easton, the 
county seat. Salem retained its use of German until the First World 
War. Other Lutheran Churches, established in following years, re-
tained German while others used English. Holy Trinity Lutheran, 
founded in 1887, maintained the use of German until 1901, but St. 
Stephen's Lutheran, which was established in 1895 1 held services 
in English. 17 
Christ Reformed Church also served as a parent organization for 
other congregations. Unlike the Lutherans, however, no split 
occurred between English and German-speaking members. Rath~r, the 
increase in the congregation's size required the creation of new 
churches. Christ Reformed held German services until 1894 when 
16 
17 
Levering, Bethlehem, and Edwin Frey, "History of the Protestant 
and Orthodox Churches of Bethlehem, Pa.", Bethlehem Globe-Times, 
August 26, 1967, p. 22. 
Ellis, Northampton County, pp. 207-208, Holy Trinity Lutheran 
Church; Bethlehem; ·pennstlvaniaj ·Golden Anniversary: '1887~937, 
Bethlehem, Pa., 1937 1 P• 5., Frey, "churches11 , p. 22. 
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English came into use on alternate Sundays. Three years later an 
English sermon preceded one in German. Its daughter organizations, 
First Reformed Church of South Bethlehem ~1867), St. Paul's (1888) 
Bethany (1897) and Zion (1898) likewise used German as the language 
18 
of their religious services. 
Another religious denomination which used German in its ser-
vices was the Evangelical Association. Its ministers held services 
in private homes beginning in 1848, and later in the Odd Fellow's 
Hall. Members of this denomination organized themselves into a 
congregation in 1854, and built a church sho·rtly thereafter. Circuit 
~ ........ 
min~.sters served the congregation until 1866, when it had become of 
sufficient size and stability to warrant its own pastor. This church 
too became a parent organization for other congregations: St. Luke's 
19 
in South Bethlehem (1885), Olivet (1889) and Emmanuel (1894). 
As in the case of the Protestant churches, the members of 
Bethlehem's first Roman Catholic congregation spoke German as their 
20 primary tongue. The congregation's early history also resembled 
that of other denominations, with services being first held in private 
homes and then, after 1856, in the congregation's own small church 
18Christ Evangelical and Reformed Church, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, 
1849-1949: One Hundredth Anniversary, Bethlehem, Pa., 1949, 
PP• 7-10. 
19Henry, ~ehigh Valley, p. 231, Emmanuel Evangelical Congregational 
Churcli.;. ·Bethlehem, Pa. , 1945, unpaginated. 
20william J. Heller, Historz of Northampton County, 3 Vola., New 
YOrk, 1920, Vol. I, P• 362. 
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building. The Church of the Nativity grew slowly, and did not have a 
resident pastor until 1871. The parish's growth did not continue, 
however, for most of the German speaking Catholics who came to the area 
tended to settle across the Lehigh River in the newly incorporated 
borough of South Bethlehem. In 1886, the church lost most of its 
membership with the creation of the Church of St. Bernard in that 
community. After this, Nativity became a mission church, as it had 
earlier, with Sunday services being performed by clergy from other 
parishes. In 1917, the building became the property of the newly-
21 
organized English-speaking congregation of Sts.Simon and Jude. 
The Roman Catholics were not the last German-language denomination 
to establish a church in Bethlehem. The Mennonites founded Ebenezer 
Bible Fellowship Church in 1884. Calvary Baptist Church was also a 
congregation which used German in its services. It came into exis-
tence at the rather late date of 1911. 22 
To be sure, Bethlehem did not remain a community inhabited 
exclusively by people speaking only German. Many of the newcomers 
knew only English, and, as time passed, that language tended to re-
place German as the primary means of communication. However, only 
four denominations which used English in their services from the 
beginning established themselves in Bethlehem before 1890: Methodists 
21~., PP• 381, 383, Stephen Daday, "Histo:ey of the Catholic 
Churches of Bethlehem, Pa,", Bethlehem Globe-Times, August 26, 
1967, P• 22, 
22Frey, "Churches," P• 18. 
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in 1854, Baptists in 1869, Episcopalians in 1872, and Pre·abyterians 
in 1876. Their presence indicated a growing diversity of interest 
and an increase in stratification.23 
Members of the various congregations were well aware that their 
churches represented specific status positions within the social 
hierarchy. The Methodsts were felt to be an essentially working-
class group, while the Episcopalians came from the upper rungs of 
the social ladder. A history of Bethlehem's First Presbyterian Church 
clearly shows this awareness of the relationship between rel~gion 
and social status. "It was believed," says the congregation's historian, 
"that there was an English speaking portion of the people, which is 
not reached by the German pastors. That there is a quiet and order-
loving portion which is not in sympathy with our excitable and 
demonstrative Methodist brethren. That the~e are those who are 
strongly averse to Ritualism, especially with high and dry tendencies 
wherever practiced." Nor, despite the "profound respect entertained 
for the Moravian Church," could many feel at ease as members of that 
body. 24 By a process of elimination, then, the Presbyterian Church 
of Bethlehem came into being in 1876. 
23see William King, History of Wesley Methodist Episcopal Church 
of Bethlehem, Pa., Bethlehem, Pa., 1902, p. 11, Severtty•Five 
Years of Trinity Church, Bethlehem, Pa., Bethlehem, Pa., n.d., 
unpaginated, James Robinson; Fiftieth Anniversary of the First 
Presbyterian Church in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania: 1875-1925, 
Bethlehem, Pa., n.d. p. 9, Frey, "churches," p. 25. 
24 Robinson, First Presbyterian Church, p. 8. 
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The presence of non-Moravian Church in Bethlehem meant the gradual 
erosion of the foundations on which the Moravians based their community 
leadership. New churches meant new social groups, with new interests 
and new needs to be met. The social institutions appropriate to a 
purely Moravian village could not serve the requirements of a 
heterogeneous, secular town. 
Political changes reflected changing social conditions. Before 
1880, all but one of Bethlehem's Chief Burgesses had been Moravians. 
After that date, election of a Moravian to that post would not be 
a foregone conclusion. Between 1880 and 1897, four men served as Chief 
Burgess, none of whom was a Moravian. George H. Meyers, a Lutheran, 
Reld office for seven years, and Jacob Kemmerer, a Presbyterian, served 
for six years. Paul Kempsmith, another Lutheran, and C.M. Dodson, an 
25 Episcopalian, each held office for two years. }1oravians would again 
be elected to this office, but only as representatives of one of 
several religious organizations, not as a matter of course. 
If the presence of a variety of non-Moravian churches marked the 
breakdown of community in Bethlehem, so did the presence of a large 
number of social and fraternal organizations. Such voluntary organiza-
25For dates of service of these men see Ordinances of Bethlehem, 
pp. 186-194, and Ordinances of Town Council: Borough of Bethlehem, 
~. Bethlehem, Pa., 1903, p. 194. For their religious 
affiliations see Portrait and Biographical Record of Lehigh, 
Northampton and Carbon Counties; ·pennsylvania, Chicago, 1894, 
pp. 156-157, John P. Chamberlin, One Hundred Years of Nativity, 
Bethlehem, Pa., 1963, pp. 35, 144-145, and Records of·salem 
Lutheran Church, Bethlehem, Pa., 1851-1919, typescri~t on 
deposit in the Bethlehem Public Library ,p. 204. 
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tiona attempted to provide a sense of community for their members. 
As such, they represented a desire to maintain elements of Gemeinschaft 
26 in a society already far along the path toward Gesellschaft, The 
creation of such fraternal lodges in Bethlehem reflects the growing 
integration of the borough into the industrialized national society. 
27 Twenty-three of these organizations existed in Bethlehem by 1892, 
An examination of the dates of their founding reveals the rate at 
which the sense of community disintegrated, Of the nineteen organiza-
tiona whose founding dates could be established, thirteen came into 
being after 1870; three in the 1870's, three in the 1880's and eight 
in the years between 1890 and 1892. By that point, a meaningful sense 
of community had clearly disappeared. On the other hand, despite the 
congregation's initial disapproval, an Odd-Fellow's lodge had been 
been established in Bethlehem as early as 1842; a clear indication 
28 that the process of erosion was already underway. The creation of 
of an American Mechanic's Lodge in 1848, a Masonic chapter in 1854, 
two more in the 1860's as well as a second Odd Fellow's lodge, and 
a Grand Army of the Republic post, point to both a lessening sense of 
26on this see, Rowland Berthoff, An Unsettled People: Social Order 
and Disorder in American History, New York, c, 1971, pp. 218-
232, 274, Robert A. Nisbet, Community and P~Ter (Formerly ~ 
Quest for Community) (Galaxy Books Edition), New York, 1962, 
P• 266, 
27Bethlehem Daily Times, Sesgui-Centennial Industrial Ed~tion, 
June 1892, pp. 13-14. 
28Levering, Bethlehem, p. 695, 
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community in Bethlehem and a decline of Moravian dominance. 
Between 1845 and 1900, Bethlehem gradually developed the social 
complexity of a town whose citizens partook fully of the life of a 
national society. By the start of the twentieth century, Bethlehem 
no longer belonged to the Moravians. The presence of a number of 
religious denominations indicated that the town's inhabitants had 
interests and needs which the Moravian Church could not tneet. On 
the other hand, the Moravians did manage to dominate local affairs 
for years after Bethlehem became a secular borough, and their desire 
to avoid excessive industrialization gave Bethlehem a commercial and 
residential character which the newer residents in the town continued 
to maintain. Thus while Bethlehem did acquire the aspects of 
Gesellschaft, such acquisition took place gradually, and the 
Bethlehem of 1890 had the enviable reputation of a modern community 
which etill retained the charms of an· earlier dey~ 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
SOUTH BETHLEHEM: ORIGINS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Located on the South bank of the Lehigh River opposite Bethlehem, 
South Bethlehem came into existence in the 1850's, and was formally 
incorporated as a borough in 1865. Unlike Bethlehem, South Bethlehem 
welcomed industrial development. Its growth as a prosperous industrial 
community mirrored the rise of the United States as an industrial 
nation and, indeed, contributed to the nation's prosperity. The 
construction of the Lehigh Valley Railroad in the 1850's made 
South Bethlehem a part of an increasingly integrated national 
economy. The railroad made it possible for South Bethlehem's indus-
tries to exploit local mineral resources such as iron and zinc and to 
sell their finished products in a national market. South Bethlehem 
never experienced the Gemeinshaft existertce of Bethlehem. From its 
birth, the town's economic life endowed it with the characteristics 
of Gesellschaft. 
Economic prosperity highlighted South Bethlehem's existence as 
an industrial community. Bethlehem, to be sure, shared in that 
prosperity. Its residents found employment in the industries across 
the river, invested in the iron and zinc companies located there, and 
sold merchandise to South Bethlehem's citizens. For all that, however, 
the two towns differed in spirit. Bethlehem remained a quiet 
56. 
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residential community, while South Bethlehem acquired all the 
characteristics of a "boom town." Prior to the creation of the city 
of Bethlehem out of the two boroughs in 1917, South Bethlehem was the 
larger of the two communities. As the location of the steel works, 
it served as the economic backbone of the area. 1 "There was a vitality 
here," a former resident has noted, "a basic industrial thrust, a 
2 
roaring go ahead, get ahead atmosphere of America on the move." 
South Bethlehem's economic prosperity had its origin in the 
proximity of the town to the anthracite coal fields of northeastern 
Pennsylvania. The valley of the Lehigh River gave direct access to 
the coal fields, a.nd it became the major route by which coal was 
3 transported from the mines to the markets of New York and Philadelphia. 
The construction of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Canal had brought 
about the doom of Moravian Bethlehem, while completion of the Lehigh 
Valley Railroad in 1855 ultimately resulted in the birth of South 
Bethlehem. 
Asa Packer, the moving spirit behind the Lehigh Valley railroad, 
was a child of his age. He devoted his life to an entrepreneurial 
career well suited to take maximum advantage of the economic oppor-
tunities available in the individualistic American society of the 
1Raymond Walters, Bethlehem Long Ago and Today, Bethlehem, Pa., 
1923, P• 63. 
2 Catherin.e Drinker Bowen, Family Portrait, Boston, c. 1970, p. 
21. 
3Felix R. Gerard, The Lehigh Valley Railroad: 1846-1946, New 
York, 1946, p. 18. 
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4 
nineteenth century. Born in Connecticut in 1805, Packer moved to 
Pennsylvania in 1822, and apprenticed himself to a cousin as a 
carpenter. By 1831, he had op~ned a. boa; yard, and engaged in the 
construction of canal boats used in hauling coal from the anthracite 
fields to Philadelphia. Successful at this, Packer expanded his 
activities by taking out large contracts for the construction of a 
series of dams and canal locks on the upper reaches of the Lehigh 
5 
River. Familiar by now with the economics of the anthracite industry, 
Packer acquired his own mining properties, and began shipping his own 
coal on his own boats. By the 1840's, he had become a wealthy man 
and a recognized leader in both the business and political life of 
Pennsylvania. After serving two terms in the state legislature, 
Packe.r secured the creation of Carbon County with the county seat 
being located at his home of Mauch Chunk. Upon the completion of his 
second term of office in the legislature, Packer received an appointment 
as a county judge in Mauch Chunk. He later served in Congress from 
1853 to 1857. His political position in Democratic Party politics 
in Pennsylvania became so secure that, at the Party's 1868 presidential 
convention, he received a favorite son nomination. Four years later, 
the Democrats chose him as their candidate for governor, but in this 
4For an understanding of the businessman in mid-nineteenth century 
America, see John E. Sawyer, "The Entrepreneur and the Social 
Orde:.r: France and the United States", in William Miller ed., ~ 
in Business: Essa s on the Historical Role of the Entre reneur, 
Harper Torchbooks Edition , New York, 1962, pp. 7-22. 
5 William J. Heller, History of Northampton County, 3 Vols., New 
York, 1920, Vol. II, PP• 4-5. 
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he was unsuccessful. 6 At the time of his death in 1879, Packer had 
7 the reputation of being one of Pennsylvania's wealthiest men. 
In 1846, the Pennsylvania legislature granted Packer and a group 
of associates a charter for a railroad. The proposed Delaware, Lehigh, 
Schuylkill, and Susquehanna Railroad would run from Phillipsburg, New 
Jersey, across the Delaware R1~er to Easton, from where it would run 
along the southern and western banks of the Lehigh to Mauch Chunk. 
At Mauch Chunk, a connection would be made with the Beaver Meadow 
Rnilroad which penetrated deeper into the coal region. Completion of 
this proposed line would open the coal fields to the markets of New 
York and Trenton via the Central Railroad of New Jersey and the Morris 
8 
canal. It would also permit the shipment of increased quantities of 
coal to Philadelphia, a market which had been opened by the construction 
of the Lehigh Canal in 1829.9 
Although chartered in 1846, the railroad company undertook no 
construction for the next five years largely because of internal 
10 dissension among its directors. Moreover, in spite of the potentially 
6Portrait and Biographical Record of Lehigh, Northampton, and 
Carbon Counties, Chicago, 1894, p. 154. 
7Heller, Northampton County, Vol. II, p. 5. 
8Gerard, Lehigh Valley Railroad, pp. 17-18, w. Ross Yates, History 
of the Lehigh Valley Region, n.p. 1963, p. 75. 
9 ~., PP• 63-64. 
10Milton c. Stuart, Asa Packer, '1805-1879: Captain of Industry, 
Educator, ·citizen, Princeton, N.Ja, 1938, pp. 17-18, Yates, 
Lehigh Valley, p. 64. 
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profitable future of the road, few inve&tors could be found. Finally, 
in 1851, Packer announced that he would build the road himself in 
return for $2,500,000, of which $1,500,000 would be in company stock 
11 
and the remaining $1,000,000 in 6 percent bonds on the first mortgage. 
Freed from the restrictions of his former associates, Packer 
initiated construction in 1851. In April 1855, the tracks of the re-
named Lehigh Valley Railr~ad reached a point opposite Bethlehem. 
By September, tracks had been laid to Mauch Chunk, 46 miles from their 
12 point of origin. 
In the years after 1855, the Lehigh Valley Railroad gre~or steadily. 
Within a relatively short time, the road was double-tracked. Moreover, 
since the company's success depended on carrying anthracite--seventy-
five percent of its income derived from the transportation of coal--
it soon branched into mining to insure itself a constant supply. In 
1889, for example, coal from its own colleries amounted to forty per-
cent of the tonnage shipped on the line. Through construction, and the 
acquisition of other railroads by purchase or lease, the Lehigh Valley 
had acquired slightly more than 1,800 miles of track by 1890. It had 
become a veritable empire: one could travel on Lehigh Valley tracks 
13 from Ne't-7 York City through Pennsylvania to Buffalo. 
The Lehigh Valley was not the only railroad to lay its track 
11Gerard, Lehigh Valley Railroad, p. 9. 
12 ~. p. 14, Joseph Mortimer Levering, A History of Bethlehem, 
Pennsylvania, 1741-1892, Bethlehem, Pa., 1903, pp. 721-722. 
13Yates, Lehigh Valley, pp. 76-77. 
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opposite Bethlehem. In 1852, the Pennsylvania legislature issued a 
charter of incorporation for the Philadelphia, Easton, and Wind Gap 
Railroad. The company, which changed its name to the North Pennsyl-
vania Railroad the following year, had its origin in the fears of 
Philadelphia businessmen for the continued prosperity of their city 
once the Lehigh Valley Railroad had linked the anthracite fields 
with New York City. The solution to their problems appeared to lay 
in the construction of a railroad of their own to connect Philadelphia 
with the coal fields. Work on the line started in 1852, and, by July 
of 1857, the North Pennsylvania had reached a junction with the Lehigh 
Valley at a point opposite Bethlehem. The hopes of the Philadelphi;· 
promoters had been thwarted: the completion of the Lehigh Valley 
Railroad eliminated the possibility of a direct link between Phila-
delphia and the antracite regions. The North Pennsylvania would 
henceforth be dependent on the Lehigh Valley for its connections to 
the mining areas of the north. Much of its future business would 
result from the transfer of shipments from the Lehigh Valley'~ lines 
14 to its own at the new junction. 
South Bethlehem came into existence at the point where the two 
railroads met. The activity which would take place at the junction 
made it a natural site for a town. As the terminus for the North 
14Jay V. Hare, History of the Nortlt Pennsylvania Railroad4 
Phila., 1944, pp. 1-10, Yates; ·LehiBh·Valley, PP• 82-83. 
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Pennsylvania line, South Bethlehem was the obvious location for an 
engine houseo The original structure built in 1857 had become in-
·adequate by 1870. In that year, a roundhouse with fifteen engine 
stalls and a tum-table replaced it. Although primarily an anthra-
cite railroad, the North Pennsylvania also served as the principal 
passenger link between the Lehigh Valley region and Philadelphia. By 
1879 seven daily trains ran each way between Philadelphia and South 
15 
Bethlehem. Moreover, since South Bethlehem acted as a transfer 
point between the two railroad lines, it stood in need of a depot. 
The two railroads had shared a depot since 1859, but by 1867 it no 
longer met the community's needs. A new union depot costing twenty-
16 
four thousand dollars replaced the older structure in that same year. 
The economic and social ramifications of these actions were obvious: 
they meant prosperity for South Bethlehem. They also meant that South 
Bethlehem's future would be determined by forces at work in the arena 
of national affairs to which it had been linked by the railroad. 
Railroads played a key role in the develop~ent of a national 
inductrial society. The integration of many separate railroad lines 
into a nation-wide transportation system linked the various sections 
of tbe country together. Railroads provided a cheap and efficient 
means of transporting goods of all kinds from one part of a continental-
15F. Ellis, History of North~ton County 1 Pennsylvania, Phila., 
1877, p. 211, Yates, Lehigh Valley, p. 84, H.T. Clauder, Clauder's 
Year-Book and Home Almanae for·l8~9, Bethlehem, Pa. 1879, pp. 
65-66, 85. 
16 
Ellis, Northampton County, p. 211. 
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sized country to another. Manufacturers increasingly produced goods 
for national, rather than local markets. Moreover, production for 
national markets had as its concomitant the creation of sources of 
supply far from the location of the original place of manufacture. 
In other words, the railroads encouraged the growth of an integrated 
17 
national economy, 
The railroads did more than just provide American society with 
a transportation system. They also provided a direct impetus ~o 
economic growth, The initial construction of railroads as well as 
their subsequent operation provided many Americans with jobs, More-
over, while railroads transported the products of American industry, 
they also created a demand for those products themselves, They 
consumed huge amounts of iron, steel, coal, and lumber, A large snd 
growing demand for rails, locomotives, and rolling stock aided the 
growth of the American iron and steel industry, Likewise, the 
management techniques developed by railroad companies to control their 
far-flung operations were eventually imitated by manufacturing con-
cerns whose activities had expanded as the railroad network had grown. 
l7This and the following paragraph are based on Alfred D. 
Chandler Jr., "The Beginning of 'Big Business' in American 
Industry", in The Business History Review, Vol. XXXIII, Spring, 
1959'; PP• 4-6, George R. Taylor and Irene D, Neu, The American 
Railroad Network, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, pp. 3-14, Edwartr\l;'e•-··· 4 
Kirkland, · Indust Comes· of A e: Busirtess · Laber and Public 
Policy, 1860•1899 Quadrangle Paperbacks Edition New York; 
1967, pp. 46-51, J6hn A. Garraty, The·New·commonwealth: 1877-
~, (Harper Torchbooks Edition) New York, 1968, PP• 102-104. 
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The stimulus which railroads gave to the nation's economic growth, 
tl1ey also gave to South Bethlehem. Indeed, even before the Lehigh 
Valley or North Pennsylvania railroads had established themselves 
physically in the community, they were responsible for increased local 
business activity. The knnwledge that railroads would locate on the 
south bank of the Lehigh River encouraged what would be a major South 
Bethlehem economic activity for decades: real estate speculation. 
Prior to 1847, four farms owned by the Moravian congregation of 
Bethlehem occupied the site of what later became South Bethlehem. 
In that year, Charles A. Luckenbach, Bethlehem's first Chief Burgess, 
procured an arrangement of sale for all but a few acres of this land 
from the church. The property was conveyed to him in April of 1848~ 
On the same day he acquired title to the properties, Luckenbach began 
selling off portions to various entrepreneurs, retaining only one, 
the largest, for himself. In 1852, he laid out his property in town 
18 lots, naming the result Augusta. The next year saw the construction 
of three large frame houses, the first dwellings in the future borough. 
In 1854, three other speculators, Charles and Ambrose Rauch and Charles 
Brodhead, added their adjoining ,roperties to the town plots of: 
Augusta. They renamed the town Wetherill, after John P. Wetherill, a 
prominent manufacturer of Philadelphia and father of a business 
associate of Brodhead's. The name Wetherill did not last long. The 
18J. Davia Brodhead, Historical Sketch of South Bethlehem, South 
Bethlehem, Pa., 1886, pp. 3-5. 
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growing settlement was variously referred to as "the southern addition 
to the Borough of Bethlehem", Bethlehem South, and, finally, upon its 
19 incorporation as a borough in 1865, as South Bethlehem. 
The prospect of railroad construction along the Lehigh River 
gave encouragement to other economic activities besides real estate 
speculation. South Bethlehem's first major industrial enterprise, a 
zinc works, became a reality with the arrival of the Lehigh Valley 
Railroad. A huge deposit of zinc ore, about eight miles long and two 
and a half miles wide, existed in the nearby Saucon Valley. The 
presence of the deposit had been known for years, but the identity of 
the ore had remained a mystery. In the early 1830's, Jacob Ueberroth, 
a farmer on whose property part of the deposit lay, thinking the 
mineral might be iron ore, took a wagon-load of it to a furnace in 
Berks County to be smelted. The effort proved a failure, and mining 
was forgotten for some years. In 1845, a Bethlehem mineralogist, 
William Tu Roepper, chanced upon samples of the ore, and correctly 
identified it as calamine, the hydro-silicate of zinc. For several 
years Roepper and Robert Earp of Philadelphia tried to produce a 
marketable zinc oxide. Failing at this, they sought to sell the righta 
which they had acquired to the deposit to the New Jersey Zinc Company, 
but the company's directors declined the offer. Samuel Wetherill, the 
company's superintendent, saw potential in the Saucon Valley deposit, 
19Ibid., p. 6, Ellis, ~orthampton County, p. 210, Levering, 
Bethlehem, PP• 720-726. 
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and personally purchased Earp and Roepper's rights. He had recently 
invented and patented a process to extract zinc oxide from its ore, 
and, in 1853, he set up two furnaces on a four acre lot purchased 
from Charles Luckenbach. Two years later, the state legislature 
granted a charter of incorporation for the new Pennsylvania and Lehigh 
20 Zinc Company which had a capital of one million dollars. 
The company had its ups and downs over the next f~w years, but 
it did succeed in turning out large quantities of various zinc products. 
For example, the company's furnaces produced the first zinc white manu-
factured in the United States. Renamed the Lehigh Zinc Company in 
1860, the corporation continued to expand its activities. Joseph 
Wharton of Philadelphia had replaced Wetherill as superintendent in 
1857. He contracted with a Belgian firm to construct furnaces for 
the production of metallic zinc, and several Belgian workmen and experts 
were brought in to supervise the work. In July of 1859, the company 
produced its first metallic zinc. The first sheet zinc was rolled in 
1865. 21 
The presence of the railroad in South Bethlehem made it advisable 
for the zinc company to locate its plant there rather than at the mine 
site four miles away. From South Bethlehem, the company's products 
could be shipped by rail almost anywhere in the country. The decision 
to locate the ~lant in South Bethlehem made it a boon for the town's 
20Yates, Lehigh Valley, pp. 71-72, Ellis, Northampton·county, PP• 
211-212, Guidebook of the Lehigh Valley·Railroad, Phila., 
1873, PP• 43-46. 
21Ellis, Northampton County, p. 212. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67. 
economy. The construction costs of the plant totaled $276,000, and, 
22 
by 1873, the company employed some 700 men at its works. For more 
than half a century, the zinc plant served as a mainstay of the local 
economy. In 1897, the works were taken over by the NeN' Jersey Zinc 
Company which ran them until 1911 when operations were discontinued 
and the site sold to the Bethlehem Steel Company. 
The railroads did more for South Bethlehem's economy than provide 
the community with transportation links; they also provided a market 
for the products of local industry. In the first years of operation, 
the Lehigh Valley Railroad had no rolling stock of its own, and had 
been obliged to rent it. To meet this need, the firm of Abbot and 
Cortright came into being in 1856. Setting up a foundry and machine 
shop, the company began to manufacture ore, gravel, and freight cars 
for the Lehigh Valley. The firm prospered and expanded its activities 
to include precision machine work. By 1907, the firm was employing 
some 300 skilled machinists who turned out high grade machine parts 
23 
and castings. 
South Bethlehem's most important enterprise, the Bethlehem Iron 
Company, also benefitted from the railroad. The discovery of iron 
ore deposits in the Saucon Valley in the 1850's created a stir in the 
area. The discovery itself was not particularly startling, for iron ore 
22 Guidebook of the Lehigh·Valley·Railroad, p. 43. 
23semi•Centennial: The·Borou h·of·south·Be~hlehem Souvenir Histor, 
South Bethleh m, Pa., 1915, pp. 62-63. · ·south'Bethlehem Globe, 
Mar. 30, 1907, p. 14. 
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deposits of various types--limonite, black magnetite and gray 
carbonate--had been known and mined in the area since the early 
24 
eighteenth century. However, the small iron furnaces scattered 
throughout the region had never been able fully to exploit these 
68. 
resources. The high cost of the charcoal used as fuel in smelting, 
as well as an inadequate transportation system, made all but small-
scale operations prohibitive. What made the difference in the dis-
covery of local iron ore deposits in the 1850's had to do with 
changes in technology. In the 1830's, anthracite coal came into use 
25 
as a fuel in the smelting of iron. Moreover, an expanding national 
transportation n~twork made it possible to move the products of the 
iron furnaces to markets some distances away. 
Construction of the Lehigh Valley Railroad presented local 
entrepreneurs the perfect opportunity to exploit the newly dis-
covered iron dep9sits, They realized that the railroads could bring 
coal from the anthracite fields to the furnaces as well as transport 
ores and limestone from nearby mines and quarries. Moreover, besides 
giving access to distant markets, the Lehigh Valley Railroad would 
also create its awn demand for iron. 26 
24walters, Bethlehem, p. 68, Yates, Lehigh Valley, pp. 67-69, 
25w. Ross Yates, "Discovery of the Process for Making Anthracite 
Iron", in Pennsylvania Masazine of·History and·Biography, Vol. 
XCVIII., April 1974, PP• 206-223. 
26R.D. Billinger, "Beginnings of Bethlehem Iron and Steel", type-
script on deposit in the Schwab Memorial Library, Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation, Bethlehem, Pa,, n.d,, p. 2. 
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Seeing in an iron furnace possibilities for the future expansion 
of South Bethlehem, Charles Brodhead, a speculator in local real 
estate, endeavored to have a government foundry established there. 
With the aid of his uncle, Richard Brodhead, Senator from Pennsylvania, 
he managed to convince the Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, of the 
desirability of such a project. Davis recommended to the Congress 
that a foundry be established, and a Senate committee reported 
favorably on the project. However, conflicts over the exact location 
of the proposed foundry prevented it from obtaining Congressional 
approval. Backers of the project thereupon abandoned their efforts 
27 to gain government support in favor of a privately financed project. 
In th~ meantime, a Bethlehem businessman, Augustus Wolle, had 
obtained possession of the ore deposit in the Saucon Valley, known 
as the Gangwere mine, and proposed erecting a furnace at the mine site. 
In 1857, in fact, he had secured a charter of incorporation for an 
organization called the Saucona Iron Company. This would have been 
a disaster for those businessmen such as Charles Brodhead who had 
invested heavily in South Bethlehem real estate. With his financial 
future at stake, Brodhead convinced Wolle to locate the proposed iron 
company across the river from Bethlehem and also to expand the 
company's activities to include the manufacture of a wide variety of 
iron products instead of just limiting its output to pig iron. Per-
suaded by Brodhead's arguments, Wolle had the company's charter amended 
27Levering, Bethlehem, p. 724. 
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in March of 1a59 to embody this expansion of activities. The company 
now became known as the Bethlehem Rolling Mills and Iron Company. 
Unfortunately, only a few subscribers to its initial stock issue could 
be found. Wolle, Brodhead, Charles and Ambrose Rauch, and Charles B. 
Daniels 0 all Bethlehem mett 1 and, all but Daniels, speculators in 
South Bethlehem real estate, were the first subscribers. With the 
exception of the Moravian Congregation, few additional investors 
could be found to put their money into the new company because of 
2a 
the financial crisis which gripped the country at the time. 
The company's fortunes improved with the decision to hire John 
Fritz as superintendent of the proposed works in 1a60. The thirty-
eight year old Fritz had already acquired a national reputation as an 
iron-master of note when he left his post as superintendP.nt of the 
Cambria Iron Works at Johnstown for South Bethlehem. His decision 
to take the job with the new firm caught the attention of potential 
investors such as Joseph Wharton of Philadelphia, and this enabled 
the company to proceed with its plans. The confidence which Fritz 
inspired was not misplaced. During the next thirty-five years, 
Fritz served as the company's chief engineer and general superintendent, 
and, in the process, achieved an international reputation as a steel-
maker of genius. 29 
2aArundel Cotter, The Story of Bethlehem Steel, New York, 1916, 
P• a, Levering, ·Bethlehem, PP• 724-725. 
29walters, Bethlehem, P• 6a, Heller, Northampton County, Vol. II, 
P• a, Peter Temin, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth Century America: 
An Economic Inguiry, Cambridge, Mass., c. 1964, pp. 104-106, 133. 
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Revived by the appointment of Fritz, the company elected its 
first board of directors in June of 1860, and the board, in turn, 
appointed the firm's officers. Asa Packer was among the company's 
first directors, an indication of the important role which the Lehigh 
Valley Railroad would play in the company's future. Robert Sayre, 
a Packer protege, and, like him, an official of the Lehigh Valley 
Railroad, later replaced Packer on the board. The directors named 
Alfred Hunt of Philadelphia as president, but the real heart and 
brains of the company was John Fritz. Fritz designed the plant, 
supervised its erection, and, for years to come, would personally 
direct all the various branches of its operations.30 
Ground-breaking ceremonies for the renamed Bethlehem Iron 
Company took place in 1861, but progress came only slowly at first. 
The outbreak of the Civil War created difficulties which delayed 
completion of the first blast furnace until January of 1863. The 
first rolling mill did not go into operation until the summer of 
1863. The first iron was puddled that July, and the company pro-
duced its first commercial product, iron rails, for the Lehigh Valley 
Railroad in September. 
For the rest of the century, the history of the Bethlehem Iron 
Company involved technological improvements and the consequent 
expansion of its markets. A machine shop began operations in 1865, 
and a second furnace came into service in 1867. 1868 saw the erection 
30Bethlehem Daily Times Sesqui-Centennial Industrial Edition, 
June 1892, p. 26. Heller; ·Notthampton·county, p. 8. 
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of a foundry. That same year the company acquired the properties of 
the Northampton Iron Company, located a short distance to the south-
east of the Bethlehem works, and a third furnace thus became part of 
the plant. Construction of a Bessemer plant began in 1868, and in 
31 October of 1873, the Company produced its first heat of steel. 
The completion of a Bessemer plant indicates the close ties 
between the Bethlehem Iron Company and the Lehigh Valley Railroad. 
Railroads had long used iron rails for their tracks, but iron had its 
drawbacks. For one thing, it wore out. The average iron rail had a 
useful life of only about four years. Replacement of worn-out rails 
caused frustration and delays as well as high maintenance costs for 
the railroads. Steel rails were superior, but, before the intra-
duction of the Bessemer process, steel could not be produced in the 
quantities required to replace iron rails with steel ones. This 
process, invented by an Englishman, Henry Bessemer in 1859, resulted 
32 in the sale of English-made steel rails to American railroads. 
The Lehigh Valley Railroad began experimenting with steel rails as 
early as 1865, The railroad's directors rapidly became convinced of 
the superiority of steel over iron rails, and persuaded the Bethlehem 
Iron Company to include a Bessemer plant in its works. Assured of a 
31Levering, Bethlehem, p. 725, Billinger, "Iron and Steel," p. 5. 
Cotter, Bethlehem Steel, pp. 3-4. 
32Temin, Iron·and Steel, pp. 44-50, 222, Burton J. Hendrick, The 
Life of Andre~ Carnegie, 2 Vols. Garden City, N.Y., 1932, vQI7 I, 
pp. 184-186. Joseph F. Wall; Andre~ Carnegie, New York, 1970, 
PP• 234, 262-264, 
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market for its products, the company built a Bessemer plant and began 
turning out steel rai.ls for sale to the Lehigh Vnlley Railroad in 
October of 1873. This made Bethlehem one of the first companies in 
the United States to use the Beosemer process. By 1885, the Bethlehem 
Iron Company was reputed to be one of the largest producers of steel 
33 
rails in the country. 
Prior to 1885, the Iron Company's output consisted principally 
of such products as rails and pig-iron billets, much to the dismay of 
John Fritz. He had urged the company's directors to include structural 
steel as one of its specialties, but was unsuccessful. In his auto-
biography Fritz criticized the conservative directors for letting too 
many opportunities pass by. "I could plainly see the end of the Acid 
Bessemer, everywhere," he wrote, "and especially with us, as the 
company had let every ore property that was available and suitable for 
the Bessemer process pass beyond their control, and the end was in 
34 
sight." To forestall.the doom he saw coming for the company, Fritz 
o·nce again pushed for expansion, and campaigned for an armor plate 
35 
plant. This time he succeeded. 
Fritz brought pressure to bear on the directors for an armor plate 
and otdnance works because of an increasing interest shown by the 
33Yates, Lehigh Valley, p. 76, Cotter, Bethlehem Steel, p. 4, 
Temin, Iron artd'Steel, pp. 132-136, 174, Brodhead; South 
Bethlehem, p. 7, Wall, Carnegie, p. 313. 
34John Fritz, the Autobiography·of John Fritz, New York, 1912, 
PP• 174-175, the quotation is on page 184. 
35Ibid., PP• 182-188. 
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Federal government in the domestic manufacture of such products. The 
government hoped to free itself from its reliance upon foreign steel 
makers. In 1884, members of the u.s. Gun Foundry Board visited the 
Bethlehem plant as part of a tour to examine the capacities of 
American steel mills for ordnance ~ork. However, the company's 
directors remained unwilling to accept Fritz's proposals until 1886 
when William c. Whitney, the Secretary of the Navy, persuaded them 
36 
of the government's need for armor plate. 
Having con~itted itself to the creation of an armor plate works, 
the company expanded its facilities also to include a plant for the 
manufacture of heavy forgings and castings. Between 1888 and 1891, 
the Bethlehem Iron Company erected the first armor plate plant in the 
United States. The cost of constructing open•·hearth furnaces and 
various other facilities required major expenditures by the company, 
and in 1889, the capital stock of the Bethlehem Iron Company increased 
from two million to three million dollars. 37 
After 1387, when the company received a four and a half million 
dollar contract f~om the government, Bethlehem devoted itself almost 
ex,-:lusively to military work. By 1892, it bad· obtained over eleven 
million dollars in government contractso Placing an increased emphasis 
on the manufacture of guns and other high-grade forgings, the company 
36Bethlehem Times, Nov. 13, 1884, p. 1, Cotter, Bethlehem Steel, 
PP• 4-5. 
37Billinger, "Iron and Steel", p. 13. 
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38 
abandoned its Bessemer works and rail mills in the 1890's. In the 
depression of the 1890's, the company's reliance on government con-
tracts helped it to survive the crisis, and the military requirements 
of the Spanish-American War helped it to prosper. During this same 
period, the Bethlehem Iron Company produced the first high-speed 
tool steel to be made in the United States, a product of such superior 
quality as to astonish European competitors. In 1899, the company 
was reorganized as the Bethlehem Steel Company with a capital of 
39 $7,500,000. 
The residents of South Bethlehem observed the fortunes of the 
Bethlehem Iron Company with undisguised interest, for their livelihoods 
and the town's future depended upon the company. As the company's 
activities expanded, the town grew. The immediate effect of the 
company's presence in South Bethlehem, of course, was that it gave 
employment to the town's residents. In 1873, some 700 men were em-
ployed in the plant. By 1885, the number had risen to 3,000. In-
eluding the families of employees, some 7,000 people depended directly 
upon the company at that point. By 1910, the company employed slightly 
more than 9,000 men. 40 
38Bethlehem Times, April 15, 1887, p. 1, Bethlehem Times Industrial 
Edition p. 26, Souvenir History, p. 60. 
39 Yates, Lehigh Valley, p. 136, Frank B. Copley, Frederick w. 
Taylor: Father of Scientific Management, 2 Vola. New York, 1923, 
Vol. II, p. 118, Cotter; ·nethlehem·steel, p. s. 
40Guidebook of the Lehigh Valley Railroad, p. 42. Brodhead, South 
Bethlehem, p. 7, u.s. Bureau of Labor; Report on the Strike at 
the Bethlehem·steel Works, Washington, 1910, p. 10. 
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The fortunes of the Iron Company affected others be~lcle those 
residents directly employed by it. The merchants, professionals, and 
all those whose livelihoods depended on providing goods and services 
for South Bethlehem's residents likewise prospered or suffered in 
direct relation to the ups and downs of the iron and steel trade. 
With a monthly payroll of $110 1 000 in 1885, the company had a major 
impact on the business community. In good times payday meant a boom 
for the merchants, in hard times possible bankruptcy. For the workers, 
hard times meant less work and either a reduced income or none at 
all. '•l 
South Bethlehem's first major economic activity had been real 
estate speculation. Both real estate speculation and housing con-
struction continued to play major roles in the town's economy for 
decades. As the company expanded its activities, and, as more people 
were employed there, the borough's housing needs grew in proportion. 
The building of houses for company employees provided employment for 
many from the late 1850's onward. In the 1880's, for example, J. 
Stewart Allam, a local contractor, found his business so increased 
that he had to establish his own planing mill. He employed over 300 
men,of whom 200 were carpenters. The announcement of the Bethlehem 
Iron Company's decision to manufacture armor plate under contract to 
the Federal government set off an orgy of speculation. Many came to 
41Broadhead, South·Bethlehem, p. 7, ·Bethlehem·Times, Nov. 18, 1884, 
p. 1, May 5, 1887, Dec. 1, 1884, p. 1; ·south·Bethlehem Globe, 
Feb. 27, 1897, P• 1. 
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South Bethlehem to purchase real estate or to establish businesses 
in anticipation of a boom. In the early 1890's, a local lawyer and 
politician, J. Davis Brodhead, purchased several farres to the east 
of the borough and laid them out in lots. By 1901, these former 
farms had become the borough of Northampton Heights, a suburb of 
42 
South Bethlehem. 
The construction and real estate businesses in South Bethlehem 
remained in a seller's market from the early days of the borough 
through the First World lvar. A shortage of housing and consequent 
43 
high rents prevailed throughout this period. Indeed, during the 
First World War the Bethlehem Steel Company found it necessary to 
resort to public meetings and publicity campaigns encouraging 
property owners to rent their houses and spare rooms to company 
employees. Unable to secure sufficient housing for its workers, the 
company persuaded the Fede~al government to step in and launch a 
massive building campaig~, an ironic development in view of the com-
pany's often-expressed hostility to government interference in 
44 
private enterprise. 
Building and loan associations reflected South Bethlehem's 
42 Harvey F. Trumbore, "Reverier of an Old Timer", Bethlehem 
43 
Globe-Times, July 13, 1945, p. 6, Bethlehem Times, May S, 
1887, P• 1, Feb. 23, 1892, P• 4. 
Frank Koester, City Planning Report for·the'City'Planning 
Commission (mimeograph), New York, 1919, p. 67; ·Bethlehem 
Times, Jan. 24, 1884. 
44 South Bethlehem Globe, Nov. 10, 1917, p. 1, Report on the 
Abandonment of the Bethlehem Project, Feb. 10, 1919, p. 2, 
in Record Group 3, Records of the United States Housing 
Corporation, National Archives. 
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prosperity and accompanied its real estate boom. The high rents 
which prevailed in South Bethlehem encouraged people to buy their 
own homes. Moreover, home ownership was considered a sure sign of 
respectability for both the American-born working man as well as 
his immigrant counterpart. The real estate developers and building 
contractors knew this, and launched several of these savings 
associations. To be sure, the developers sought to improve their 
own finances by dcing so, but they also felt that, by helping the 
workingman to attain the status of a property owner, they were 
improving the community itself. By 1915, South Bethlehem had five 
building and loan associations, a point of pride to community 
leaders. The building and loan associations made it possible for 
·---
many of those who had been lured to South Bethlehem by its prosperity 
to have a share in it. 45 
By 1900, South Bethlehem had become a thriving and prosperous 
town. Asa Packer's Lehigh Valley Railroad had created an indus-
trial community where only farms had existed before. The railroads 
had made it possible to exploit the natural resources of the Lehigh 
Valley, and had bound South Bethlehem to the rest of the nation with 
ties of iron and steel. South Bethlehem's growth and development 
45caroline w. Manning, The Immigrant Woman and Her Job , in 
Bulletin of the Woman 1s Bureau, No. 74, Washington, 1930, p. 
54, Souvenir History, P• 58. Ellis, Northampton County, P• 
213. For a discussion of building and loan associations in 
nineteenth century America see, Stephen Thernstrom, Pove~y 
and Pro ress: Social Mobilit in a·Nirteteenth Centur Cit, 
Atheneum Edition) New York, 1969, pp. 116-125, 127. 
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had not been an isolated series of events, but were an integral part 
of the nation's emergence as an industrial society. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE POPULATION OF SOUTH BETHLEHEM 
Population growth accompanied South Bethlehem's economic 
development. By 1910, the town had nearly 20,000 inhabitants. They 
were a diverse lot: some had come from villages in Eastern Europe or 
along the shores of the Mediterranean, while others had journeyed but 
a short distance from nearby farms. The result was a socially compleJt, 
heterogeneous town. South Bethlehem did not become a melting pot. 
On the contrary, the narrow confines of the town contained a number 
of distinct ethnic communities each with its own traditions, values, 
and institutions. In short, as South Bethlehem became an industrial 
town, it also acquired many of the social characteristics of much 
larger metropolitan centers. The processes of industrialization, 
immigration, and urbanization, so obviously present on the national 
scene, also had their manifestations in the much smaller arena of 
South Bethlehem. 
Local topographical conditions imposed strict limits on South 
Bethlehem's potential for growth. The railroad junction, and the 
industrial plants which gave life to the community, had all been 
located on a narrow flood plain of the Lehigh River. This flood plain 
extended south of the river for only a few hundred yards before it met 
the lower slopes of South Mountain, a northern extension of Virginia's 
so. 
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Blue Ridge, which paralleled the river at this point. Since the town's 
industrial establishments occupied most of the available level areas, 
South Bethlehem's residential areas developed on the lower slopes of 
the mountain. At the point of its greatest development, South 
Bethlehem thus covered an area only little over a mile in length and 
only about a quarter of that in width. Within the compass of these 
narrow limits, thousands of people from a wide variety of ethnic and 
1 
religious backgrounds lived and worked. 
South Bethlehem grew rapidly. In 1861, the fledgling community 
had but 947 residents. In 1870, the number had risen to 3,556. By 
1910, South Bethlehem's population had gro~~ to 19,973. A major part 
of this population growth resulted from the arrival of immigrants in 
the borough. In 1870, for example, 1,106 of the town's 3,556 residents 
had been born abroad. The census of 1890 similarly revealed 2,694 
immigrants among South Bethlehem's 10,302 inhabitants. By 1910, the 
foreign community of South Bethlehem, made up of immigrants and their 
American-born children, comprised two-thirds of the borough's 
population or 13,841 out of 19,973. By contrast, a similar segment 
of Bethlehem's population comprised only one-sixth of the total, or 
2,238 out of 12,837.2 In 1917, representatives of some 64 different 
1 Delos F. Wilcox, Report on the Transit Prob~~m of Bethlehem, Pa. 1 
and Vicinity, (mimeograph) Bethlehem, Pa., 1918, pp. 20-23. 
2Joseph Mortimer Levering, A History of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania: 
1741-1892, Bethlehem, Pa., 1903; ·Nirtth'Certsus·~f'the United States, 
Vol. I, Washington, 1872, p. 253, ·Eleventh'Census ·of the United 
States, Vol. IV, Washington, 1895, p. 455, Thirteenth Census of 
the United States, Vol. III, Washington, 1913, pp. 590, 593. 
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ethnic groups were reported to be living in South Bethlehem. As a 
municipal official later noted, this was indeed a community to which 
3 the word polyglot aptly applied. 
South Bethlehem's economic development, rapid population growth, 
and ethnic diversity made it a town which differed in spirit from 
Bethlehem. South Bethlehem's rampant growth made it typical of what 
Page Smith has called a "cumulative" town. That is, it did t~ot come 
into existence as the result of careful planning by an organized group. 
On the contrary, South Bethlehem blossomed and grew as a result of many 
individual decisions made by people from a wide variety of backgrounds. 
They all came to South Bethlehem in search of economic opportunity, and 
only similar economic motives united them. Chance and the common desire 
to achieve a degree of financial success alone gave this random 
4 
conglomeration of people the semblance of a community. Indeed,to 
Catherine Drinker Bowen, who lived in South Bethlehem during this period, 
the town had the aspect of "another place and another planet, a Wild 
West of its own."5 In a town whose inhabitants could be unkindly 
6 
character:l.zed as "border ruffians", social integration was at a minimum. 
3Archibald Johnston, Message of Archibald Johnsto~, Mayor of the 
City of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1919, p. 27. 
4For general discussion of this process, see, Page Smith, ~ 
City Upon a Hill: The Town in American History, New York, 1966, 
p. 107, Rowland Berthoff, An'Unsettled·People: ·social Order and 
Disorder in American History, New York, c. 1971, p. 225. 
5catherine Drinker Bowen, Family·Portrait, Boston, c. 1970, p. 21. 
6The quotation is from~., p. 25, see also Smith; City·Upon a 
Hill, pp. 32-35. 
-
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South Bethlehem, in other words, fitted Ferdinand Tennies' concept 
of Gesellschaft, 
Little beyond the political institutions of the borough existed 
to give South Bethlehem's residents a sense of membership in a 
community. However, in an age which valued individualism so highly, 
little power had been placed in the hands of governmental authorities. 
This held true for all levels of government, from the national down 
7 
to the municipal, State laws limited the power of borough governments 
to such activities as laying out and maintaining streets, regulating 
markets, preventing animals from running at large, keeping the peace, 
regulating sewers and cesspools, and providing fire protection. To 
create a sense of community in a time when economic success had 
greater value in most men's eyes, was the task of the people who 
settled in the town. Some would seek to achieve this goal and attempt 
to create those institutions which would provide a sense of security 
and order, but, others, their eye on the main chance, would not. 
The diverse ethnic origins of South Bethlehem's residents made 
for a minimum of social integration. Distinctions between ethnic 
groups stratified the town's population much more rigidly than did 
class differences. Indeed, in a very real sense, ethnic groups were 
7For some contemporary observations on this see, James Bryce, 
The American Commonwealth, 2 Vol. (Capricorn Books Edition) 
New York, 1954, Vol, I, PP• 27-34, Vol, II, PP• 359-367, John 
A, Garraty, 'The·New·commonwealth'l877•1890, (Harper Torchbooks 
Edition) New York, c, 1968, pp. 226-258, Sam Bass Warner, Jr., 
The Private City: 'Philadelphia'in·Three·stages of'Its Growth, 
Phila,, c, 1968, PP• 61-62, 99-123, 152-157, 
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themselves social classes. Each group maintained their traditional 
beliefs, values, and behavior patterns and created their own 
religious and social institutions. Life was lived within the frame-
work of an ethnic community, and the members of one group usually 
remained indifferent to, if not ignorant of others. Thus while some 
people attained positions of wealth and leadership within their own 
community, their status did not necessarily cross ethnic boundaries. 
John Gosztonyi, and Anthony Costelucci, for example, might be recognized 
as wealthy and respected leaders of the Slovak and Italian communities, 
but this did not gain them entry into the upper social class of South 
Bethlehem. Psychologically, there were thus many South Bethlehems in 
existence at the same time, and the boundaries of one did not often 
8 
coincide with the boundaries of another. 
Many of the early inhabitants of South Bethlehem had German 
backgrounds. Some came as immigrants from Germany and Austria, while 
others, speaking Pennsylvania Dutch, had been born in the Lehigh 
Valley. A few German-speaking Moravians moved to the south side of 
the Lehigh River from Bethlehem. 
8south Bethlehem Globe, May 29, 1904, p. 1, April 12, 1905, p. 1, 
May 1, 1905, Po 1, May 22, 1905, P• 7, Mar. 29, 1907, P• 1, 
William J. Heller, History of Northam!ton County, 3 Vola., New 
York, 1920, Vol. IIi:, pp. 521-522, 61 -617, Rowland Berthoff, 
"The Social Order of the Anthracite Region, 1825-1902", 
Pennsylvania Magazine of·Histo:l and'Biography, Vol. LXXIX, 
July 1965, 274-275, Ferdinand Tonnies; ·community and Society 
(Gemeinschaft·und·Gesellsehaft)Charles P. Loomis Ed., (Harper 
Torchbooks Edition), New York, 1963, p. 47, Colin Bell and 
Howard Newby, Community·Studies: ·An·Introduetion·to the·study 
of the Local Community, New York, 1962, p. 62. 
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Moravians never exercised the same influence in South Bethlehem 
that they did in the older town across the river. Their numbers 
remained small, for most of their co-religionists had little interest 
in the affairs of South Bethlehem, and preferred to remain in 
Bethlehem, Neverthelesa 0 a small contingent of Moravians did settle 
in South Bethlehem, and they provided the town with its first 
institutional religious services. Beginning in the summer of 1859, 
Moraviana living in South Bethlehem held religious services in 
private homes. In 1861, some sixty Moravians petitioned their 
Church's Home Mission Society for authorization to establish a 
congregation in South Bethlehem. A regular congregation was organized 
on Christmas Day 1862, and construction of a church building begun the 
following year. However, financial difficulties delayed completion 
of the structure, and the congregation sold the unfinished building 
to the newly organized Lehigh University in 1866. The congregation 
then began work on a second church building which they consecrated 
in 1868.9 
South Bethlehem's Moravian congregation held its services in 
German. This did not please everyone, and a second, English-
speaking congregation of twenty members, came into being in 1868. 
This second Moravian congregation did not remain in existence for very 
long. When its pastor transferred his allegiance to the Presbyterian 
Church, so did most of his flock. They organized a Presbyterian 
9Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 731-732. 
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congregation in 1869, and completed construction of a church building 
by 1872.10 
The establishment of Luther.an and Reformed churches in So11th 
Bethlehem indicated the presence of the Pennsylvania Dutch in the 
borough. A Lutheran congregation, St. Peter's, came into being in 
1863, and, within a year, it had built itu own church. The congrega-
tion grew rapidly. On January 1, 1870 alone, it admitted 72 new 
communicants to membership, Moreover, as St. Peter's grew in size, 
it grew in importance as well, By the 1870's, its minister had 
taken on the ~astoral duties of churches in nearby Freemansburg and 
Lower Saucon Township. 11 The Lutherans of St. Peter's also assisted 
in the establishment of the First Reformed Church of South Bethlehem. 
Founded in 1867, the Reformed congregation did not complete its own 
church building until 1872, and it had the use of St. Peter's for 
services until then, 
Most of South Bethlehem's Pennsylvania Dutch residents clung 
tenaciously to their ethnic identity. Thus, German remained the 
language used in St. Peter's religious services until 1919, Only at 
that point did the congregation's members assent to alternate the use 
of German with English in Sunday Services. The Church did not finally 
abolish German language services until 1938, Lutherans desiring to 
attend services in English sought membership at St. Mark's Church, a 
10James Robinson, Fiftieth'Anni~ersary·of·the'First·Presbyterian 
Church in Bethlehem; ·pennsylvania: '1875•1925, Bethlehem, Pa,, 
n,d,, P• 9, 
11 St. Peter's First 100 Years, Bethlehem, Pa,, n.d., pp. 10, 15, 
19' so. 
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congregation formed :i.n 1888. 
87. 
The Pennsylvp·:da Dutch were not South Bethlehem's only German-
speaking residents. Immigrants from Germany and Austria also settled 
in the borough. Although German immigrants began to arrive in the 
town in the 1860's, ne~1rly two decades earlier than the Austrians, 
the Austrians eventually outnumbered them. In 1920, for example, 
the town claimed 584 residents of German birth compared with 1,351 
13 
born in Austria. 
Immigrants from Germany neve·r formed a self-conscious ethnic 
community in South Bethlehem. Most of the Germans had Lutheran back-
grounds, and, by joining the already existing Lutheran congregations, 
were rapidly assimilated by the Pennsylvania Dutch. To contemporary 
observers, it seemed remarkable how quickly German immigrants adopted 
Pennsylvania Dutch ways. "It takes but a short time", wrote one, "to 
twist their German into a sense of the local vernacular. The work of 
amalgamation between the two tongues is rapid and often very nearly 
14 
complete." Identifying themselves with the Pennsylvania Dutch made 
it easier for German immigrants to enter into American life than they 
might have otherwise. As they settled in South Bethlehem, German 
12 Historical Souvenir of St. Peter's Lutheran Church1 Bethlehem, 
13 
Pennsylvania, 75th Anniversary, Bethlehem, Pa., n.d., p. 13. 
Manuscript Census schedule, Ninth Census of the United States, 
Fourteenth Census of the United·states, Vol. III, Washington, 
1922, p. 889. This census gives a more precise indication 
of the ethnic origins of immigrants because of the dismember-
ment of the Austrian Empire after World War I. 
14 Quoted in W. Ross Yates, History of the Lehigh Valley Region, 
n.p. 1963, p. 102. 
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immigrants found themselves mingling with a native American group 
which had itself recently left the farm for an urban-industrial 
environment. The German immigrant of Protestant ba~kground thus 
did not have to undergo the distressing struggle for acceptance that 
his Catholic counterpart did. As a result, no social organizations 
of a distinctly German immigrant nature came into being in South 
Bethlehem. Instead, the German newcomers could join existing social 
and fraternal organizations such as the Elks, or Knights of the 
Golden Eagle which in South Bethlehem had a large Pennsylvania Dutch 
membership. German political clubs which elsewhere might have been 
composed exclusively of German immigrants had speakers address them 
15 
in both Pennsylvania Dutch and High German. 
Unlike the Germans, Austrian immigrants did not become part of 
the Pennsylvania Dutch community, Most of the Austrian immigrants 
were Roman Catholics, and the Pennsylvania Dutch, like most 
Protestant Americans, viewed the Catholic Church with suspicion and 
16 
distrust. As a result, the Austrians created a community life of 
their own, 
The Austrians organized a Catholic Parish in 1886. Named in 
15Bethlehem Daily Times, Sesqui-Centennial Industrial Edition, 
June 1892, p. 22, also·~hlehem·Times, Oct, 28, 1890, p. 1, 
Nov. 1, 1890, p. 4. 
16 Ibid., Feb, 3, 1892, P• 4, Feb, 6, 1892, p. 4, Feb. 9, 1892, p. 
~For anti-Catholic feelings among the Pennsylvania Dutch, see 
Emerson H. Loucks, The Ku KlUX'Klan in·Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, 
1936, pp. 29-30, 36, 38-39, 86-87, 89, for a general account of 
American Anti-Catholicism see John Higham, Strangers in the Land, 
Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925, (Atheneum Edition), 
New York, 1965, pp. 77-87. 
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honor of St. Bernard, this church had become inadequate by 1895. In 
that year, the congregation began work on a new church, this one 
17 
dedicated to the Holy Ghost. The old church continued in use as a 
parochial school. In both the church and the school, German served 
18 
as the language of instruction. 
The Irish appeared on the scene in South Bethlehem about the same 
time as the Pennsylvania Dutch. Irishmen settled in the town even 
before it had been formally incorporated as a borough. The first 
Irish residents in the town came as laborers helping to construct 
the Lehigh Valley Railroad, Later, more of them arrived in the borough 
seeking employment in the iron and zinc works. An 1861 survey of 
South Bethlehem's population revealed that of the town's 947 residents, 
387 were Irish Catholics.19 By 1863, South Bethlehem's first Catholic 
parish, the Church of the Holy Infancy, had been created to serve the 
20 Irish community's religious needs, 
Prior to the arrival of immigrants from Southern and Eastern 
Europe in the 1880's and 1890's, the Irish comprised the largest 
ethnic group in South Bethlehem. In 1870, of 1,106 immigrants living 
in the borough, 672 carne from Ireland. Moreover, another 435 of the 
17 Heller, Northampton County, Vol, I, pp. 382-383, Bethlehem Times, 
Mar. 1, 1896, p. 1. 
18
rbid,, Oct. 24, 1892, P• 8, 
19Levering, Bethlehem, p. 731. 
20semi-Centennial: The Borough of·south Bethlehem; ·pennsylvania; 
Souvenir·History, South Bethlehem, Pa,, 1915, pp. 45-46. 
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town's inhabitants had Irish-born parents. Since the total population 
of South Bethlehem numbered only 3,556 at the time, the Irish 
community accounted for nearly one-third of the town's population. 
In 1880, the Irish community totalled 1,658 out of 4,925, again 
nearly a third of the town. By this time, however, the American-born 
children of Irish parents far outnumbered those born in Ireland: 1,042 
to 616. 21 
Considering their numbers, the Irish in South Bethlehem naturally 
became a potent political force. Moreover, being present in South 
Bethlehem at the time of its incor~oration as a borough, the Irish 
had the opportunity to assist in the creation of local political 
parties. Thus, they did not have to serve apprenticeships in already 
established organizations, but could start near the top. Most of the 
Irish in South Bethlehem became Democrats. As a result, South 
Bethlehem's wards usually returned a heavily Democratic vote in almost 
every election. This contrasted sharply with the Republican majorities 
usually found in the cities and larger boroughs elsewhere in the 
22 Lehigh Valley. 
The Irish shared political power in South Bethlehem with the 
Germans. The Irish dominated the partnership, however~ For example, 
South Bethlehem's first Chief Burgess, James McMahon, had been born 
23 in County Limerick. Moreover, out of a total of 178 terms available 
21Manuscript Census schedules; 'Nirtth·census·of'the·united'States, 
and Tenth Census·of·the·united'States. 
22Yates, Lehigh Valley, pp. 114-115, 117-118. 
23 Portrait and Biographical Record of Lehigh, Northampton, and 
Carbon Counties, Pennsylval1ia; .. £hicago, 1894, p. 187. 
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on the borough council between 1865 and 1886, 87 were filled by men 
with Irish surnames and 44 by those with German ones. The remaining 
48 terms were held by individuals whose names give no clear indication 
24 
of ethnic background. The relationship between the Irish and the 
Germans in local politics can be seen in a quarrel which resulted 
over the appointment of an Irishman as postmaster in 1892. "The 
office by natural rotation should go to a German this time," a dis-
appointed office-seeker wrote to the local newspaper, "for the Irish 
25 have had it for two terms," 
Before the advent of the "New Immigration" which began to make 
itself felt in the borough in the 1880's, no other ethnic groups in 
South Bethlehem had an importance equal to that of the Irish and 
Germans. Although the 1870 census listed only 74 Belgians living 
in South Bethlehem, they comprised the next largest immigrant group. 
They had originally come to South Bethlehem at the request of the 
26 Zinc Company's owners to help set up and run the plant. There were 
never enough of them to form a stable community: no Belgian church 
or social organizations came into being in South Bethlehem. 
Only a handful of immigrants from Great Britain settled in the 
24A list of officeholders is included in J. Davis Brodhead, 
Historical Sketch of the Borough of South Bethlehem, South 
Bethlehem, Pa., 1886, pp. 127-134. 
25 Bethlehem Times, Nov. 19, 1892, p. 4. 
26Brodhead, South Bethlehem, P• 8, F. Ellis; 'llistory of·Northampton 
County, Pennsylvania, Phila., 1887, p. 212 1 Manuscript census 
schedule, Ninth Census, 
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borough. The 1870 census returns reveal the names of only 31 English 
and 24 Welsh-born residents. By 1880, the number had dwindled to 22 
27 
and 13 for the English and Welsh respectively. In neither case did 
a significant ethnic community arise. 
Only a few Negroes lived in South Bethlehem. In 1900, they 
28 
numbered 115 out of a population of over thirteen thousand. Given 
the importance of color distinctions in American life, the Negroes 
did not achieve acceptance as members of the native American society 
in South Bethlehem, and had to create their own community life. The 
organization of an African Methodist Episcopal congregation in 1894 
reflects its existence. However, the members of the congregation 
were too few in numbers, and too lacking in wealth to erect a church 
building of their own for several years. Until the dedication of St. 
John's Zion A.li.E. Church in 1902, the congregation worshipped in a 
29 
room in South Bethlehem's Municipal Building. Perhaps because 
Negroes received a cool reception when applying for work at the steel 
30 
mill, the Negro community remained small. In any case, the Steel Com-
pany failed to make use of Negro labor in the local plant even during the 
27 Manuscript census schedules, Ninth Census and Tenth Census. 
28Twelfth Census of the United States, Vol. I, Washington, 1901, 
p. 640. 
29south Bethlehem Globe, Sept~ 2, 1907, p. 1. 
30 Ibid., May 18, 1907, P• 3. Aug. 2, 1917, P• 3, Aug. 13, 1917, 
p. 1, Bureau of Planning and Development, The People of 
Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1967 1 p. 58. 
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1920's, when Southern Negroes began migrating to northern industrial 
centers to act as replacements for the immigrant laborers excluded 
from the United States by restrictive immigration laws. Instead, the 
Bethlehem Steel Company preferred to send representatives to northern 
Mexico and southern Texas to recruit Mexican labor. Over a thousand 
31 Mexicans thus arrived by train from Mexico in April and ~my of 1923. 
A shift in the geographical origins of American immigration took 
place toward the end of the nineteenth century. Prior·to the 1880's 
most immigrants had come to the United States from such places in the 
northern and western parts of Europe as England, Ireland, Germany and 
Scandinavia. From the 1880's on, however, an increasingly larger per-
centage of immdgrants came from lands in the south and east of Europe: 
Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Disturbed by the 
unfamiliar appearance and cultural patterns of the more recent immi-
grants, many Americans considered thetn to be inherently different from 
immigrants who had come to the Untted States in the past. A distinction 
between the "old" immigration and the "new" immigration passed into 
general usage. It became an article of faith among many Americans that 
the newcomers were not readily assimilable to American society. Such 
reasoning would eventually lead to the restriction of immigration in 
the 1920's. 32 Before that happened, however, millioos of these "new" 
31Paul s. Taylor, Mexican·Labor·in the·u~s~: ·Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, 
Berkeley, Calif., 1931, PP• 2-5. 
32Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration, Chicago, 1960, pp. 177-
··182, Oscar Handlin, Race ·and ·Nationality ·in ·American Life, (Anchor 
Books Edition), New York, 1957, pp. 74-110. 
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immigrants arrived in the United States, and, from among those millions, 
some made their way to South Bethlehem. 
By the 1920's, representatives of several of the newer immigrant 
groups had established flourishing colonies in South Bethlehem. Slovaks, 
Hungarians, Poles, Slovenes, Italians, Greeks, Russians, and Eastern 
European Jews settled in the borough. Although many of these immigrants 
originally intended to return to Europe after working in the United 
States for a few years, numbers of them became permanent residents in-
stead. In the case of each of these ethnic groups, the creation of 
churches and mutual benefit societies signalled the presence of a 
stable and permanent community. 
The Slovaks were the first of the new immigrant groups to settle 
in South Bethlehem. They first appeared in the borough in the lat~ 
1870's. They had come from the anthracite regions where immigrants 
from Eastern Europe had been finding work for the previous decade or 
so. From the coal fields Slovak immigrants made their way to South 
Bethlehem and other small industrial towns which lay along the tracks 
33 
of the Lehigh Valley Railroad. The newcomers obtained jobs at the 
Iron Company, and, in time, were joined by others of their fellow 
countrymen. Transiency characterized most of the early Slovak arrivals 
in South Bethlehem, but gradually members of the colony developed roots 
34 in the community and became permanent residents. In January of 1891, 
33
victor R. Greene; ·The'Sla~ic·communitt·on·strike: Immigrant 
Labor in·Pennsylvania'Artthracite, Notre Dame, Ind., c. 1968, 
pp. 34-36, Yates, ·Lehigh·valley~ pp. 77, 101-103. 
34Bethlehem Times, July 22, 1890, P• 4. 
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the Roman Catholic Parish of Sts. Cyril and Methodius was organized 
for the benefit of South Bethlehem's Slovaks, and the contractors 
completed work on the church building by October of that year. With 
its own regular pastor, this became the first Slovak parish in the 
diocese. By 1903, the original structure had become inadequate and 
the congregation replaced it with a new building. The old church 
continued in use as a parochial school. In 1915, the school had an 
35 
enrollment of 400 pupils. 
Not all of the borough's Slovaks belonged to the Catholic Church. 
Lutherans accounted for a small percentage of the total. Unlike the 
Catholics~ the Lutherans were too few in number to establish a church 
of their own for a number of years. Until 1911, they attended Slovak 
language services held for their benefit at St. Peter's Lutheran Church. 
In August 1911, the Slovak Lutherans formed St. John's Slovak Lutheran 
Church, and purchased two building lots. However, the congregation's 
small size and consequent lack of funds delayed construction of a 
church building until 1918. The congregation acquired its own minister 
in 1922. 36 
Once an ethnic group had attained a degree of stability and 
permanence, it followed in the footsteps of the Irish, Germans, and 
35 ~·• Apr. 28, 1891, p. 4, Oct. 9, 1891, p. 4, Diamond Jubilee 
Souvenir Book, 1891-1966 Saints·cyril·and Methodius Parish, 
Bethlehem, Pa., 1966, pp. 30, 34, 84; Souvenir·nistory, p. 22. 
36John Daniels, A History of St~ ·John·Evartgelical·Lutheran Church, 
Bethlehem, Pa., 1951, pp. 1-2. 
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Slovaks and organized a church. Consequently, the founding dates of 
an ethnic group's church can thus be looked upon as a benchmark in-
dicating the point at which transiency ceased to be a major factor 
in the development of an immigrant group's community life. Thus, in 
1902 both the Magyars and the Italians established their own 
Catholic parishes: St. John Capistrano for the !t1mgarians and Our 
37 Lady of Pompeii of the Holy Rosary for the Italians. South 
Bethlehem's Polish community organized St. Stanislaus parish in 
38 
1905. Slovenian Catholics--known locally as the Windish--formed a 
congregation named in honor of St. Joseph in 1913u 39 
Not all of the Magyars or Slovenes in South Bethlehem were 
Catholics, and the Protestants amonp, them founded their own churches. 
Magyar Protestants organized the First Hungarian Reformed Church in 
1906.40 Slovenes of the Lutheran faith set up St. John's Windish 
Lutheran Church in 1914. 41 
Two Orthodox Churches named after St. Nicholas came into exis-
tence in South Bethlehem within a year of each other. The earlier of 
the two churches, started in 1914, belong to the borough's Greek 
37 Golden Jubilee of St. John Capistrano Hungarian Roman Catholic 
Church of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania 1903-1953, Bethlehem, Pa., ncld. 
pp. 7-11, South Beth1~hem·Globe, Sept. 19, 1904, p. 1, July 21, 
1902, p. 2, Beth1~hem'Globe•Times, Feb. 27, 1967, p. 31. 
38
south Bethlehem Globe, June 7, 1905, p. 1. 
39 Golden Jubilee 1914-1964·st• Joseph's·church, Bethlehem, Pa. 
n.d., PP• 11-14o 
40 Souvenir History, p. 47, South·B~thl~hem·Globe, Sept. 10, 1906, 
p. 1. 
41 Heller, Northampton County, Vol. II, pp. 61-62, Bethlehem Globe-
Times, "Bi-centennial Edition," June 24, 1942, P• 21. 
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community, while the second, foundad in 1915, was a White Russian 
42 
congregation. 
97. 
In 1917, Ruthenians from Eastern Hungary established St. Peter 
and Paul's Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite. This group had hut 
few members, and, although the congregation erected a basement church 
in the year of its organization, the church building was not completed 
until 1942.43 
A small Jewish community came into being in South Bethlehem in 
the 1880's. Its members came mostly from Russia, Hungary, and 
Lithuania. After several attempts they organized the congregation of 
Brith Sholom in 1889, and constructed a permanent synagogue in 1897.44 
To members of ethnic communities, their churches meant more than 
just a religious association for common worship. In many respects, 
the parish replaced the peasant village which most of the immigrants 
had so recently left. In the peasant mind, religion had little to do 
with personal conduct, rather it was a magical process by which man 
came into contact with the mysterious forces that ruled the universe. 
By integrating man into the scheme of things, the Church made life 
42Edwin Frey, "History of the Protestant and Orthodox Churches 
of Bethlehem, Pa.", Bethlehem Globe Times, Aug. 26, 1967, 
p. 21, see also ~·• Feb. 28, 1967, p. 38. 
43 ~., May 16, 1970, P• 5. 
44 . William Frankel, History of the Early Jewish·community of 
Bethlehemp Pennsylvania, Bethlehem, Pa., 1955, pp. 6-12, 
South Bethlehem Globe, Dec. 13, 1890, pp. 1-2. 
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45 intelligible for him. As such, the Church served as the locus of 
all social activity, by its sanctioning of the mutual obligations of 
family and village life. The seeming social disorder of the 
individualistic society around them dismayed most immigrants. Un-
familiar with the language and customs of the Americans, they attempted 
to recreate a semblance of the more orderly society from which they had 
come. Thus the establishment of a Church in an ethnic community had 
a high priority. A Church of their own would act as a center of 
social life for immigrants and provide them with a meaningful sense 
46 
of membership in a community. 
In a similar fashion, every ethnic community also created mutual 
benefit societies. Besides providing their members with insurance 
benefits, these associations had another, more important function. 
Like the Church, they provided the ethnic community with a sense of 
cohesion and unity. Such societies reinforced the immigrant's sense 
of participation in a collective entity far less confusing than the 
47 individualistic American society. Indeed, in South Bethlehem's 
45Kenneth D. Miller, Peasant Pioneers: An Interpretation of the 
Slavic People in the United States, New York, c. 1925, p. 57, 
Oscar Handlin, The·u·rooted: 'TheE ic·stor ·of the Greac 
Mi ration that made the·American·Peo le Universal Library 
Edition New York, c. 1951, pp. 117-124, William I. Thomas, and 
Florian Znaniecki, The Polish·Peasartt in·Europe and·America, 2 
Vols~: New York, 1956, Vol. I, pp. 205-288. 
46~., Vol. II, pp. 1523-1526, Handlin, ·uprooted, pp. 125-143. 
47Berthoff, Unsettled People, pp. 273, 371-372, 444-447. Thomas 
and Znaniecki; Polish·Peasant, Vol. II, PP• 1517-1523, Emily 
Green Balch; our·slavie·Fellow·citizens, New York, 1910, 378-
382. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99. 
ethnic communities, the creation of a mutual benefit society pro-
ceeded the creation of a parish church. Those societies established 
after a church had been founded were usually intimatelt connected 
with it as well. Thus, the Irish had their Emerald Beneficial Associa-
tion and Ancient Order of Hibernians, the Austrians their Fran~ Joseph 
Society, and the Poles a St. Stanislaus Society. Other such 
organizations included the First Hungarian Sick and Beneficial Society, 
the Slovak Catholic Union, the Slovak E~ngelical Jednota, the South 
Bethlehem Windic Society, the Brotherhood of St. Nicholas and the 
48 Italian Mutual Benefit Society. 
As a form of Gemeinschaft, the immigrant community depended on the 
strength of primary group relationships as well as on formal institutions 
such as churches and benefit societies for its continued existence. The 
primary group serves to relate the life of the individual to the 
society around him. The warm, intimate, and personal associations of 
such primary groups as families, friendships, neighborhoods, and 
villages gave direction and meaning to life. Such relationships are, 
of course, developed in a cultural context. Since immigrants could but 
rarely gain immediate acceptance by American primary groups because 
of cultural differences, they re-created in the United States, those 
49 primary group relationships they had known at home. Thus, the ethnic 
48Bethlehem Times, April 27, 1885, p. 1, June 23, 1885, p. 1, 
Mar. 6, 1888, p. 1, April 11, 1887, p. 1; ·souvertir'History, 
pp. 21-23, Po 71, Daniels, ·st~ ·John's, p. 1. 
49 On primary groups see, Milton M. Gordon, ·Assimilation in 
American Life: The Role·of Race, ·Religiort; ·artd·National Origins, 
New York, 1964, pp. 31-32, see also Charles P. Loomis and John 
c. McKenney, "The Application of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
as Related to other Typologies," in Tennies, Community and 
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communities of South Bethlenem did not consist of random conglomerations 
of strangers sharing nothing but similar ethnic backgrounds. On the 
contrary, the members of the town's immigrant colonies almost always 
came from limited geographical areas. They had usually been born in 
the same province, and often in the same village. 
A process of chain migration operated to bring together people 
who had shared close ties in Europe. As individuals settled in South 
Bethlehem, they wrote home describing conditions in the town. Their 
letters generally received a wide circulation among relatives and 
friends. Often these letters ~ontained requests that wives or friends 
join the writers, or, in some cases, the letters simply stirred up a 
desire among those still at home to emigrate. In any case, most 
later immigrants to South Bethlehem often came to the town bearing 
so letters addressed to friends and relatives. Thus, in South 
Bethlehem, the Catholic Slovaks came mostly from the province of 
Saris, while their Lutheran compatriots came from Zvolen. The 
borough's Italian community came from a group of villages near Naples. 
The Greeks originated on the island of Khios, off the Turkish coast, 
and in two adjoining villages on the nearby mainland. The Poles came 
from Austrian Galacia. The Magyar community was populated by immi-
grants from the four counties of Vas, Veszprem, Sopron, and Zala in 
northwestern Hungary. The Slovenes in the town originated in the 
so 
Society, pp. 14-15, see also Thomas and Znaniecki, Polish 
Peasant, Vol. II, pp. 1117-1122, 1389-1391, 1513-1Sl7. 
South Bethlehem Globe, Jan. 19, 1905, p. 8, Mar. 29, 1907, 
p. 1, Nov. 29, 1907, p. 1. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101. 
district of Prekmunje, in what is now northeastern Yugoslavia. The 
Austrians came from the province of Carniola, A survey of the town's 
immigrant population, taken in the 1920's revealed that the Austrians, 
Magyars, and Slovenes who settled there had all come from an area of 
a hundred miles square, where today the borders of Austria, Hungary, 
51 
and Yugoslavia meet. 
Although large metropolitan areas saw the emergence of ethnic 
enclaves inhabited solely by one or another immigrant group, such 
ghettos did not develop in South Bethlehem. Indeed, as Kenneth Miller 
pointed out some years ago, such ethnic neighborhoods were rarely to 
52 be found in the smaller industrial towns of Pennsylvania. In South 
Bethlehem, the chronic housing shortage and the town's limited size 
prevented the creation of ethnic residential districts, Instead, the 
"foreign section" of South Bethlehem served as one big ghetto where 
53 
a variety of ethnic groups rubbed elbows. The only exception to 
this rule occurred in the case of the Catholic Slovaks. When their 
church had been built in the early 1890's, no housing construction 
------------------------------..,). • .3.1\..JIII'~- .... 
51 John Daniels, "The Slovaks and America," (Unpublished M,A, 
52 
thesis), Lehigh University, 1947, p. 64, St. Joseph's Church, 
p. 12, Souvenir History, pp. 21-23, Bethlehem Globe-Times, Feb. 
27, 1967, pp. 36, 38. Caroline W, Manning, The Immigrant Woman 
and Her Job, in Bulletin of the Woman's Bureau, No. 74, 
Washington, 1930, p. 20, 
Miller, Peasant Pioneers, p. 55, For the situation in large 
cities see, David Ward, Cities·and·Immigrants: A·Geography of 
Change in Nineteenth Century·America, New York, 1971, pp. 109-
121. 
53 
Bethlehem Times, Oct, 29, 1895, p. 1, South Bethlehem Globe, 
Sept. 13, 1904, p, 1, May 23, 1906, P• 1, Sept. 10, 1906, p. 8, 
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had as yet taken place in the immediate area. The church's pastor 
took the opportunity to purchase land surrounding the building which 
54 
he then sold to his parishioners as building lots. By the time the 
other new immigr&nt groups organized churches, South Bethlehem had 
been built up considerably, and the Slovak example could not be 
duplicated. In any case, the Slovaks did not completely dominate 
the area around their church; Poles, Slovenes, and Magyars lived 
there 3S well. Moreover, by 1915, six other ethnic churches could 
be found within a five minute walk of the Slovak church: two Hungarian, 
one Italian, one Polish and two Slovene or Windish, as they preferred 
55 
to be known. 
Among the immigrants from Eastern Europe, intergroup hostility 
was rare, Being peasants, the immigrants displayed little of the 
nationalistic feelings common to their middle-class countrymen. Even 
the Slovaks who had been subject to the discrimination of the Hungarian 
policy of "Magyarization" in Europe, expressed little of the antipathy 
toward Magyars that many Slovak leaders and editors insisted they 
56 
should feel. On the contrary Slovaks, Magyars, Poles, and Slovenes 
mingled freely in South Bethlehem. They attended one another's weddings, 
funerals, and christenings, and in some cases established ritual kinship 
54 Souvenir History, p. 22, 
55The Bethlehem, Pa~ ·city ·nirectorz ·1915..;.1916, Asheville, Nt. c. 
1915, pp. 721-724, 729-737, 742-746. 
56 See Kenneth D. Miller, The Czecho..;.Slovaks·irt'America, New York, 
1922, pp. 74-76, ·south·Bethlehem·Globe, Oct. 10, 1902, p. 1. 
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relations across ethnic lines by becoming the godparents of one 
57 
103. 
another's children. The ease with which members of these various 
groups interacted can be seen in the membership of Catholic Poles, 
Magyars, and Slovenes in the Slovak parish prior to the creation of 
58 their own congregations. 
If the recent immigrant groups did not display antipathy toward 
one another, ethnic hostilities did, nevertheless, manifest them-
selves in South Bethlehem. For the most part, such hostilities came 
from native Americans and members of the "old" immigration, and were 
directed against the newcomers. Nor did anti-alien sentiments 
originate with the less respectable members of the society. On the 
contrary, both the local rowdies as well as members of the middle 
class referred to Eastern Europeans as "Huns" and "Hunkies" and to 
Italians as "Dagoes". Such derogatory terms appeared regularly in 
local newspaper articles as generic designations rather than as 
59 
consciouR labels of abuse. As small-town organs the local newspapers 
were hardly likely to express attitudes of which their readers dis-
approved. Moreover, in the absence of opposition to the unfavorable 
image d·rn:tm of the immigrants, the hostile opinions expressed in the 
newspapers must be assumed to reflect the values and prejudices of 
57 South Bethlehem Globe, May 6, 1904, p. 1, Nov. 10, 1891, p. 1. 
For godparent status as a form of ritual kinship, see Robert T. 
Anderson, Traditional'Eutope: A'Study·in·Artthtopology and History, 
Belmont, Calif., 197l,·pp. 146~147. 
58
cyril and Methodius, p. 30; South Bethlehem·Globe, Oct. 20, 1902, 
p. 1. 
59 Bethlehem Times, June 17, 1890, p. 1, Aug. 17, 1893, p. 2, 
Sept. 13, 1904, P• 1, May 23, 1906, p. 1. 
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their subscribers more or less accurately. 
Immigrant status in itself did not serve as the criterion by 
which an individual or group was judged. Neither the Irish nor the 
Germans came in for any abuse; rather, they themselves expressed anti-
pathy for the newer immigrants. Indeed, so alien did immigrants from 
Southern and Eastern Europe appear to local observers, that the Irish 
and the Germans acquired~ facto status as native' Americans. The 
Germans had mingled with the Pennsylvania Dutch and had become 
indistinguishable from them. Consequently, their status as Americans 
never came into question. Likewise, the Irish, who clearly had immi-
grant status, had been among the first groups to inhabit South 
Bethlehem and could therefore be viewed as being among the community's 
"founding fathers." The local Irish residents thus had a relatively 
high status within the town's social hie~archy from the start. They 
had not been forced to struggle for social acceptance in the same 
60 
way their countrymen, settling in the large metropolitan areas, had. 
It is a significant indication of status rankings in the borough that 
a Souvenir History, issued on the occasion of South Be~hlehem's 50th 
anniversary, did not list either the Germans or the Irish in the pages 
61 devoted to the "Foreign Population." Yet according to the Federal 
60 See John Higham, "Another Look at Nativism", Catholic 
Historical Review, XLIV (1958), pp. 155-156, esp. n. 13, p. 
155, on the Irish immigrants' problems. in a large city see, 
Oscar Handlin; ·nostort•s·Immi tartts: 'A'Stud 'irt'Aceulturation, 
(Atheneum Revised Edition , New York, 1968. 
61 See Souvenir History, pp. 21-23. 
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Census of 1910, ?eople of German and Irish birth made up sizeable 
62 portions of South Bethlehem's population. 
105. 
Ethnic hostilities in South Bethlehem arose out of social and 
economic differences. The newcomers were different in both customs 
and appearance from the natives, and Americans simply could not 
comprehend life-styles other than their own. They attributed such 
immigrant behavior as boisterous parties or strong displays of 
63 
emotion to an inherent inferiority. More importantly, however, 
very real status anxieties motivated the antagonism of the Irish and 
Germans toward the new i~tgrant groups. German and Irish workingmen 
in South Bethlehem feared for their jobs. Eastern~cEuropeans, after all, 
came to the borough seeking employment in the steel mills where many 
Irish and Germans worked. In time, the newcomers began moving from 
positions as common laborers to the furnaces; jobs once held ex-
elusively by members of the older groups. Perceiving themselves 
threatened, the "old" innnigrants reacted in a hostile fashion. Com-
64 
petition thus increased ethnic tensions. 
The anti-immigrant sentiments which found expression in South 
Bethlehem may have had local causes, but they also had national causes 
62 
63 
Thirteenth Census, Vol. III, p. 593. 
Bethlehem Times, Dec. 15, 1885, p. 1, Sept. 16, 1891, p. 1, 
South Bethlehem'Globe, Sept. 13, 1904, p. 1, May 11, 1907, p. 
1, Sept. 10, 1906, P• 1. 
64 Bethlehem Times, May 27, 1894, p. 1. This was a widespread 
phenomenon in the steel industry, see John A. Fitch, The 
Steelworkers, New York, 1911, p. 31, see also Higham,~nother 
Look at Nativism," PP• 156-158. 
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as well, and the two cannot be separated. In the main, such feelings 
developed in response to the continuing industrialization of the 
United States. As industrialization proceeded, it lessened the validity 
of the standards and values which had served as guidelines for behavior 
in an older society. A national, industrial society did not operate 
in accord with the standards appropriate to life in a small town. 
Society had become increasingly impersonal, and so, too, had human 
relationships. When decisions made in some distant city could change 
his whole life, the individual began to feel lost and helpless. Nor 
could the social mechanisms of community pressure alter the state of 
things, for often those whose decisions influenced local affairs lived 
at a distance, and were not subject to community sanctions. Indeed, 
the creation of a national transportation network had made the local 
community itself dependent upon outside forces. In such a situation, 
then, the immigrant, whose presence in the community was a direct 
result of industr:f.alization, became a symbol of all that appeared to 
be wrong with the new society. Americans could not separate the 
strangeness of the aliens in their midst from the strangeness caused 
65 
by industrial change. 
Thus, anxiety characterized the native Americans' view of the 
immigrant. The natives saw the world they had known disappearing in 
65 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for·order: ·1877-1920, (American 
Century Series Edition) New York, c. 1967, pp. 44-76, Samuel 
P. Hays, The Response to'Irtdustria1ism: '1885~1914, Chicago, 
1957, PP• 71-76, 99-100. 
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a complex society in which variety of classes and ethnic groups vied 
for status and power. A racist ideology extolling the genetic 
superiority of Anglo-Saxons and positing the inferiority of the new 
immigrants emerged out of the status anxieties of New England's 
patrician intellectuals. They felt that immigrants from Southern 
and Eastern Europe· could not be assimilated into the mainstream of 
American life because of the newcomers' supposed inherent inability 
to adopt civilized behavior. The dissemination of such beliefs 
helped to create a climate of opinion which would eventually lead to 
66 
immigration restriction. 
In spite of ethnic hostilities, ambivalence c.ften characterized 
the attitudes expressed about South Bethlehem's immigrants. On one 
hand, some newspaper articles often derided immigrant life-styles 
and appearance, while others made the immigrants appear picturesque. 
Moreover, the local newspapers did not promote efforts to assimilate 
the newcomers, and editorials about "the inunigrant problem" reflected 
wire service descriptions of metropolitan conditions rather than the 
local situation.67 
While local residents indicated their dislike of the newcomers, 
they also realized that the newcomers contributed to South Bethlehem's 
66Higham, Strangers irt'the Land, pp. 87-105, E. Digby Baltzell, 
The Protestartt'Establishmertt: 'Atistoctac ·and·caste·in America, 
(Vintage Books Edition , New York, 1966, pp. 87-109, Barbara 
Miller Solomon, ·Ancestors and'Immigrartts~ · 'A'Changing New 
England Tradition (Science Editions), New York, 1965. 
67 Bethlehem Times, Feb. 18, 1891, p. 4, see also Berthoff, "The 
Social Order of the Anthracite Region," p. 270. 
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prosperity--a prosperity which they welcomed. The Hungarian and 
Slovak steelworkers and the Italians employed in the local construction 
industry were recognized as contributors to the local economy. More-
over, the cigar and textile factories which began to dot South 
Bethlehem after 1900 all employed immigrant women. Indeed, these 
factories had been established in the town precisely because the 
immigrant communities provided a large pool of previously untapped 
68 female labor. No one expressed any desire to remove the steel 
mills and textile factories simply to rid the to~m of immigrants. 
In spite of the fact that many wished the immigrants would go 
away, they did not, and, instead, continued to be an important element 
in the growth and development of the community. In the course of time 
attitudes changed, and instead of traating members of ethnic groups 
with contempt, native Americans act:lvely sought their assimilation 
with American culture. Assimilatiot& took time, however, and as late 
as 1937 a survey of the town's educational facilities asserted that 
the primary task of local schools was "amalgamating cultures in order 
to mold a desirable American cultural product. 1169 Yet, in spite of 
the desire to eliminate all national differences in an American 
melting pot, ethnic identities continued to persist. In 1939, the 
authors of the Northampton County·Guide, a W.P.A. project, considered 
68Bethlehem·Times, Aug. 14, 1886, p. 1, Oct. 6, 1890, p. 1. 
69 
South Bethlehem·Globe, Mar. 5, 1906, p. 1, Manning; ·Immigrant 
Women, pp. 4-s, 12. 
William E. Arnold, et al., Surve~ of the Schools of·Bethlehem, 
Pennsylvania, Bethl~eil, Pa., 19 7, pp. 17-18. 
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the following paragraph to be indicative of life in the community: 
Along Third Street are Greek restaurants, redolent 
with boiled lamb and syrupy coffee; Italian 
groceries with windows strung with fiery sausages 
and Parmegiano and Coceocarollo cheese; Russian 
tea houses and Roumanian restaurants and Polish 
pool rooms and Hungarian societies. National, 
fraternal and musical clubs flourish, and native 
costume celebrations of the various nationalistic 
groups are held with pomp and ceremony every 
Sunday during the summer in Central Park, and are 
known as "Nationality Days." 70 
South Bethlehem. in the fifty years between 1865 and 1915, con-
trasts sharply with the Bethlehem of the same period. The town on the 
north side of the river resisted industrialization and grew slowly. 
Even though diversity of interests separated its inhabitants somewhat, 
the population remained fairly homogeneous, and the town presented the 
world with the picture of a sedate appendage to an inddstrial nation. 
South Bethlehem, on the other hand, was anything but a sedate, 
homogeneous community. Compared to Bethlehem, the younger community 
appeared to explode rather than grow. It welcomed industrialization, 
and rapidly filled up with people of diverse ethnic, religious, and 
cultural backgrounds. The inhabitants lived in a bustling town 
which contained a bewildering variety of small ethnic communities. 
Diversity of interest among Bethlehem's inhabitants seemed like rock-
ribbed solidarity when seen in the light of the multitude of linguistic 
and cultural barriers which divided the residents of South Bethlehem. 
Rather than an appendage of the industrial society of late nineteenth 
century America, South Bethlehem was that society in microcosm. 
70Northampton Courtty Guide, Bethlehem, Pa., 1939, p. 147. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE SOUTH BETHLEHEM ELITE 
Comprising an ethnic community, not unlike those formed by 
immigrants, a small group of upper class families dominated South 
Bethlehem from its beginnings until the turn of the century. Re-
siding in an area known as Fountain Hill, these elite families 
directed the activities of the Lehigh Vall~~ Railroad, the Bethlehem 
Iron Company, and other enterprises. In so doing, they controlled 
the fate of the community. Fortunately for South Bethlehem, the 
local elite did not act irresponsibly toward the community. On 
the contrary, taking their religious obligations as members of the 
Episcopal Church seriously, they used their wealth to benefit the 
town, providing it with such things as a hospital and an orphanage. 
However, by the turn of the century, the elite community's founding 
generation began to die off, and few of their successors felt a 
compulsion to maintain the tradition of noblesse oblige. 
South Bethlehem's elite families constituted a self-conscious, 
well-defined community, with a strong sense of its own identity. A 
major factor in the emergence of this group as a coherent community 
was the connection of many of its members with Asa Packer's various 
enterprises, a fact reinforced among some by ties of both blood and 
lW. 
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marriage with the industrialist and his descendants, Moreover, since 
the children of South Bethlehem's elite frequently married one 
another, their cotmnunity wao·, in reality, one large family. As a 
result, primary group socialization served to inculcate a strong sense 
of group identity and distinctiveness. 
A common membership in the local Episcopal parish, the Church of 
the Nativity, provided additional support to the elite's sense of 
community, Having originally initiated the movement for organizing 
a congregation, members of South Bethlehem's elite contined to serve 
on the parish vestry. Indeed, membership on the vestry came to 
represent a clear indication that an individual belonged to the elite 
community, 
In 1858, Robert H. Sayre, the chief engineer of the Lehigh 
Valley Railroad, decided to establish his headquarters in South 
Bethlehem, where the tracks of the North Pennsylvania Railroad and 
the Lehigh Valley formed a strategic junction. This marked the 
effecti•le start of South Bethlehem's upper class community. Sayre 
built a permanent residence on a spur of South Mountain known as 
1 
Fountain Hill, located at the borough's western edge. Others soon 
imitated his example, William H. Sayre Jr., Robert's brother and 
general agent for the Lehigh Valley as well as assistant to the 
1John w. Jordan, Historic·Homcs·an.d·In.stitutions·artd Geneologieal 
and Personal·Memoties'of 'the·tehigh'Vallet'of'Penrtsylvania, 2 
Vol,, New York, 1905, Vol. I, pp, 234-237, John P. Chamberlain, 
One Hundred Years·of·Nativity, Bethlehem, Pa., 1963, pp. 15-16, 
For the origin of the name Fountain Hill, see Earl J. Bauman, 
"The History of Fountain Hill," (Unpublished M.A. Thesis) 
Lehigh University, 1951, pp, 112-113, 
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president, constructed his own rambling Victorian mansion across the 
street. With him came his father, the elder William Sayre, n business 
partner and friend of Packer's. 2 
Shortly after the Sayres moved to South Bethlehem, they were 
joined by Elisha Packer Wilbur and his family. A nephew of Asa 
Packer, Wilbur became president of the Lehigh Valley after Packer's 
death in 1879. The Wilbur family was destined to be of major impor-
tance in the economic development of South Bethlehem. They actively 
involved themselves in banking as well as the Iron Company and the 
3 Lehigh Valley Railroad. 
Garrett B. Linderman, Packer's son-in-law, moved to South 
Bethlehem in 1870. Trained as a physician, Linderman had graduated 
from the New York City College of Physicians and Surgeons. In 1856, 
he married Lucy Packer, and retired from the medical profession in 
order to take an active interest in his father-in-law's business 
affairs. Like the Wilburs, Linderman was active in banking and the 
4 
affairs of the Lehigh Valley Railroad and the Bethlehem Iron Company. 
The Sayre, Wilbur, and Linderman families served as the core of 
2chamberlain, Nativity, p. 15, Ruth Hutchinson, "The Discovery 
of Fountain Hill," in Bethlehem Globe-Times, Dec. 23, 1967, 
P• A-3. 
3Jordan, Lehigh Valley, pp. 79, Semi-Centennial: ·The Borough of 
South Bethlehem, ·pennstlvania·souvenir'History, South Bethlehem, 
Pa., 1915, p. 3. William J. Reller; 'Hist~r~·of·Northampton 
County, 3 Vols., New York, 1920, Vol. III, pp. 508, 519-520. 
4Portrait and Biographical Record of Lehigh, Northampton, and 
Carbon Counties, Chicago, 1894, pp. 8-13. 
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South Bethlehem's elite, but other families also belonged to this 
group. William w. Thurston, president of the Bethlehem Iron Company, 
H. Stanley Goodwin, superintendent of the Lehigh Valley R.ailroad, 
Andrew N. Cleaver, a banker and manager of several coal mining firms 
owned by the Packer interests, William L. Dunglison, another banker, 
and John Smylie, a major stockholder in the Iron Company and owner of 
a firm manufacturing precision parts for locomotives, became members 
of the local elite. So, too, did Tinsley Jeter who moved from 
Philadelphia to South Bethlehem in 1860 so that he might supervise 
more closely the construction of the Ironton Railroad, a project 
connecting his iron mines with the Lehigh Valley Railroad. These men 
all built their mansions in the Fountain Hill area, and became part of 
5 South Bethlehem's upper class. 
The men heading South Bethlehem's upper-class families in the 
nineteenth century did not fit the pattern of rags-to-riches so 
beloved of Horatio Alger. Theirs was not the story of poor boy making 
6 good. On the contrary, they began their careers already well prepared 
for success. In this they conform to a profile first developed by 
Frances w. Gregory and Irene D. Neu for industrial leaders of the 
1870's. Of old, Anglo-American stock, their families had roots in 
5Jordan, Leltigh Valley, Vol. I, pp. 258-60, Heller, Northampton 
County, Vol. III, pp. 594-595, Chamberlain; ·Nativity, p. 16. 
6For a discussion of Alger see, Richard Weiss, "Horatio Alger, Jr. 
and the Response to Industrialism," in Frederic Cople Jaber, Ed., 
The Age of Industrialism·in America: ·Essays in·social·Structure 
and Cultural Values, New York, c. 1968, pp. 304-313. 
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New England. They generally received a better than average education, 
and did not obtain their first employment until about age eighteen, 
much later than the average American of the time. Usually of an 
Episcopal, Congregational, or Presbyterian background, they had been 
raised in an atmosphere in which business and a relatively high social 
7 
standing were intimately associated with family life. 
Most of the South Bethlehem elite conformed rather closely to 
8 
this typology, as did Asa Packer, the elite's spiritual father. The 
Sayre and Wilbur families, for example, originated in New England, 
belonged to the Episcopal faith, and had received fairly high levels 
9 
of education. Tinsley Jeter and Garrett B. Linderman deviated from 
this norm vnly in that the former was the scion of an old Virginia 
10 family, and the latter of a Pennsylvania one. 
An entrepreneural background was not a necessary prerequisite 
for entry into the South Bethlehem elite. A ranking position in 
certain local institutions, plus, of course, a decent family back-
ground, made an individual acceptable. Thus the director of St. Luke's 
Hospital, William L. Estes, became an honored member of the local 
establishment. The presidents of Lehigh University were also warmly 
7Frances W. Gregory and Irene D. Neu, "The American Industrial 
Elite in the 1870's: Their Social Origins," in William Miller, 
Ed., Men in·Business: Essa s·on the'Historical Role of the 
Entrepreneur, (Harper Torchbooks Edition , New York, 1962, pp. 
193-204. 
SHeller, Northampton County. Vol. II, pp. 3-5. 
9Jordan, Lehigh Valley, Vol. I, pp. 234-237, Vol. II, pp. 7-9. 
10Portrait and Biographical Record, ppa 8-13p Jordan, Lehigh 
Valley, Vol. I, pp. 258-60. 
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received by the residents of Fountain Hill as the acceptance of Henry 
Coppee, Robert A. Lamberton, Thomas M. Drown, or Henry s. Drinker 
attested. Professors could also be numbered among the elite. For 
example, William H. Chandler, Professor of Chemistry married a 
daughter of Robert Sayre and served on the Board of Trustees of St. 
Luke's Hospital, a position of no little prestige. Benjamin w. 
Frazier, another I.ehigh professor, served as a vestryman of Nativity 
Episcopal Church, another position highly regarded by the upper 
11 
class. 
Since the Episcopal Church loomed so large in the elite's social 
life, its rectors were included in the upper-class community as a 
matter of course. This was no condesce·,lding gesture on the part of 
parishioners, for many of the clergy came from backgrounds which would 
have granted them access to local society in their own right~ Indeed, 
several young men from prominent South Bethlehem families later be= 
12 
came Episcopal clergymen. 
Besides a common social background, ties of kinship and marriage 
helped to unite the Fountain Hill elite into a self-conscious 
community. Garrett B. Linderman, for example, married Asa Packer's 
1lwilliam L. Estes, Jr., Ed., William L. Estes, 1855-1940: The First 
Superintendent, 'Director·and'Chief·surgeort·of·st~ Luke's Hospital: 
An'Autobiography, Bethlehem, Pa., 1967, pp. 64-65, Chamberlain, 
Nati~ty, p. 33, Catherine Drinker Bowen; 'A'Historx·of·Lehigh 
University, Bethlehem, Pa., 1924, pp. 94-105, Jordan, Lehigh 
Valley, Vol. I, pp. 234-237, ·parish 'Artrtalsj ·church of the Nativity: 
Bethlehem·southj 'Pennsylvania; '1862•1902, n.p., n.d., p. 214. 
12Chamberlain, Nativity, pp. 18, 72, for a discussion of the relation 
between the clergy and small town elites, see Page Smith, As a 
City Upon a Hill: The Town in American History, New York, 1966, 
p. 74. 
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daughter, Lucy. Their son, Robert Packer Linderman, married Ruth May 
Sayre, the daughter of Packer's chief engineer, Robert H. Sayre. 
Linderman's daughters, Sally and Lillian, married two of Elisha 
Wilbur's sons Warren and Eldridge Packer. Elisha Wilbur was Asa 
Packer's nephew and his successor as president of the Lehigh Valley 
Railroad. Anotlter of Elisha Wilbur's sons, Rollin, married Nancy 
Lamberton, daughter of a Lehigh University president. 13 
Robert H. Sayre, married four times. His three daughters by his 
first wife married into the local elite. Ruth married Robert P. 
Linderman, Elizabeth married Andrew N. Cleaver, an official of the 
E.P. Wilbur Trust Co., and Eliza married William H. Chandler, a 
Lehigh Professor. Sayre's second wife was the widow of the late 
Senator Richard Brodhead and an aunt by marriage of Garrett B. 
Linderman. SayTe's third wife, whom he married in 1879, was a daughter 
of Asa Packer. Thus, Robert H. Sayre's family had ties throughout 
the local elite community and contributed to the feeling that 
Fountain Hill belonged to a clan of entrepreneurs. 14 
The Episcopal Church of the Nativity served as an institutional 
focus for the elite community's life. The appearance of Robert H. 
Sayre and Tinsley Jeter as permanent residents in South Bethlehem 
marked the start of Nativity parish. The families of both men were 
13Heller, Northampton Courtty, Vol. III, p. 165, Jordan, Lehigh 
Valley, Vol. I, pp. 209-212, Vol. II, p. 9, Chamberlain, 
Nativity, pp. 17, 44; ·south'Bathlehem·Globe, Jan. 5, 1907, p. 
1. 
14 Jordan, Lehigh Valley, Vol. II, p. 9. 
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d~vout Episcopalians, and attended the lay services Jeter held in his 
home every Sunday afternoon beginning in 1860. In May of 1862, the 
members of this small group established a Sunday school in the station 
,,.. 
of the North Pennsylvania Railroad. William H. Sayre Jr. became 
the superintendent, a post he held until his ueath in 1909.15 
The creation of a. Sunday school led to the formation of an 
Episcopal parish within a relatively short time. In July of 1862, 
the Diocese of Pennsylvania sent the Reverend Elephalet Potter as 
a missionary to Bethlehem and Allentown. In September, he began holding 
regular services in South Bethlehem. The presence of a clergyman 
encouraged the local Episcopalians to establish a legally constituted 
parish. On November 8, 1862, they organized a temporary vestry con-
sisting of Jeter, Robert Sayre, his father and brother, John Smylie, 
and Ira Co~tright, a founder of the Iron Company. The new vestry 
launched a fund-raising campaign, and, by the following August, 
$18,000 had been collected. On Christmas Day 1864, the congregation 
16 
held its first religious service in the newly completed church. 
In May of 1863, the Annual Diocesan Convention, meeting in 
Philadelphia, accepted the parish into the diocese. In the course of 
the meeting, two new members were added to the vestry: Asa Packer 
and Solomon W. Roberts of Philadelphia. Neither of these men lived 
in South Bethlehem, and never attended any meetings of the vestry. 
15Nativity·Annals, p. 4v Chamberlain, ·Nativity, p. 18. 
16Ibid., PP• 18-23. 
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As the parish historian notes, their inclusion was probably due to 
17 
contributions they had made to the church. Packer, in any case, 
had close ties to the original vestrymen. In June of the same year, 
the Reverend Potter became Nativity's first rector. 
Nativity Church acted as a parent organization for Bethlehem's 
Trinity Episcopal Church. In 1869, Nativity's vestry established a 
mission Sunday school in Bethlehem with H. Stanley Goodwin as 
superintendent. Shortly afterwards, the rector began holding ser-
vices on Sunday evenings. A parish was soon organized, and by 
January of 1872, the construction of Trinity Church was completed. 
Several members of its first vestry also served on Nativity's: Charles 
Dodson, William Dunglison, H. Stanley Goodwin, and Robert Sayre. 
Only Dodson lived in Bethlehem, and he withdrew from Nativity's vestry 
in 1879.18 
The residents of South Bethlehem considered Nativity to be the 
Church of the borough's upper-class community, as indeed it was. 
This association between the elite and the Episcopal Church was not 
a merely local development, but reflected the national status of the 
Episcopal Church. In American society the various denominations have 
always served to unite people of similar outlooks and social standing, 
and, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the Protestant Episcopal 
Church had emerged as the major upper-class religious denomination in 
17Ibid., P• 23. 
18Nativity Annals, pp. 45, 53, 68, Seventy•Five Years·of·Trinity 
Church: Bethlehem; Pa., Bethlehem, Pa., n.d., pp. 1-2. 
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the United States. It had been the church of the southern planter 
aristocracy from earliest colonial times, and, during the eighteenth 
century, the merchant elite of the northern cities also turned to it 
in increasing numbers. To the upper classes of American society, the 
Episcopal Church represented a link with the aristocratic traditions 
of England which, they felt, their wealth should permit them to 
emulate. In the years after the Civil War, the Episcopal Church 
expanded its membership as newly rich industrialists eagerly conformed 
19 to the customs of the class they aspired to join. 
The founders of Nativity Church came from families long 
affiliated with the Episcopal Church. They were not recent converts. 
William H. Sayre, Sr. had been instrumental in the creation of St. 
Mark's Episcopal Church in Mauch Chunk during 1835. Along with Asa 
Packer, Sayre had served on St. Mark's first vestry. This long-
established relationship of the founders with the Episcopal Church 
20 became a source of no small pride to members of the parish. Indeed, 
it would appear that more recent converts to the Episcopal faith 
received less than full acceptance by the Fountain Hill elite regardless 
of their 'i'Yealth. I11 any caH:Je• th11. wealthy members of Bethlehem's 
Trinity Episcopal Church, some of whom were recent converts, did not 
21 
socialize extensively with the residents of Fountain Hill. 
19E. Eigby Baltzell, Philadelphia·Gentlemen: The'Making of a 
National·Upper·class, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, PP• 225-233. 
20 Chamberlain, Nativity, p. 9. 
21 Ibid., p. 29, Hutchinson, "Discovery of Fountain Hill," 
p:-A'-3. 
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The Church was not the only institution designed to buttress the 
Fountain Hill elite's sense of community. Like Episcopalians else-
where, the local elite sought to perpetuate an upper-class life-style 
intimately connected with membership in the church. Thus, a school 
for the daughters of Fountain Hill families, Bishopthorpe Manor, 
opened its doors in 1868. It was located on a property which had 
come into the hands of Tinsley Jeter who suggested that it be used 
for a school. Jeter's proposal met with diocesan approval, and 
Nativity's rector and vestry became the school's board of trustees. 
Jeter acted as the school's first president. He improved the property 
at his own expense, and leased it to the trustees rent-free until they 
could raise the money to purchase the school. Jeter himself made the 
largest contribution to the fund. The school became church property 
in 1871.22 
Lehigh University was another local educational institution in 
which the Fountain Hill ~entry took special interest. Founded in 
1865 by Asa Packer as a "polytechnic college," its emphasis was on 
such subjects as engineering. Although Lehigh was founded as a non-
sectarian institution, it had close ties with the Episcopal Church. A 
devout Episcopalian, Packer turned for advice in founding the school 
to William B. Stevens, the Episcopal Bishop of Pennsylvania. Bishop 
Stevens became the first president of Lehigh's board of trustees, and, 
until 1897, the Bishop of the Diocese of Eastern Pennsylvania always 
22 Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, pp. 296-312, Nativity 
Annals, p. 48, Bauman, "Founta::iU Hill," p. 31. 
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became the board's president. Indeed, because of Lehigh's close 
connection with the Episcopal Church, the University received per-
mission to send delegates to the diocesan convention of 1888. 23 
The Fountain Hill gentry maintained a strong interest in the 
affairs of the University. The first board of trustees included 
Robert H. Sayre, William H. Sayre Jr., and Garrett B. Linderman. 
Nativity's rector, Reverend Elephalet Potter acted as the Board's 
secretary and Elisha Wilbur, who became a trustee in 1879, was its 
24 treasurer. For years, these men gave of their time and money to 
Lehigh, and took a great interest in its success. The connection of 
the school with the local elite could also be seen in the close 
social relations between the Fountain Hill residents and the presidents 
and faculty of Lehigh. Members of the latter g~oup served on 
Nativity's vestry and married into the families on what residents of 
South Bethlehem referred to as "Episcopal Hill." Students from the 
University, coming from the proper backgrounds, were likewise wel-
corned into the homes on Fountain Hill. Marriages between Lehigh 
25 
students and daughters of the local gentry were not uncommon. For 
most of the nineteenth century, the relationship between Lehigh and 
Fountain Hill was a family one. 
23Bowen, Lehigh University, PP• 8-9, 84, Jonathan w. Miller, 
History of·the'Diocese·of·central'Penns11Vartia~ '1871~1909, 
2 Vols. Fracksville, Pa., 1909, Vol. II, p. 239. 
24Bowen, Lehigh University, pp. 84, 92. 
25 Chamberlain, Nativity, pp. 25, 34, Hutchinson 1 "Discovery of 
Fountain Hill, 11 p. A-27.. 
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The close ties of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United 
States with the Church of England colored its view of society. The 
American Church had originated in the Anglican Communion, and had 
never lost touch with the medieval ideal of being a truly catholic 
church which ministered to the whole community, not just to elite 
groups. Strongly influenced by the Christian Socialism of their 
Anglican cousins, Episcopal clergymen organized and supported move-
menta to improve the lot of the American workingman. Indeed, the 
Episcopal Church was clearly in the forefront of the Social Gospel 
movement of the late nineteenth cent.ury. To the degree that wealthy 
Episcopalians heeded their clergy's reminders of a Christian's 
responsibility toward society, they also followed their aristocratic 
26 
impulses and acted out of a spirit of noblesse oblige. 
In South Bethlehem, the Episcopal elite took their religious 
responsibilities seriously. Indeed, Nativity was established in 
South Bethlehem in order to provide the many working men who lived 
there ~>Tith a church. An 1862 circular requesting aid in the con-
struction of a church noted that: 
Bethlehem South is immediately opposite the 
Terminus of the North Pennsylvania Railroad. 
It now contains a population of one thousand 
inhabitants. Most of these are persons of 
very modest means, and a great majority are 
laborers, mechanics and workmen in the 
zinc and iron works of the place. The Iron 
26Henry F. May, Protestant Churches and Industrial America, 
(Harper Torchbooks Edition), New York, 1967, pp. 182-186, 
Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, pp. 230ff., Smith, City 
Upon a Hill, p. 94. 
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Furnace and Rolling Mill of the Bethlehem Iron 
Company are now nearly completed, and will soon 
bring a large addition to the population. There 
is no church of any kind in·the place, a want 
severely felt by all, but more especially by the 
laboring classes, who are less able and less dis-
posed to go the distance required to reach the 
churches on the other side of the river.z7 
In spite of the good intentions of Nativity's founders, the 
parish did not acquire working-class members. Churches of other 
123. 
denominations more congenial to the town.' s working-class inhabitants 
soon came into existence in South Bethlehem, and most workmen joined 
them instead of Nativity. Moreover, the town's residents considered 
Nativity to be a church for the carriage trade. In an unsuccessful 
attempt to belie this, the families living near the church made it a 
28 point to leave their carriages at home and walk to services. 
Although the efforts to attract workmen from the zinc and iron 
works to services at Nativity failed, the Episcopalians did not 
abandon efforts to reach members of the "laboring classes." Since 
the workmen did not come to Nativity, Nativity went to them. In 
August of 1873, Nativity's rector held services at the Leckaweki 
Springs Hotel about a mile west of the church. The hotel was located 
near the Shive Governor Company, a factory owned by John Smylie, a 
member of Nativity's vestry. Smylie had ,just moved his factory from 
Philadelphia and he wanted to provide a chapel for his employees. 
27Nativity·Annals, p. 9. Italics in the original. 
28 Chamberlain, Nativitz, p. 33. 
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With $1,000 provided by Robert H. Sayre, St. Mary's Chapel was built 
on a plot of land Smylie donated to the parish. The chapel was conse-
crated in April of 1875, From then on, regular services were held 
every Sunday, and sunday school classes were led by Sayre until his 
29 
death in 1907. 
At the initiative of William w. Thurston, vice-preBident and 
later president of the Iron Company, a second chapel, St. Joseph's, 
was opened in 1882. It was located "at the foot of Lehigh Mountain, 
opposite No. 3 Furnace," about a mile to the east of Nativity. The 
services, held in a small cottage, attracted worshippers from among 
those employed in the Iron works, and, before long, a larger building 
was needed, Thurston persuaded Joseph Wharton of Philadelphia, a 
director of the Iron Company, to donate a plot of land for the 
P• ~pose, The chapel was completed in 1884 with Thurston himself 
paying the construction cost of $2,500, 30 
The Episcopal leaders did not confine their community activities 
to purely religious affairs. One of their projects was the establish-
ment of St. Luke's Hospital, The idea originated with NativHy's 
rector, Cortland Whitehead who had come to the parish in 1870. At that 
time, the closest hospital was in Philadelphia. Not even the Bethlehem 
31 Iron Company had so much as a dispensat:y. Whitehead at f:f.rst thought 
29
.ill.!!•• P• 34, 
30rbid., pp. 44, 50, 
31Estes, Autobiography, pp. 66-67, 80, 
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in terms of a small cottage hospital run by the parish, and suggested 
this to the trustees of Bishopthorpe Manor at a board meeting in 
1872. The trustees responded enthusiastically to the idea, obtained 
a charter, and began soliciting funds. In June of 1873, St. Luke's 
32 Hospital was opened in a house in South Bethlehem. 
Within a short time of its founding, the hospital outgrew its 
original facilities. Given financial assistance by Asa Packer, the 
hospital's trustees acquired the grounds of a former water cure known 
as the Hydropathic Institute located in the Fountain Rill area. 
Packer also bequeathed $350,000 to St. Luke's upon his death in 1879, 
and as a result, considerable expansion was undertaken. In 1881, the 
trustees recruited Dr. William L. Estes as director of the hospital. 
He remained in charge of St. Luke's for forty yearsp and under his 
direction it developed into a hospital whose reputation eventually 
attracted cases from all over the eastern United States. In 1884, 
St. Luke's established a training school for nurses, the third such 
33 in the United States. 
The founders of St. Luke's at first intended the hospital to be 
a denominational institution. However, it quickly became apparent 
that only a non-sectarian hospital would receive community support, and 
the hospital's charter was amended to that effect. Although the new 
charter permitted members of other denominations to sit on the Board 
32souvenir·Ristory, pp. 54-55, Chamberlain; Nativity, pp. 30-32. 
33 Estes, Autobiography, pp. 76-79, 104-108. 
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of Trustees, the hospital still retained its Episcopalian ties. The 
charter required the Bishop of the diocese to be president of the 
34 board, and for a majority of the board members to be Episcopalians. 
Among the residents of South Bethlehem serving on the board were 
Tinsley Jeter, Elisha Wilbur, Garrett B. Linderman, Robert H. Sayre, 
William H. Sayre, and H.s. Goodwin. These men and their families 
took an active interest in the hospital and gave freely of their 
money, time, and energy. Both Wilbur and Sayre donated wards to the 
hospital, and Sayre, shortly before his death in 1907, presented St. 
35 Luke's with a pathology laboratory. 
The Episcopal gentry's concern for South Bethlehem's welfare 
was not limited to the establishment of a hospital. At the urging 
of Nativity's rector, the Reverend Kinlock Nelson, the vestry gave 
its support to the creation of a Workingman's Club in South Bethlehem. 
This club opened its doors in February of 1885, with Robert H. Sayre, 
William w. Thurston, Tinsley Jeter and other Fountain Hill residents 
36 
serving on the executive committee. Nelson, like other Episcopal 
clergymen of the day, was aware of the social problems arising from 
an industrial society. By creating the club, he hoped to provide 
working men with "facilities for social intercourse, instruction and 
rational recreation at a very small cost."37 The club was non-
34 Miller, Diocese, Vol. I, p. 247. 
35Estes, Autobiography, pp. 62-63; ·souvenir'History, p. 54. 
36Nativ~ty Annals, P• 83. 
37 ~·· p. 84. 
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denominational and open to anyone who cared to join. The club fur-
nished its members with evening classes in mechanical drawing and 
mathematics, a library, an athletic program, baths, and "Public 
38 Entertainments at frequent intervals." 
The club proved to be short-lived. Although 242 men joined 
within two months of its opening, by the spring of 1886 the club had 
closed down. Three factors accounted for the club's failure: the 
absence of level ground in South Bethlehem for the athletic program, 
the lack of a permanent staff, and the large number of rival social 
39 
organizations competing for members. 
The Fountain Rill gentry did not perform all of their community 
activities through the agency of the Episcopal Church. In 1882, for 
example, William W. Thurston used his own resources to establish an 
orphanage in South Bethlehem after a smallpox epidemic had ravaged 
tl1e town and caused over a hundred deaths. For the next four years, 
40 
Thurston finance the orphanage by himself. When Thurston's health 
began to fail in 1886, it became necessary to place the Children's 
Rome on a more secure footing. Accordingly, the Home was incorporated 
in November 1886, with the directorship composed of members of the 
community's leading families. 41 
38Ibid., P• 84. 
39Bethlehem'Times, Apr. 9, 1886, p. 1, Chamberlain, Nativity, p.43. 
40Bethlehem Daily·Times; ·sesgui•CentP-nnial·Industrial·Edition, 
June, 1892, p. 14; ·souvenit'Ristorl, p. 55. 
41Bauman, Fountain Rill, p. 48-50, Souvenir·Ristory, pp. 55-56, 
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During the next few years, the number of children at the Home 
increased, and it became necessary to expand its facilities. Thurston 
purchased a plot of land, and public subscriptions raised $3,700. The 
Children's Home's new quarters were ready for occupancy in 1888, In 
1895, a donation of land and buildings permitted the home to relocate 
on a six-acre tract in Salisbury Township, near the Lehigh County 
line. Between 1882 and 1910, the Home cared for nearly a thousand 
children ranging in age from 2 to 14. After 1918, the Children's Home 
42 
waa financed by the Bethlehem Community Chest, 
The Fountain Hill elite did not limit their involvement with 
South Bethlehem to philanthropy. They took an active role in the 
town's political and economic life as well, Elisha P. Wilbur sat on 
South Bethlehem's first borough council. He served two more terms 
as councilman before being elected to serve five one-year terms as 
Chief Burgess, The voters of South Bethlehem likewise chose H, Stanley 
Goodwin, Superintendent of the Lehigh Valley Railroad, to eighteen 
terms as Chief Burgess, and he served continuously from 1875 until 
his death in 1892, Goodwin was a Republican, and maintained his 
popularity in a town so staunchly Democratic that local humorists 
declared the favorite sport of the inhabitants was stoning Republican 
43 parades. 
The major economic interests of South Bethlehem's elite were 
42Bethlehem·children's Home·Momertto 1 1910, South Bethlehem, Pa,, 
431910, pp, 3-4, Bauman, 
11Fountain Hill, 11 p. SO, 
Souvenir History, p. 16, .T. Davis Brodhead, Historical Sketch 
of South Bethlehem, South Bethlehem, Pa., 1886, pp. 127-130, 
Edwin Frey, "History of the Protestant and Orthodox Churches 
of Bethlehem, Pa." Bethlehem Globe-Times, Aug. 26, 1967, p. 25. 
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coal mines, the Lehigh Valley Railroad, ~nd the Bethlehem Iron 
Company. As president,.,vice-presidents, superintendents, directors 
and major stockholders of these firms, the Sayres, Wilburs, Lindermans, 
and others held South Bethlehem's economic future in their hands. 
These same men "<-lere also involved in business activites of a more 
limited scope, and of more immediate effect on the community. When 
the Bethlehem South Gas and Water Company was organized in 1864, 
Elisha P. Wilbur served as president, and Robert and William Sayre, 
44 
John Smylie, and H.S. Goodwin sat on the board of directors. 
Elisha P. Wilbur organized South Bethlehem's first bank, the E.P. 
Wilbur Trust Company in 1870, and Garrett B. Linderman organized 
the Lehigh Valley National Bank across the river in Bethlehem two 
45 
years later. Both directly and indirectly, then, the settlement 
o~'Fountain Hill was the locus of economic power which controlled 
South Bethlehem. 
In 1900, Nativity became the Cathedral Church for the newly 
46 
created Diocese of Bethlehem. The location of South Bethlehem as 
an Episcopal residence indicated Nativity's status as a church of 
the wealthy and powerful. In one sense, however, the choice of 
Nativity as a Cathedral served as both an epitaph as well as an 
encomium, for, by the turn of the century, the dominance of the 
44F. Ellis; History·of·Northampton·countYi Pennsylvania, Phila., 
1877, p. 211. 
45Ibid., p. 213, ·Bethlehem Times·Industrial Ed., p. 22. 
46 Chamberlain, Nativity, p. 73. 
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Fountain Hill gentry in the affairs of South Bethlehem came to an 
end. 
One reason for Fountain Hill's decline was the passing of the 
generation which had made the neighborhood a center of wealth and 
power. Garrett B. Linderman died in 1885, William W. Thurston died 
in 1890 and was followed by H. Stanley Goodwin in 1892. In 1907, 
Robert H. Sayre passed on, as did Elisha P. Hilbur in 1911. Their 
children did not follow in their footsteps. Only two members of 
the second generation achieved anything approaching the status of 
their fathers: Warren A. Wilbur and Robert P. Linderman, and 
Linderman died of blood poisoning in 1903 at the age of 39. The 
other surviving male children of the founders left South Bethlehem 
47 to pursue careers elsewhere. 
Before 1900, membership on Nativity's vestry had been a sure 
sign of status in the community. However, the deaths of its original 
members left the vestry unable to make good its losses. After 1908, 
local businessmen instead of industrialists dominated the board. 
Only two vestrymen represented the older groups: Andrew N. Cleaver, 
a contemporary of the founders and Warren A. Wilbur. Indeed, interest 
in church affairs declined so much that by 1917 the rector was asked 
to prepare a schedule of vestrymen to usher on Sundays to insure their 
48 
attendance at services. 
47Hutchinson, "Discovery of FountainHill," pp. A-4, A-12, 
Souvenir'History, p. 3; ·Nativity·Annals, p. 204, Jordan, 
Lehigh Valley, pp. 7-9. 
48chamberlain, Nativity, PP• 73, 81. 
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Other signs of change accompanied the vestry's decline. By 1903, 
the Bethlehem Steel Company no longer belonged to the Fountain Hill 
elite, but had become the person property of Charles M. Schwab who 
49 
was transforming it into a firm of international consequence. 
Likewise Bishopthorpe Manor closed its doors in 1902 because of a 
lack of endowment. When it reopened in 1908, it did so as a 
50 privately owned institution. 
The disappearance of the Fountain Hill gentry was the local 
manifestation of a more general, national phenomenon. As industrializa-
tion had created the local elite community, continuing industrialization 
caused its decline. As the national economy became integrated, local 
elites were absorbed into an emerging national metropolitan elite. 
The centralization of economic power in the major urban areas of the 
country created a centralized national upper-class. Shared economic 
interests resulted 1n a shared life-style. New England boarding 
schools and fashionable eastern universities became family surrogates 
molding the various local aristocracies:, to a common national pattern. 
Exchanging a local orientation for an expanded cosmopolitan one, the 
new national elite nevertheless maintained its familiar life-style. 
The children of upper-class families continued to intermarry and to 
51 pursue careers of approved status in the elite community. The 
49Gertrude G. Schroeder, 'The Growth'Of'Major·steel Companies: 
1900•1950, Baltimore, 1950, pp. 48-49. 
50 Souvenir History, p. 35. 
51Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877•1920 (American 
Century Series Edition), New York, 1968, p. 111, Baltzell, 
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departure of the Fountain Hill elite from South Bethlehem was 
symbolized by the life of Francis B. Sayre, the son of Robert H. 
Sayre. In 1913 he married Jessie Wilson, daughter of President 
Woodrow Wilson, and later pursued a distinguished career in the 
52 Foreign Service. Sayre's marriage marked the end of an era in 
South Bethlehem's history. 
132. 
The Fountain Hill elite gave South Bethlehem a group of leaders 
who exercised an enormous influence on the town's development. Their 
financial resources made them the unquestioned arbiters of the town's 
economic growth, and this resulted in their assumption of social and 
political leadership as well. Moreover, influenced by their membership 
in the Episcopal Church, the Fountain Hill industrialists also emerged 
as the community's moral leaders. Their concern for the local 
community's welfare, as well as their ability to implement that 
concern put them at the pinnacle of the local status hierarchy. No 
other local groups possessed the resources to challenge them, and, 
indeed, none wanted to. Moreover, in a South Bethlehem made up of 
many social and economic groups from a wide variety of ethnic and 
cultural backgrounds, the Fountain Hill leadership provided the town 
with a sense of community as '-Tell as continuity and stability. "7hereas 
Bethlehem's Moravian traditions had served to assimilate newcomers 
52 
Philadelphia Gentlemen, pp. 103-129, Maurice R. Stein, ~ 
Eeli ee·of·commurtit :'Art Inter retation·of·Ameriean Studies, 
Harper Torchbooks Edition New York, 19 3, p. 59. 
South Bethlehem Globe, Nov. 25, 1913, p. 1, Hutchinson, 
"niscoveey of Fountain Hill," p. A-14. 
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into existing patterns of social relationships, South Bethlehem had 
to create its own patterns, a task which the residents of Fountain 
Hill found themselves obliged to carry out. The families on 
Fountain Hill had developed roots in the community and felt that 
they had responsibilities toward it. As a local historian once 
noted, "they had supplied a tone and a social life that were of the 
best American-Victorian tradition."53 
53Raymond lvalters; Bethlehem ·Lons Ago· and ·Today, Bethlehem, Pa. 
1923, p. 62. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BETIILEHEM IRON BECOMES BETHLEHEM STEEL 
The Bethlehem Iron Company was reorganized as the Bethlehem 
Steel Company in 1899. By this time the South Bethlehem elite no 
longer had much influence over its affairs, and control of the com-
pany passed into the hands of Charles M. Schwab who made it into 
the nation's second largest steel producer. With the change of 
ownership carne methods of management based on impersonal bureau-
cratic principles to replace the informal procedurP.s of the previous 
regime. Because Bethlehem Steel was the economic heart of the local 
community, it was the means by which the values of a mature indus-
trial society, which these new techniques represented, became a part 
of the lives of the town's inhabitants. 
Bureaucratic methods of industrial management comprised but the 
tip of an iceberg, for they were only one manifestation of a funda-
mental change taking place in American life. After a half-century 
of intensive industrialization, the individualistic philosophy which 
underlay the nation's economic expansion no longer seemed to be an 
appropriate guide to behavior in a complex society. A new ethos, one 
derived from the experience of the industrial corporation, and based 
on bureaucratic ideals of rationality, order, impersonal regulations, 
and centralized decision-making, came to dominate American life. It 
134. 
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is the purpose of this chapter to describe this transformation, and, 
by using Bethlehem Steel as an example, show how the values of 
corporate industrialism became part of American life. 
A philosophy of individualism held the allegiance of the American 
people for most of the nineteenth century. For Americans, the ideal 
man was totally self-reliant, and European visitors to the United 
States such as de Tocqueville noted that the complex network of 
obligations and relationships which, in Europe, bound the individual 
to the rest of society, simply did not exist in the United States. 
A belief in the equality of all men had replaced notions of social 
hierarchy, and Americans asserted that each man's destiny lay in his 
1 
own hands, Thus, Americans resented any efforts by government or by 
society in general to interfere in the lives of individuals. The 
relatively fluid social structure of nineteenth century America, which 
alarmed Europeans, was a source of pride to the people of the United 
States. Where Europeans saw impending chaos, Americans believed that 
a natural harmony -- much like Adam Smith's invisible hand -- would 
preserve stability in a society of individuals freed from the artificial 
2 
social order of Europe. 
For Ralph Waldo Emerson, an unrestrained individualism appeared to 
3 be the means by which mankind could achieve moral perfection. To 
1 . 
Alexis de Tocquevtlle; ·nemoeract'irt'America, J.P. Mayer and Max 
Lerner, Eds., New York, c. 1966, p. 478. 
2 John William Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol·for·an Age, (Galaxy 
Books Edition), New York, 1962, pp. 207-213. 
3 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Selected Prose and Poetry, Reginald L. Cook, 
Ed., (Rinehart Edition), New York, 1963, pp. 165-180. 
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most Americans, however, individualism appeared to be the means by 
4 
which they could achieve economic success. The consequence of a 
wide-spread belief in uninhibited individualism was an era of 
restricted governmental authority and laissez faire economics. As 
Richard Hofstadter noted: "The same forces in American life that 
had made Jacksonian equalitarianism possible and had given to the 
equalitarian theme in the agrarian romance its most compelling appeal 
had also unleashed in the nation an entrepreneurial zeal probably 
without precedent in history, a rage for business, for profits, for 
5 
opportunity, for advancement." 
A materialistic individualism dominated the values of post-Civil 
War America and encouraged economic growth. The absence of a 
traditional European social order meant that Americans lacked the 
European's traditional attitudes regarding property, occupation, and 
6 business activity. Instead, men's lives revolved around the quest 
for wealth, and most Americans gave their approval to an ethic of 
economic exploitation. Competition, ruthlessness, acquisition, and 
un~qual wealth received the approbation of clergymen, academics, 
judges, lawyers, and politicians. Legislative enactments and judiciai 
4ward, Jackson, pp. 166-180. 
5Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: ·From·Bryan·to·F~D.R., 
(Vintage Books EditionJNew York, 1955, pp. 39-40. 
6John E, Sawyer, "The Entrepreneur and the Social. Order: . France 
and the United States," in William Miller, Ed.; Men·in·Business: 
Essa son the Historicsl'Role·of·the Erttre·reneur, (Harper Torch-
books Edition , New York, 1962, p. 20, 
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7 decisions institutionalized such values and gave them legal status. 
The mores of the time made it an age dominated by the spirit of the 
entrepreneur. 
For many nineteenth century Americans, the entrepreneur 
personified the ideal man: the self-reliant individual who created 
his own destiny. A psychological profile of the entrepreneurial 
type, developed by the late economist Joseph Schumpeter, goes far to 
show how well such a mentality meshed with the mores of the time. The 
entrepreneur, Schumpeter noted, was first and foremost an innovator. 
Entrepreneurs were rarely either inventors or capitalists. TI1ey seldom 
possessed a deep understanding of technological processes, and few of 
them risked their own capital. Instead, the typical entrepreneur was 
one who saw the commercial value of other men's new ideas, and per-
suaded men with capital to invest in ne~-1 ventures. As an innovator, 
the entrepreneur had to ,ossess unbounded confidence in himself and 
his ideas, and needed the energy and drive to pursue them regardless 
of opposition, Moreover, as Schumpeter pointed out, the entrepreneur 
often made business an avenue of social advancement: through business 
he sought to gain recognition and social distinction. Thus, the entre-
preneur aggressively pursued success, but he pursued success for its 
7Louis M. Hacker; ·The·world of Andre~·carnegie: ·1865•1901, New 
York, c, 1968, PP• 57-85, See also Richard Hofstadter; Social 
Darwinism·in·Americart Thought (Beacon Press Revised Edition), 
Boston, 1966, pp. 13-104, and Robert Green McCloskey, American 
Conservatism ·in ·the Ase ·of 'Ertterptise1 '1865 ... 1910: ·A ·studt:of. 
William Graham·sumrter; ·stephen·J~ 'Field; ·and·Artdte~·carnegi6 1 (llar.,e.r Torchbooks Edition), New York, 1964, PP• 1-21. 
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own sake, not for the wealth it would bring. For him wealth served 
primarily as an indication of achievement, it did not bring pleasure 
in itself. The entrepreneur derived his real pleasure from the 
accomplishment of the tasks he set for himself. As an innovator, an 
adventurer, and an interloper, the entrepreneur embodied the values 
of American society, and men like Andrew Carnegie and John D. 
8 Rockefeller becatne heroes to the 1\..merican public. 
If the American industrial economy owed its origins and growth 
to the competitive spirit of the nation's entrepreneurs, that same 
competitive spirit had little place in the highly developed and complex 
economy which had come into existence by the end of the nineteenth 
century. At that point, the nation 1s economy required stability rather 
than innovation, and control rather than competition. The modern 
industrial corporation proved to be the means by which these needs 
could be met. 
Corporations had long been known as a device for limiting the 
liability of investors in a business venture only to the extent of 
their investment if a creditor brought suit against the firm. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, however, this financial aspect of 
the corporation had been superseded by the corporation's function as 
8Joseph Schumpeter; The·Theory of ·Economie·Development:An 
Inguiry·into·Profits, ·capital; ·credit; ·Intereat·and·the'Buainess 
Cycle, Cambridge, Maas., 1934, pp. 90-94, the classic biographies 
of Carnegie and Rockefeller are: Burton J. Hendrick, ·The Life·of 
Andrew Carnegie, 2 Vole., Garden City, New York, 1932 and Allan 
Nevins, Study in·Power: ·John D. ·Rockefeller; ·Industrialist and 
Philanthropist, 2 Vola., New York, 1933. 
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the administrative unit of industrial production. By combining many 
formerly competing firms under one centralized leadership, the new 
corporations brought stability to American industry. Besides 
horizontal combination, vertical integration of all manufacturing 
processes from the obtaining of raw materials to marketing also be-
came a characteristic of the industrial corporation. In such complex 
organizations, managerial talents were of greater value than entre-
preneurial ones, and by the first decade of the twentieth century, 
bureaucrats were replacing entrepreneurs as the dominant figures in 
9 
the American business world. 
Bureaucracy is characterized by centralized decision-making, 
hierarchical chaine of command, impersonal regulations, and specialized 
departments staffed by career professionals who hold office b' virtue 
of a technical competence or expertise in a particular field. Because 
a bureaucratic organization emphasizes the rationalization of activity 
it produces stability and order, and this enables the organization to 
10 
plan for the future instead of being at the mercy of events. 
9Ed.wo.od C., Kirklnn~ ~ Tn~uRtry Comes of A e: Business Labor and 
Public Policy, 1860-1897, Quadrangle Paperbacko Edition , 
Chicago, 1967, pp. 195-215, John Tipple, "Big Businessmen and 
a New Economy," in H. ~-layne Morgan, The Gilded Age, Revised 
Edition, Syracuse, New York, c. 1970, pp. 13-30, William Miller, 
"The Business Elite in Business Bureaucracies: Careers of Top 
Executives in the Early Twentieth Century," in l-1iller Men in 
Business, pp. 286-305. 
10The classic analysis of bureaucracy is Max Weber; 'The ·Theory of 
Social and·Eeonomic or anization, Talcott Parsons, Ed., (Free 
Press Paperback Edition , New York, 1968, pp. 324-341, for a 
more recent analysis, see, Robert K. Merton, ·social Theory and 
Social Structure, Enlarged Edition, New York, 1968~ pp. 249-
278. 
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In the case of the industrial corporations, economies of scale 
resulted from the standardization of processes and the greater 
efficiency which bureaucracy made possible. All this made for 
profitability, and the success of the systematically organized 
corporation led to the ~pread of such managerial methods through-
out the American business world. 11 
Large scale technological production required administrative 
procedures to cope with the demands made on corporations whose mani-
fold activities involved them in an economy of continental scope and 
complexity. The nation's railroads, because they were the first to 
face the challenge of handling large amounts of men, money, and 
materials were the first business establishments to institute 
bureaucratic managerial controls. As mileage and traffic increased, 
railroads created specialized departments to carry out such tasks as 
maintenance, traffic, planning, and accounting, all of which were 
supervised by a central office. As examples of bureaucratic organiza-
tion, railroads thus served as models for later corporations to 
12 
emulate. 
Methods of systematic management were as necessary in the factory 
as they were in the administrative offices, because continuity and 
11Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy. and Structure:· Chapters in 
the History·of·the Irtdustrial·Enterprise, Cambridge, l1ass., 
1962, PP• 8-41. 
12Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Railroads: Pioneers in Modern 
Corporate U.anagement,"·Busirtess'History·Review, Vol. XXIX, 
Spring, 1965, PP• 16-40. 
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stability would be impossible without total control of manufacturing 
13 processes as well. The capacity of American factories to meet the 
demands of a growing market had grown. However, as companies expanded 
their operations, they often lost control of these operations, as new 
and specialized departments were added to existing factories. 
Coordination between departments performing separate, but related, 
functions was often nil, and the result was confusion, waste, and 
internal disorder. Thus, systematic management was necessary within 
the factory itself. Just as in the administrative structure, bureau-
cratic met~uJa ~~ta uaed in the plant to standardize procedures and 
14 
create chains of command. With professional experts in charge of 
technical ~rocesses control no longer depended on personality. A 
situation such as Captain Bill Jones' refusal of Andrew Carnegie's 
offer of a partnership because he feared it 'might create a gap 
15 between him and his men would not happen under the new system. 
The implications of scientific management went beyond industrial 
organization to include the whole complex of relationships between 
technology and society, or, in other words, between man and machine. 
Its proponents often compared the funct1.oning of a factory -- and later 
13sudhir Kakar, Frederick Taylor: A Study·in Personality and 
Innovation, Cambridge, Mass., c. 1970, P• 105. 
14 Joseph A. Litterer, "Systematic Management: Design for 
Organizational Recoupling in American Manufacturing Firms," 
·Business History·Review, Vol. XXXVII, Winter, 1963 11 pp. 369-391. 
15Robert A. Hessen 11 "A Biography of Charles M. Schwab, Steel 
Industrialist," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1969, p. 55. 
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of society in general - to a machine. The machine was an example 
of rationalized organization whose every specialized part contri-
buted to the machine's functioning. So it was with a social system; 
16 
each individual was seen to be a part of a larger whole. Moreover, 
just as the functioning of a machine was based on the systematic 
application of scientific law so, too, could scientific systematiza-
17 
tion be applied to human social groups. There was, of course, a 
depersonalizing element in all of this; systematic management left 
little room for personal idiosyncracy or autonomy. As Frederick W. 
Taylor, "the father of scientific management,,, bluntly declared: "In 
18 
the past man has been first; in the future the system must be first." 
Taylor, moreover, was referring not only to the factory but to the 
general society as well. In a tinte when the social controls appropriate 
to an individualistic society proved inadequate in an urban-industrial 
world, an ethic of organization had great appeal. To thoughtful 
Americans the application of scientific methods to the social structure 
of the factory seemed applicable outside it as well. As Samuel Haber 
has noted, the rationally organized factory "became one of those places 
where an important segment of the American intelligentsia saw the 
16 John ~alliam Ward, "The Ideal of Individualism and the Realicy 
of Organization," in Earl F. Cheit, Ed., The·Business·Establish-
ment, NeY York, 1964, pp. 62-63. 
17Robert H. Wiebe, ·The·seareh·of Order: 1877•1920, (American 
Century Series Edition), New York, 1968, pp. 151-154. 
18 . Frederick w. Taylor; The·Principles·of·seientific·Manasement, 
New York, 1911, p. 7. 
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future -- and saw that it worked". 
143. 
The development of bureaucratic concepts of industrial organiza-
tion had a major impact on the Bethlehem Iron Company. Moreover, 
because the company's affairs were of crucial importance to South 
Bethlehem, these concepts, and the value-system they represented, 
eventually influenced events in the community as well. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Bethlehem Iron Company 
had shed its reputation as a small, locally owned firm specializing 
in the manufacture of rails for anthracite railroads. This change in 
status was the direct result of the company's decision to enter the 
ordnance and armor plate fields. The nature of the new market required 
company officials to familiarize themselves with a world previously 
alien to them, for they now found themselves dealing with politicians, 
20 
government bureaucrats, and representatives of foreign governments. 
Moreover, to keep ahead of such competitors as the Carnegie Steel 
Company, Bethlehem's officials had to keep abreast of national 
21 political and economic developments as well as technological advances. 
In other words, for the Company to survive, its leaders had to abandon 
19samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in 
the Progressive Era, 1890•1920, Chicago, c. 1964, p. xi. 
20 Hessen, "Schwab", pp. 166, 175-178, Arundel Cotter, The Story 
of Bethlehem Steel, New York, 1916, pp. 3-7. 
21
s.G.to7. Benjamin, "The Works of the Bethlehem Iron Company", 
Harper's Weekly, Vol. 35, Mar. 14, 1891, p. 194, R. Hughes, 
11From Ore to Armor Plate,"·cosmopolitan, Vol. 28, Feb. 1900, 
pp. 405-413, Hessen, "Schwab", 177-180. 
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22 their previous local orientation for a more cosmopolitan one. 
144. 
Related to the company's entran~e into new fields of production 
was a change in the nature of its ownership. Prior to the late 1880's, 
the Bethlehem Iron Company had been owned and operated by the families 
of the local elite. However, in order for the company to enter the 
armor plate field, it needed additional capital. The funds came from 
Joseph Wharton of Philadelphia, a financier of note who later esta-
blished the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania. 
Wharton had been involved in the company's affairs since its creation 
in the 1860's, but after 1889, he possessed a quarter of the company's 
23 
stock and majority of its bonds. Wharton thus had an important 
influence upon the firm's activities and it was at his insistence that 
24 the company was reorganized in 1899 as the Bethlehem Steel Company. 
In 1899, the Bethlehem Iron Company had a capital of $7,560,000. 
In that year, the newly organized Bethlehem Steel Company obtained 
control of the Iron Company's various properties on a 999 year lease 
on a guaranty of six percent on the outstanding stock. The lease was 
later cancelled, Iron Company stock was exchanged for Steel Company 
bonds paying six percent, and the properties were transferred outright 
22 For a discussion of local and cosmopolitan orientations, see, 
Merton, Social Theory, pp. 441-474. 
23Frank B. Copley, Frederick·w. Taylor: ·Father·of·seientific 
Management, 2 Vola., New York, 1923, Vol. II, p. 7. R.n. 
Billinger, "Beginnings of Bethlehem Iron and Steel", typescript 
on deposit in the Schwab Memorial Library, Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation, Bethlehem, Pa., n.d., p. 13. 
24 Horace B. Davis, Labor and Steel, New York, c. 1933, P• 189. 
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25 to Bethlehem Steel. The reorganization ended the active involve-
ment of the Fountain Hill elite in Company affairs. Edward T. 
Stotesbury, a Philadelphia banker and later a J.P. Morgan partner, 
as well as other Philadelphia and New York financiers joined Wharton 
on the company's board of directors. Of the seven members of the 
revised board of directors, only one, Robert P. Linderman, the 
company'~ president, was associated with a family that had founded 
26 
the firm. 
Joseph Wharton was cne of the first financiers in the country to 
recognize the value of the systematic organization of industry, and 
it was at his initiative that Frederick W. Taylor went to Bethlehem 
in 1898 to improv~ the company's works. Th~ Cou1pany's expansion of 
its operations in the 1890's had not been accompanied by a corres-
ponding increase in managerial control. The office of general 
superintendent, as John Frttz had molded it, did not concern itself 
with plant operations, but with the design and erection of buildings 
and machinery, and with the planning of developments. Thus, no one 
man was responsible for coordinating the activities in the plant as 
a whole. The actual operation of the works wa~ left to the heads of 
various departments, such as forging, melting, tempering, and machine 
shop. Since, at this time, the company employed between five and 
25cotter; ·Bethlehem·steel, p. 6. 
26 South·Bethlehem·Globe, Aug. 28, 1901, p. 1. 
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27 
six thousan.d men, the resulting confusion and waste were intolerable. 
Thus, Wharton decided to secure the services of •raylor who had 
organized the works of the Midvale Steel Company, Bethlehem's com-
28 petitor in the manufacture of ordnance. Taylor arrived in South 
Bethlehem in May of 1898 with the understanding that he was to 
improve the efficiency of the various shops by introducing a piece-
29 
work system to increase production. 
Taylor did not have the same conception of his task as did the 
men who employed him. For Taylor, the entire plant was to be viewed 
as a whole whose parts had to be studied in detail, their operations 
systematized, and finally organized into a coordinated system. Thus, 
the introduction of a piece rate system in the company's machine shops 
meant first of all studying the methods, procedures, and tools used 
in the shop, and only then setting about the rational reordering of 
operations. Taylor's favorite tools were the slide-rule and the stop-
30 
watch, and, in fact, he was the originator of the time-motion study. 
AR a result of his studies, Taylor at times went so far as to design 
27copley, Taylor, Vol. II, p. a, see also, Ressen, "Schwab," pp. 
302-305. See also, Frederick W. Taylor to Robert P.. Linderman, 
June 2, 1898, in Taylor Collection, Stevens Institute of 
Technology, Hoboken, New Jersey. 
28Frederick w. Taylor to Russel Davenport, Jan. 4, 1898, Taylor 
Collection. 
29
copley, Taylor, Vol. II, p. 14. 
30 Kakar, Taylor,pp. 69-72, Frederick w. Taylor to Robert P. 
Linderman, May 27, 1898, Taylor Collection. 
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new tools and machinery for the shops whose activities was 
31 
systematizing. 
147. 
The scientific management of industry meant for Taylor the total 
control of all activities within a plant. He thus saw his task as 
including the introduction of standardized inventory controls, 
methods of cost accounting, hierarchical chains of command, and higher 
32 
wages for labor. This latter caused Taylor's employers some 
difficulty. He had been brought in to increase productivity and reduce 
labor costs, and they could not seem to follow his argument that re-
33 duced labor costs had to be coupled with higher wages. His system 
was based on piece-work rates, and if company officials wanted the 
men to work harder they had to pay them more. "My experience," he 
wrote, "is that it is necessary to pay them on Piece Work from 25 
to 50 per cent more than they can get on day work in order to stimulate 
34 them to their maximum." Taylor, as we have noted, saw the industrial 
plant as an integrated system, and, by paying labor higher wages, he 
sought to convince workmen t~at their interests were the same as 
their employer's. Taylor had no use for employers who cared only for 
35 
profit and did not consider their worker's welfare. He believed 
31Taylor, Princinles of Scientific Management, pp. 114-118, 
Copley; Taylor, Vol. II, pp. 117-118. 
32 Frederick w. Taylor to Robert P. Linderman, April 4, 1898, 
Taylor Collection. 
33 Frederick w. Taylor to Russel Davenport, Jan. 4, 1898, Taylor 
Collection, 
34Frederick w. Taylor to Robert P. Linderman, Jan. 19, 1898, 
Taylor Collection, 
35
copley, !aylor, P• 54. 
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that the proper implementation of his programs would insure labor's 
cooperation with management, and that a contented labor force would 
36 feel no need to resort to labor unions to obtain decent treatment. 
Taylor's approach to the problems of industrial activity can be 
seen in his systematizing of one of the most menial tasks in the 
Bethlehem Works: 37 shovelling. When he arrived at the works, the 
company employed some 600 men to move such materials as light ash, 
coal, coke, or ore about the steel yard wherever needed. The men 
owned their own shovelsp worked in large groups, and their activities 
carried them all about the yard which, by that time, covered an area 
about two miles long, and, in places, about half a mile wide. 
Taylor's first steps in reorganizing this activity was to run a 
series of tests to determine the optimum shovel load for a first-
class worker. He concluded that a load of 21 pounds was the ideal 
weight for a first-class shoveller. He also concluded that one kind 
of shovel would not do for handling all types of material, but that 
special shovels should be designed for specific tasks; a large one 
for ashes, for example, and a small one for ore. 
As a result of Taylor's investigations, work in the steel yard 
was systematized. The men no longer used their own shovels, but were 
given specially designed tools for each assignment. This meant the 
erection of tool rooms at various locations about the yard so that the 
36Frederick w. Taylor to William Crozier, Apr. 20, 1910, Taylor 
Collection, see also Taylor, ·Principles·of·Scientifie Management, 
pp. 10, 17-19, 72-77. 
37This and the following paragraphs are based on ~·• pp. 65-
71. 
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men would have the proper equipment immediately at hand. To 
eliminate the waste motion of men wander1bg about the yard, a yard 
staff was organized which planned work at least a day in advance, 
so that when individuals checked in, they would know what their 
jobs for that day would be. Large maps of the steel yard indicating 
the location of men and jobs permitted the staff to move gangs from 
one spot to another. A telephone network was installed in the plant 
to insure effective communication between the planning staff and the 
labor gangs. Once the yard was mapped, the relationship in time and 
space of various jobs could be seen, and reorganization of the yard 
itself soon followed. Materials were then delivered or dumped 
according to a logical sequence. 
Taylor's efforts at systematizing the yard produced remarkable 
results. After three years, 140 men did the same amoun~ of work 
600 had done previously. The cost per ton of handling materials 
was reduced by 50 percent. During the last six months of Taylor's 
stay at Bethlehem, when all the work in the yard had been 
systematized, the savings to the company amounted to between $75,000 
to $80,000 a year, after including the cost of a planning staff, new 
tools, and a wage increase of 60 percent for the workmen. 
Taylor's efforts at reorganizing activities in the steel works 
did not meet with universal approval. For one thing, he was an 
abrasive, tactless man who stubbornly insisted that his course of 
action was always the right one, and that those who questioned him 
38 
were his enemies. As important as his personality in creating 
38 Copley, Taylor, Vol. II, P• 150. Kakar, Taylor, pp. 39-40, 
59, 148-151. 
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opposition to Taylor's methods were the methods themselves. The 
most conspicuous element in Taylor's management system was its 
39 
150. 
imperso~ality. As in all bureaucratic schemes, scientific manage-
ment left little room for personal autonomy. At Bethlehem, the 
personal element dominated the company's management staff. After 
years of ownership by local families, the Bethlehem Iron Company 
had become a hotbed of nepotism. Nepotism, of course, was the 
traditional means of recruiting loyal staff when most firms were 
small family affairs and management was personal. By the time Taylor 
arrived at Bethlehem, the company had g~cwn in size, and nepotism 
40 
had become a synonym for incompetence. Taylor represented the 
winds of change at Bethlehem, and people who held positions because 
of personal connections resisted those changes. 
Taylor was dismissed fDom the company's employ in May of 1901. 
His activities had resulted in the creation of two factions: pro-
Taylor and anti-Taylor. The anti-Taylor faction was the larger of 
the two, and, moreover, it had the sympathetic ear of the company's 
president, Robert P. Linderman. In a sense, Taylor had been hired 
over Linderman's head by Wharton, a company director. Although 
nominally employed by Linderman, Taylor was, in reality, accountable 
to Wharton. It was to Wharton that he had to show results, but it 
39Haber, Seierttifie.·Manaeement, pp. 24, 28-29, Kakar, Taylor, 
PP• 68-69, 105, 
40 ... Copley, Taylor, Vol~ II, pp. 7-8, 21, on nepotism in business 
see Miller, 11The Business Elite", in Miller; ·Mert ·in Busi~_!, 
pp. 292-293. 
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was to Linderman that he had to go for authority to produce those 
41 
results. However adequate Linderman may have been in directing 
the company's financial affairs, he did not have a technological 
42 
background and had to rely on his staff for information. Since 
many of his subordinates were hostile to Taylor, Linderman's under-
standing of Taylor's goals and methods was, naturally, limited. 
In any event, Taylor and Linderman did not get on very well, and in 
the spring of 1901, Linderman bowed to pressure from the anti-Taylor 
faction. Upon Taylor's return from vacation, Linderman informed 
him that after May 1, 1901, his services would no longer be required. 43 
The dismissal of "that man" caused a collective sigh of relief from 
many company employees. Three months later, the Bethlehem Steel 
44 Company acquired a new owner: Charles M. Schwab. 
There were two legacies of Taylor's stay at Bethlehem. His 
attempts to improve efficiency led to the development of high-speed 
tool steel. His studies of the art of cutting metals resulted in 
the discovery that tools made from chromium-tungsten steels would do 
from two to four times as much work when heated to the melting point. 
This tool steel revolutionized the machine industry of the United 
41copley, Taylor, Vol. II, PP• 10, 22. 
42Ibid., pp. 145-146, see also Haber, Scientific·Martagement, 
~5, footnote.lO. 
43Robert P. Linderman to Frederick w. Taylor, April 17, 1901, 
Taylor Collection. 
44 Copley, Taylor, Vol. II, PP• 154-155. 
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States, and has been credited with enabling the United States to 
outstrip G~rmany in the production of. munitions during World War 
45 
152. 
One. Also, Taylor and an assistant, H.s. Gantt introduced a task-
bonus system for piece-work in the Bethlehem plant. It involved 
payment of a straight hourly wage plus a bonus for additional work 
with a set time period. This was reinforced by a bonus paid to 
the shop foreman as an incentive encouraging him to teach and help 
46 
his men. What Gantt and Taylor denounced as a misuse of this 
system under Schwab was to lead to serious labor trouble at Bethlehem 
in 1910.47 
When Charles M. Schwab purchased the Bethlehem Steel Company for 
$15,000,000 in August of 1901, he ~l'as thi.rty-ni~e yem::; oJ.rl » fl.n.d the 
president of the United States Steel Corporation. Schwab's rise in 
the steel industry had been meteoric. At the age of eighteen he 
obtained a job as an engineer's helper for a dollar a day at the 
Carnegie-owned Edgar Thomson Steel Works. Six yea~s later, at the 
age of 24, he advanced to superintendent of the COiupany's Homestead 
Works. Two years after that he returned to the Edgar Thomson Works 
as its general superintendent. After the bitter Homestead strike of 
1892, Carnegie ordered Schwab to restore normal relations in the plant. 
45 Kakar, Taylor, pp. 102-105. 
46 Copley, Taylor, Vol. II, p. 128, see also Taylor; Principles 
of Scientific·Management, pp. 121-122. 
47 ... , 
H.S. Gantt, Work; Wages·and·Profit, 2nd edition, New York, 1910, 
pp. 111-113, Frederick w. Taylor to William Crozier, Apr. 20, 
1910, Taylor Collection. 
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Upon the successful completion of this task, Schwab served as the 
manager of both the Homestead and Edgar Thomson Works. In 1897, at 
the age of 35, he became president of the Carnegie Steel Company. 
Receiving bonuses that amounted to six percent of the company's 
48 profits, Schwab was earning more than a million dollars a year. 
When the United States Steel Corporation -- the first American 
corporation to be capitalized for more than a billion dollars - was 
organi~ed in 1901, Charles M. Schwab became its first president. 
Schwab's appointment was more than simply a recognition of his 
abilities as a steel-maker, it was also a reward for his efforts 
in making the corporation a reality. Indeed, the idea of a great 
corporation which would rationalize the steel industry, and end 
ruinous competition by combining rival firms into one organization, 
was first broached by Schwab at· a dinner given in his honor in New 
York on December 12, 1900. In what may be the most important after-
dinner speech in American business history he told an audience which 
included J.P. Morgan and Edward H. Harriman about the state of the 
contemporary steel industry. The promise of the American steel 
industry was great, he said, and American technology was far in 
advance of its European competition. He felt, however, that the 
industry was not living up to its promise: there was too much 
duplication of product and too much destructive competition. A single 
48E. Neal Hartley, "Charles Michael Schwab," itt'Dictionary·o£ 
American·Biography, Vol. 22, Supplement. 2, New York, 1958, pp. 
601-602. Joseph F. Wall; 'Artdrew·carnegie, New York, 1970, pp. 
'.31-534, 666, 668-
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giant firm, rationally organized, would end all that, and, by 
rationalizing production and distribution, create great profits. 
In such a firm, each of its plants, strategically located, would 
specialize in a single product and thus dominate its market area. 
A centrally directed sales force could coordinate production and 
distribution. The consequences of integration would be great 
economics in manufacturing, and great profits which, in turn, could 
be used to find new uses for steel, permitting the opening of new 
. 49 
markets and the reaping of record profits. 
Schwab was not making concrete proposals in his sp~ech, but 
was giving voice to a vision he had of the steel industry's future. 
His visions were infectious, however, and, at least one of his 
listeners, J.P. Morgan, caught the disease. Morgan called Schwab 
aside after his speech, and interrogated the steel man for half an 
hour about his ideas. During the course of the next few weeks, 
Schwab drew up lists of what companies should be included in the 
proposed merger, and carried out the negotiations between Morgan 
and Andrew Carnegie, whose Carnegie Steel Company was to be the heart 
of the new firm. In all this he was a success, and the United States 
Steel Corporation, chartered in New Jersey with a capitalization of 
$1,403,000,000, came into being on Apr.il 1, 1901. On April 16, 
so Schwab, then aged 39, became the new corporation's first president. 
49Hessen, "Schw~b", pp. 20S-208, Wall; ·carnegie, pp. 785-793. 
so Sidney B. Whipple, "Notes on Mr. Schwab's Life," Unpublished 
typescript, 2 Vols. 1935, on deposit in the Charles M. Schwab 
Memorial Library, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Bethlehem, Pa. 
p. 86, Hendrick, Carnegie, Vol. II, p. 1~8. 
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Schwab held his position as president of the United States Steel 
until August of 1903, when he resigned. His years at the head of 
u.s. Steel were not happy ones. He quarrelled often and bitterly 
over matters of policy with the board of directors, most of whose 
members were financiers, not practical steelmen. ~loreover, he 
aroused the displeasure of J.P. Morgan by ill-considered speeches 
and a public deportment which did little to contribute to a 
reputation for maturity and a sense of responsibility. Since the 
initial public reaction to the formation of the uSteel Trust" as it 
became known was hostile, Schwab's construction of the largest and 
most lavish mansion in New York City, and his well-publicized pres~nce 
at the gaming tables in Monte Carlo did not improve the firm's image. 
However, it was Schwab's involvement in the United Ship-building 
scandal, which his biographer calls "one of the seamiest scandals 
in American industrial history," which forced him out of the 
51 presidency of u.s. Steel. 
Schwab's involvement in the Shipbuilding debacle grew out of his 
acquisition of the Bethlehem Steel Company in 1901, only a few 
months after he became president of United States Steel. He purchased 
80,000 shares from Bethlehem's Chairman Joseph Wharton, 60,000 from its 
president Robert P. Linderman, and another 20,000 shares on the open 
market. Since the firm had only 300,000 shares outotanding, this 
was enough to give him a controlling interest. The transaction cost 
5lnessen, "Schwab", pp. 213-280, the quotation is on p. 249, 
Wall, Carnegie, pp. 799-802. 
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him $15,000 1 000; $7 1500,000 of it was in cash and he gave his notes 
52 
for a like sum at six per cent. This was a personal investment 
of Schwab's, and he did not feel that ownership of Bethlehem con-
flicted with his role as president of United States Steel. J.P. 
Morgan disagreed, however, and convinced Schwab to turn Bethlehem 
over to him, with Schwab having the option to repurchase it at the 
53 
original price should he ever decide to leave u.s. Steel, 
In 1902, Schwab was persuaded to include Bethlehem Steel in a 
recently organized corporation called the United States Shipbuilding 
Company, Schwab repurchased Bethlehem from Morgan, and delivered it 
to the corporation, In return he received $10,000,000 in bonds, with 
Bethlehem's plant and properties as the collateral in case of default. 
lie also obtained 10,000,000 each in preferred and common stock, Thus, 
if the merger failed, he would at least reacquire Bethlehem Steel, 
54 if it succeeded, he stood to make a fortune, 
The United States Shipbuilding Company failed, and it failed 
spectacularly, Of the nine subsidiary companies in the corporation, 
only one, Bethlehem Steel, was solvent, When Bethlehem's officials 
were instructed to turn over its profits to the corporation, they 
refused, and the corporation collapsed, Buying out the other investors 
in the defunct firm, Schwab united the most valuable portions into the 
52 Hessen, "Schwab," p, 254, Alfred Henry Lewis, "Owners of 
53 
America, Part V: Charles M, Schwab," Cosmopolitan, Vol. 45, 
Oct, 1908, p. 485. 
Cotter, Bethlehem Steel~ pp. 8-10. 
54Heseen, "Schwab," P• 256, 
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Bethlehem Steel Corporation which was chartered in New Jersey on 
. 55 
December 10, 1904 with a capitalization of $30,000,000. 
Schwab had nearly total control over the Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation. Owning three-quarters of its stock in the firm's early 
years, and remaining its largest stockholder for a long time afterwards,. 
Schwab was in a position to do pretty much as he pleased. In the years 
after taking control of Bethlehem Steel, Schwab transformed the small, 
specialized company into the second largest manufacturer of a 
diversified line of steel products in the United States. He also 
established a steel empire east of the Pittsburgh district, an area 
which u.s. Steel had ignored. He was convinced that steel could be 
produced successfully on the East Coast with iron ores from Cuba and 
South America instead of being dependent on ores from the Lake 
Superior region. Through plant expansions and mergers Schwab reached 
his goal by the start of World War I, little more than a decade after 
56 his resignation from u.s. Steel. 
Schwab found Bethlehem devoted to the manufacture of a specialized 
line of products such as heavy forgings, ordnance and armor plate. 
Although profitable, such products had a limited demand, and Schwab 
set off on a program of expansion into other areas of production. 
Bethlehem entered into the structural steel market, something that 
55 ~., pp. 288-289, Cotter; 'Bethlehem·steel, p. 10. 
56 . . . 
Gertrude G. Schroeder, 'The·Growth·of Major·steel·companies: 
1900•1950, Baltimore, 1950, pp. 47-50. 
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,John Fritz had failed to get the company's directors interested in 
57 daring the 1880's. Taking a chance, Schwab purchased the patent 
rights to a structural steel beam recently invented by Henry Grey. 
Grey's invention was a design for making in one piece the big beams 
used :f.n the construction of large buildings. In the past, structural 
beams had been formed by riveting together a number of different 
sections of steel. Grey offered the rights to his beam to virtually 
every intportant steel firm in the country, but ~-1ithout results. Only 
Schwab had seen the potential of Grey's beam, but when he sought to 
acquire t:he patent for u.s. Steel, he was overridden by the directors. 
Once in C•ontrol of Bethlehem, Schwab decided to manufacture Grey's 
beam. Convinced of the new beam's potential, Schwab poured all the 
money he owned or could borrow into constructing a plant to produce 
it. The new Saucon Plant of the South Bethlehem works doubled the 
size of the existing plant as well as ita labor force. Schwab's 
gamble paid off. Grey's light, strong, and inexpensive beam made 
feasible the erection of skyscrapers, and, Bethlehem for many years 
remained the major producer of structural steel in the United States.58 
Schwab's ownership of Bethlehem Steel also resulted in changes 
in the company's organizations~ structure, changes which had been 
resisted when Frederick w. Taylor proposed them. Under Schwab, a 
definite managerial hierarchy was established, Centralized control 
57 
58 
John Fritz, The Autobiography of John Fritz, New York, 1912, 
pp • 17 4-·177 • 
Cotter, Bethlehem Steel, p. 44, Eugene G. Grace, Charles M. 
Schwab, New York, 1947, PP• 32-34, Hessen, "Schwab", pp. 296-
302, Whipple, "Notes", p. 257-258. 
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of operations replaced the virtual autonomy of departments which had 
existed under the previous regime. The office of General Manager 
was created to coordinate sales and production, and the able Eugene 
59 G. Grace was named to the position. Schwab did not tolerate 
nepotism and inefficiency; if an individual did not produce he was 
asked to resign. Moreover, Schwab firmly believed in promotions 
from within; he brought no new people with him when he took over the 
company. The only immediate changes in personnel Schwab made were 
to ask for the resignation of the firm's president and vice 
president -- men who could not accept Schwab's methods. As president 
he installed Archibald Johnston, a man whom Taylor considered to be 
60 
one of the few really able executives under the old regime. As an 
incentive, Schwab introduced an executive bonus system similar to that 
which had been in effect when he was employed by Andrew Carnegie. 
Monetary rewards, he believed, would increase the productivity of his 
subordinates. As Bethlehem prospered, bonuses rose to fantastic 
heights, and Schwab became as famous for his "Boys of Bethlehem," as 
61 Carnegie had been for his "Young Geniuses." 
In a time when the bureaucrat was replacing the entrepreneur as 
the representative American business leader, Schwab's career marks 
him as a transitional figure. His rise to prominence in the steel 
59Hessen, "Schwab"~ pp. 302-304. 
60
south Bethlehem Globe, June 30, 1906, p. 1, Copley; 'Taylor, 
Vol. II, P• 140. 
61 Cotter, Bethlehem Steel, pp. 20-22, "One of Schwab's 'Boys of 
Bethlehem'," Literary Digest, Vol. 55, Nov. 3, 1917, p. 87. 
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industry, had been the result of his. promotions through the hierarchy 
of the Carnegie Steel Company to the office of president, and from 
there to the presidency of United States Steel. To be sure, his 
rapid advancement was the result of talent and ability, but they 
were talents and ability of a bureaucratic rather than an entre-
preneurial nature. Schwab's rise had been the result of Carnegie's 
recognition of his talents: Schwab had not carved out his own path-
way to the top. Only at a rather later age than usual, and only 
after he had been forced out of u.s. Steel, did Schwab launch an 
entrepreneurial career by gaining control of Bethlehem Stee1.62 
Although Schwab's career was essentially a bureaucratic one,. 
his outlook was conditioned by the individualistit~ values of the 
era into which he had been born. He was, as William Miller has noted, 
63 
a hostage to his image of a freer past. Thus, Schwab's view of his 
life and career was conditioned by a value system which celebrated 
the entrepreneur. In later years, for example, he referred to him-
self as a "barefoot boy" with little education who rose to prominence 
64 
as a result of nothing more than hard work and a desire to succeed. 
In actual fact, however, Schwab's life did not conform to such a 
Horatio Alger-like formula. His family was not as destitute as he 
intimated. His father, John Schwab, owned a small woolen mill in 
62Hessen, "Schwab,"·passim, see.also, Miller, "Business Elite," 
in Miller, Ed.; ·Men·in·Business, p. 293. 
63tbid. 
64 Whipple, "Notes," PP• 5-11. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
161. 
western Pennsylvania, and had profited from providing the Union Army 
with blankets during the Civil War. He likewise owned part of a 
65 
livery stable and a small stage-coach line. Although Schwab's 
family'did experience some deprivation, it was not a grinding poverty, 
but more in the nature of a deferred satisfaction of immediate wants 
in the expectation of future success. 
Schwab never expressed a great regard for the value of formal 
education in preparing a man for success. He considered practical 
66 
experience of greater importance than a college education. He 
always pointed to himself ~s a man of limited schooling who had never-
the less risen to the top of his chosen field. However, like his 
stories of boyhood poverty, Schwab's description of his education was 
tailored by his view of himself as a self-made man. Schwab attended 
St. Francis College in Loretto, Pennsylvania. To be sure, the school 
provided little more than a high school education at the time, but 
in the 1870's even this was more education than most Americans received. 
In any case, Schwab completed courses of instruction in both sur·reying 
and engineering, valuable assets in an economy becoming more industrialized 
67 
every day. 
Of his early days in the steel industry Schwab liked to relate 
how, as a boy, Captain Bill Jones of Carnegie Steel found him 
work~ng as a grocery clerk and offered him a job driving stakes for 
65Hessen, "Schwab", pp. 10, 18-19, Grace, ·sehwab, P• 5. 
66 Charles M. Schwab, Succeeding·with'Whlt'You·nave, New York, 1917, 
pp. 32, 35. 
67Hessen, "Schwab", p. 27. 
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68 
an engineer for the sum of a dollar a day. This, like other 
aspects of Schwab's early life needs clarification. He did not 
enter the job market until the age of eighteen, somewhat later in 
life than the average ~-1orkingman. His first job, and the only one 
he ever held outside of the steel industry, was as a grocery clerk--
a ~-1hite-collar position. His background and education had not 
prepared him to look f ~rward to a career as a manual laborer. lfuen 
he took the job as an engineer's helper he did so with the 
expectation of acquiring enough practical knowledge to obtain a 
l1igher-ranking position. Indeed, in many respects, Schwab conformed 
to the profile established by Neu and Gregory of industrial leaders 
in the 1870's: he came from a middle-class background, had acquired 
a better than average education, entered the job market at a later 
age than was customary, and had expectation of rapid job mobility. 
To be sure, Schwab did differ from the standard profile. He was not 
of Protestant English stock or of New England background, but was the 
grandson of an early nineteenth century German immi.grant to 
Pennsylvania. He also differed from the profile in that he belonged 
to the Catholic Church instead of the Episcopal or Presbyterian, but 
69 
these differences were relatively less significant than the similarities. 
Schwab's career at Carnegie Steel was the story of an incredibly 
68 
69 
Whipple, "Notes", p. 22. 
Frances w. Gregory and Irene D. Neu, "The. American Industrial 
Elite in the 1870's: Their Social Origins," in Miller, Ed, 
Men in Business, PP• 193-204, Hessen, "Schwab", pp. 4, 16-17. 
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rapid rise. It was, however, a rise through a bureaucratic 
hierarchy. Bureaucrats hold their positions and receive promotions 
because of their professional competence, and such competence was 
what brought Schwab to the attention of his superiors. At a time 
where the steel industry was still at the stage of rule-of-thumb 
operations, Schwab set up a chemistry laboratory in his home, and 
worked far into the night studying the relatively young sciences 
of chemistry and tnetallurgy. By making himself indispensible to 
Captain Jones, he acquired the post of Jones' chief assistant. In 
this way he became known to Andrew Carnegie who appointed Schwab, 
then aged 24, head of the Homestead Works. Possessing a photographic 
memory, Schwab developed an expert knowledge of all branches of 
steelmaking, a knowledge which helped him rise to the presidency of 
70 Carnegie Steel. 
Schwab possessed more than a technical knowledge of steelmaking; 
he also possessed the valuable ability to convince people to do what 
he wanted. He was a born salesman and an accomplished speaker. 
71 
Reportedly, he could sell auybody anything. He was, as a later 
critic once noted, "a born actor: with his baritone voice, his ready 
flow of language, his golden-toothed smile and, above all, his 
marvelous gift for bursting into tears without a moment's notice, 
he knows how to fascinate enemies, Senators, government prosecutors, 
70 Whipple, "Notes", pp. 15, 17. 
71 Arundel Cotter, "Charles M. Schwab,"·Moody's·~$azine, Vol. 
18, July 1915, p. 324. 
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72 justices and rebellious stockholders." Congenial and democratic, 
Schwab administered the various steel firms he headed with what one 
73 historian has called a "gay ruthlessness." At Bethlehem Steel, 
for example, he reorganized the managerial hierarchy and then sub-
jected his subordinates to an almost constant pressure. If they 
did not meet expectations they were dismissed, but if they exceeded 
74 
expectations they received substantial bonuses. Schwab's com-
bination of bureaucratic talents and entrepreneurial drive transformed 
Bethlehem Steel from a manufacturer of special~zed steel products 
to a diversified industrial giant. 
In 1917 Schwab published a little volume entitled Succeeding With 
What You nave. In it, he gave the ambitious young man a series of 
helpful hints on achieving success in the business world. His formula 
was simply one of hard work and total devotion to the job. "If a 
young man entering industry were to ask me for advice I would say: 
Don't be afraid of imperiling your health by giving a few extra hours 
to the company that pays your salary," he wrote. Failure, in Schwab's 
mind, was the result of a reluctance to do more than what was expected~ 
"I have yet to hear an instance where misfortune hit a man because he 
worked overtime. I know lots of instances where it hit men who did 
not ••• More serious than physical injury is the slow relentless blight 
72 
"Bethlehem Bonuses," New Republic, Vol. 67, July 15, 1931, p.220. 
73navid Brody, Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919, 
Philadelphia, c. 1965, p. 20. 
74 Copley, Taylor, Vol. II, PP• 158-164. 
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that brings standstill, lack of advancement, final failure." The 
real key to advancement was to do more than one's fellow workers. 
"All successful employers of labor are stalking men who will do the 
unusual, men who think, men who attract attention by performing 
more than is expected of them. These men have no difficulty in making 
their worth felt. They stand out above their fellows until their 
superiors cannot fail to see them." Education was of little value 
compared to hard work, nor was genius required to achieve success, 
Ordj.nary men, using their normal abilities in a whole-hearted 
devotion to the job were as capable of reaching the top, Schwab be-
75 lieved, as those with a college education. 
Schwab's little homily on success gives some insight into the 
manner in which he adjusted the values he acquired during a more 
individualistic era to the realities of a society which had become 
increasingly organized, It will be readily observed that the advice 
which Schwab offered his readers contained nothing new. Rather, 
Schwab merely articulated values which Americans had long held dear: 
success and failure were both the result of an individual's moral 
qualities. The ambitious man succeeded because he worked hard and 
devoted all his energies to his chosen calling. Success was the reward 
for effort, and failure was the result of its absence. Other than a 
willingness to labor hard, success required no special talents; it 
could be achieved by anyone willing to pursue it. A man's destiny 
75 Schwab, Succeeding, PP• 11, 14, 26, 32-35. 
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lay in his own hand. Schwab's advice bore a close resemblance to 
the values expressed by Americans in Alexis de Tocq,ueville' s 
76 
day. However, there was a world of difference between Schwab's 
advice and that given by Ralph Waldo Emerson. Self-reliance 
played little part in Schwab's formula for success. Nowhere did 
he suggest to his readers that they strike out on their own, blaze 
new trails, or become entrepreneurs and create their own 
businesses. On the contrary, Schwab recommended that they apply 
their talents and energies within an organizational framework. 
Success came because an individual stood out from the crowd when he 
worked harder than his fellow employees, and thus gained the 
recognition of his superiors. Displays of zeal and competence would 
result in advancement in a corporate hierarchy. Success, as Schwab 
explained it, meant obtaining promotions not achieving independence. 
Thus, the expressions Schwab used seemed to indicate a continuity of 
values from the mid-nineteenth cen~ury to the first dec&des of the 
twentieth, but, in reality, close examination shows instead, a 
replacement of one set of values by another. In many respects, 
Schwab's adaptation of his values to a changed reality mirrored a 
process which took place in the minds of many Americans as they 
attempted to cope with a complex urban-industrial society. 
Although Americans displayed an initial hostility to bureau-
cratic values, an organizational ethos gradually became part of the 
76 See above, pp. 134-138. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
167. 
American scene. The dislike of. the giant industrial combinations 
when they first began to appear in the American arena, soon gave 
way to acceptance as people recognized their importance to the 
77 
continued functioning of an industrial economy. In a society 
grown increasingly complex and impersonal, a value-system stressing 
cooperation rather than competition appeared more and more 
appropriate. The transition from one set of values to another was 
not a difficult one for, as we observed in the case of Charles M. 
Schwab, bureaucratic ideas seemed to continue the reign of traditional 
small-town values. Energy, efficiency, frugality, promptness, 
78 
perseverance and a host of other values were common to both systems. 
Thus, Americans redefined what they meant by individual:fr:m, and by the 
early twentieth century individualism had come to be measured by 
participation in society rather than maintenance of an aloof distance 
from it. As the analogy of a machine came to be used as a 
description of society, the true individualist was declared to be the 
person who devoted himself to functioning as a specialized part of 
79 that machine. Just such an attitude permeated Herbert QJ.",_cf~l:;yi' s 
'· 
The Promise of American Life, a book of great influence on the climate 
77 Richard Hofstadter, "What Happened to the Antitrust ~1ovement? 
Notes on the Evolution of An American Creed", in Cheit, Ed., 
The Business Establishment, pp. 113-132. 
78Hofstadter, Age·of Reform, p. 225, Wiebe, Search for·order, 
PP• 133-134. 
79
ward, "Individualismand Organization", in Cheit, Ed., The 
Business Establishment, pp. 62-63, 68-69, Taylor, ·prirtcrpres 
of Scientific·Management, pp. 125-127. 
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80 
of reform politics during the Progressive period. In bureaucratic 
organization, a professional competence is highly prized, and in a 
complex society, professionalism became the new individualism of 
the American middle class. Teachers, lawyers, doctors, social 
workers, engineers and other experts created professional organiza-
tiona which set the standards for entrance into those professions, 
They thus became the recognized practitioners of their specialized 
81 
occupations within an impersonal and variegated society. A 
collective individualism replaced an atomistic individualism or, to 
use David Riesman's terminology, Americans abandoned "inner 
82 direction" for "other-direction," The true individualist, it was 
now said, functioned as part of a team, and a homogeneous, not a 
83 pluralistic, society should be the goal for which Americans strove. 
Although the residents of South Bethlehem were not aware of it, 
Schwab's acquisition of Bethlehem Steel meant that the relationship 
which had long existed between the company and the community was to 
change.. As in most small industrial tolms, the inhabitants took an 
80Herbert Croly:,,· The Promise of American Life, (Capricorn Books 
Edition), New York, 1964, pp. 427-441. 
8lwiebe, Search for Order, p. 111-132, 
82navid Riesman, The Lonely·crowd: A Study·of·the Chadging 
American·character, New Haven, c. 1950, pp. 14-17, 19-25, 
see also Michael Kammen; P~ople·of'Paradox: ·An·Inguiry·con-
cerning the Otigirts·of·Am~tican·civilization, New York, 1972, 
pp. 266-267, for a discussion of "collective individualism." 
83For example, see CroL.:;v;•;. Promise ·of ·American ·Life, pp. 399-
454, 
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84 
almost proprietary interest in the company's affairs. Since the 
company had been in the hands of local owners for decades, it was 
naturally assumed that Schwab's purchase of the former Linderman 
mansion indicated that Schwab would continue the traditions esta-
blished by the old Fountain Hill elite. This was not the case, for 
Schwab's orientation was to a world of national and international 
85 
financial and industrial affairs. He had no special loyalties to 
a small Pennsylvania steel town. He was a product of corporate 
industrialism, and it was the Bethlehem Steel Corporation not South 
Bethlehem on which he lavished his attentions. If he placed any value 
on the community, it was merely as a source of labor. The strike 
which occurred in February of 1910, precipitated a collision between 
these two value systems, which forced South Bethlehem to look at 
its~lf in an entirely new light. 
84 Copley, Taylor, Vol. II, pp. 45-47, see also·south·Bethlehem 
Globe, May 24, 1905, p. 1, June 3, 1905, p. 1, Mar. 1, 1907, 
P• 1, Sept. 14, 1907, P• 1. Wall, Carnegie, PP• 581-583. 
85Fo:r discussion of the itnpac·t of corporate industrialism on 
small towns, see Page Smith~ AS a CitY Upon a'Hill: 'The'Town 
·in·Amerieart History, New York, 1966, p •. l07, and Maurice R. 
Stein;·The·Eelipse of·communit: ·Art·Inter retation·of·Ameriean 
Studies, (Harper Torehbooks edition , New York, 1964, pp. 
85-86, 90-91. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE STEEL STRIKE OF 1910 
Charles M. Schwab brought to South Bethlehem a new and unt:amiliar 
set of attitudes regarding the management of industrial operations 
when he acquired control of the Bethlehem Steel Company. The im-
plementation of these attitudes led to the outbreak of a strike ut 
the company's South Bethlehem Works in February of 1910. Although 
the strike originated in a dispute over wages and hours, it soon 
developed into something more than a conflict between labor and 
management. It became a struggle between the company and the 
community itself, and, as such, marked a collision between opposing 
systems of values. In that sense, the victory of the company, after 
a long and drawn-out struggle, meant the triumph of the values of an 
urban-industrial society over those of the small town. 
Schwab often proclaimed himself the ftiend of labor. "The best 
understanding that can be reached between capital and labor is achieved 
when you make the workmen realize that they are as much a part of the 
1 business as the stockholders", he stated. "When reductions have to 
1sidney B. Whipple, "Notes on Mr. Schwab's Life," Unpublished 
typescript, 2 Vola., 1935, on deposit in the Charles M. Schwab 
Memorial Library,. Bethlehem St~el Corporationp Bethlehem. Pa., 
PP• 71-72. 
170. 
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be made the proper thing to do is to call the men in and take them 
into your confidence. Show them your cost and profit sheets. 
Demonstrate your position, frankly, and honestly, and you'll have no 
2 trouble." Congenial and accessible, Schwab was, as an individual, 
a favorite among his workers. 3 This friendship for labor had its 
limits, however, for Schwab would not allow unions in the companies 
he ran. "I will not permit myself to be in the position of having 
4 the labor dictate to the management," he declared. To some of 
his critics, Schwab's stand on labor smacked of hypocrisy. "The 
fact to be observed in all this", one wrote, "is that where unpleasant 
things have to be said about labor, Charlie doesn't say them. Some-
one else does the talking, and thus it is with entire truthfulness 
that Charlie can declare that my happiest reflection on my past 
5 business career, has to do with my relation to the workingman." 
Schwab's attitude towar~ labor was that of the entrepreneur. He 
viewed labor as simply one more factor in the production of steel 
which had to be accounted for; unions were a disruptive factor in 
attempts to rationalize business. Like Andrew Carnegie, Schwab saw 
2 ~·~~ P• 74. 
3Frank P. Stockbridge, "S<:hwab, Leader of Men," The World's Work,· 
Vol. 36, July, 1918, p. 2.47. 
4clarence w. Barron; ·They. Told .Barron: ·.conversations ·and 
Revelationa·of·an·American·Pepts'in'Wall'Street, New York, 1930, 
P• 82. 
5Arthur Strawn, "A Man of Heart,"·Anterican·Mercury, Vol. 12, Oct. 
1927, P• 142. 
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little conn.ection between wages and productivity. Seeking to maximize 
profit, Schwab viewed the question of wages in terms of their relati·on 
to low operating cost. As president of Carnegie Steel, he consistently 
6 
sought to cut wages, as an easy way to cut costs. Under Schwab, the 
wages paid at Bethlehem were said to be the lowest in the steel indus-
7 try. 
Of particular complaint among the Bethlehem Steel Company's em-
ployees was Schwab's bonus system. As designed by Frederick w. Taylor 
and H.s. Gantt, this system was intended to reward workers for 
efficiency and, by so doing, increase production. An increase of 
30 to 60 percent in wages, they believed, would encourage the men to 
see that their interests and those of their employers were identical. 
For the employer, the bonus system would result in an increased 
8 productivity as well as lower his over-all costs. The bonus plan as 
employed by Schwab retained the mechanics of the system designed by 
6David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era, Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1960, pp. 40-41, Robert A. Hessen, "A Biography 
of Charles M. Schwab, Steel Industrialist," Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Columbia University, 1969, pp. 130, 133. For a 
general discussion of the entrepreneurial attitude toward labor 
and unions, see, Edward c. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age: 
BusinessA-Labor and Public Policy, 1860-1897 (Quadrangle Paper-
backs Edition) Chicago, 1967, pp. 362-363, Joseph F. Wall, 
Andrew Carnegie, New York, 1970, pp. 343-346, 624-628. 
7
"The Bethlehem Strike," The Survey, Vol. 24, May 21, 1910, pp. 
308-309. 
8Frederick w. Taylor; ·The·Prineiples·of·seierttifie.-Martagement, New 
York, 1911, pp. 39, 74, 121-122, n.s. Gantt; ·work; ·wases ·and 
Profit, 2nd Ed., New York, 1913, pp. 72~73, 110-115, Frank B. 
Copley, ·Frederick W~ 'Taylor: ·Father·of·Seierttifie Martagement, 
2 Vola., New York, 1903, Vol. II, pp. 127-133. 
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Taylor and Gantt, but ignored its spirit. In practice, the plan 
called for an hourly rate and a bonus of 20 percent if the work 
assigned was completed within a specified time. If more than the 
assigned work was completed within the set time, an additional bonus 
of 50 percent was paid. Although Schwab was proud of his plan, and 
publicized its use, not all of his employees shared his enthusiasm. 
They claimed that the plan worked to their detriment, for, they said, 
it was used as a speed-up, and, under it, the normal work rate was 
gradually increased. The bonus, in effect, became a necessity in 
9 
order to bring earnings up to the level of wages prevailing elsewhere. 
Since the men naturally sought to earn as much as possible during the 
regular work day, they were often tired by the end of their normal 
shifts and resented company demands that they work overtime. 
The question of overtime work was an issue of particular bitter-
ness among employees. Overtime work had been paid for at the rate of 
time and a half prior to the recession of 1907. Since that time, 
10 however, overtime work was paid for at the regular hourly rate. By 
1910, the company was earning near record profits, and so its 
refusal to pay an increased rate was particularly irksome to the men 
who had to work overtime. Moreover, overtime work was not a question 
of choice: a. ·refusal to do such work often meant dismissal.11 
9John A. Fitch, The·steelwotkers, New York, 1911, p. 342. United 
States Bureau of Labor; 'Report on·the·strike·at·the Bethlehem 
Steel Works, Washington, 1910, p. 15. 
10Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
11Ibid 
-·· 
p. 15, "The Bethlehem Strike,"·The·survex, p. 306. 
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Long hours were resented by both the company's skilled 
machinists as well as its unskilled laborers. In January of 1910, 
there were 91 184 men on the payroll. Over 97 percent of the work 
force had a normal work day of at least 10 hours 25 minutes, with 
51 percent of the total force working 12 or more hours. For 29 
percent of the company's employees, the work week was seven days 
long with no extra compensation for Sunday work. When the other 71 
percent of the work force, those who had a six-day week, came in on 
Sunday, their labor was considered overtime, but, nevertheless, they 
received only the regular wage for their work. In January of 1910, 
··- 12 43.5 percent of the company's employees did Sunday work. 
Work in a steel mill was dangerous, and long hours did nothing 
to ensure safety. During 1909, 10 percent of all the men employed 
by the company met with some kind of accident, with as many as 2 
percent o£ the workers in two different departments being injured. 
13 
Twenty-one men lost their lives while at work. One resident of 
South Bethlehem noted that "we see the ambulance go three or four or 
five times a day, and sometimes six or eight, to and from the 
14 hospital; it passes by my office." 
12 Report on Strike, pp. 9-16. 
13 Ibid., p. 121. For a general discussion of the hazards in-
VOiVed for men working in steel mills see Brody; ·staelworkers 
in America, pp. 100-101, 159-161. 
14 
"Testimony of Mr. Harry A. Cyphers", in United States 
Commission on Industrial Relations; 'Firtal·Report·and·Testimony, 
Vol. XI, Washington, 1916, p. 10614. 
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For long hours of dangerous work, compensation was small. Pay-
roll figures for January of 1910 show that of 9,184 men, 2,640 or 28 
percent earned 12 to 14 cents an hour. Another 1,528 received 14 to 
16 cents an hour. Of all the employees, 61.2 percent made less than 
18 cents an hour or $2.10 for a day's work. Only 21 highly skilled 
15 individuals made more than 60 cents an hour. 
Late in January of 1910, a skilled employee in the No. 4 
Machine Shop was dismissed for refusing to work overtime. Shortly 
thereafter, a committee of three approached their superintendent 
with requests that the discharged machinist be reinstated, that 
Sunday work be eliminated, and overtime work in the shop be reduced 
to a minimum. These requests were refused, and a few days later 
the three delegates were themselves discharged for refusing overtime 
work. To their fellow machinists, these dismissals seemed to be a 
reprisal for the three men's earlier action, and in protest, the men 
in the No. 4 Machine Shop decided to strike. They were joined by men 
from Machine Shops No. 3 and No. 6, raising their number to about 800. 
At this point the company's plant police forced the striking 
machinists to leave the plant. The strikers repaired to a nearby 
open field, where they established a committee to call on Schwab to 
discuss their grievances. Meeting with Schwab in his office, the 
delegates asked for the riinstatement of the dismissed men and for 
abolition of overtime work, or, if this could not be done, to pay 
15Report·on Strike, P• 19. 
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time and a half for such labor. Schwab gave the committee several 
reasons why overtime had to continue, and why the company could not 
pay time and a half for it. When pressed by the committee to attend 
a gene~al meeting of the striking machinists that afternoon to explain 
his position, Schwab declined. Later, Schwab did attend the meeting 
but, by then, news of his earlier refusal had inflamed the strikers. 
They hooted and ·1-~ered his statement that if the men came back their 
grievances would be attended to on an individual basis, but that the 
company would not negotiate through the strikers representatives. 
On Sunday, February 6, a committee approached the superintendent 
of the plant, C.A. Buck. The members came from a meeting in which 
the striking machinists decided to drop their demands regarding over-
time work. They would return to work if everyone, including the 
three machinists previously dismissed, were reinstated. The strike 
might have ended then and there, but Buck, fearing this would appear 
as capitulation, and set a precedent in future demands for collective 
bargaining, refused. The men could all return to work, he said, but 
the company would decide whom it would emplO)'. "In other words," 
Buck stated, "the company wants it understood that the Bethlehem 
16 Steel Company is running that plant." Stunned by news of the rebuff, 
the strikers voted unanimously to stay out. 17 
To observers, the most significant aspect of the strike was its 
1611Statement submitted by the Executive Committee of the 
Strikers," in~., p. 38. 
17 South Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 7, 1910, p. 1. 
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18 
spontaneity and unorganized character. No unions existed in the 
plant, and in South Bethlehem itself there were only a few organized 
bartenders and a small carpenter's union. Well aware of Schwab's 
dislike of unions, the strike's leaders deliberately avoided the 
subject of organization for several days in the hope that the dispute 
could be settled quickly. Only after Buck's refusal to reinstate all 
of the striking machinists did their executive committee permit union 
organizers to work among the men. In fact, the executive committee 
had not requested the assistance of organizers from the American 
Federation of Labor. The organizers a·rrived 1n South Bethlehe'ill only 
after being informed of the strike by the pres:f.dent of the local 
19 
bartender's union. 
Upon their arrival, the labor organizers were dismayed by the 
informal character of the strike, and especially by the absence of 
any preparations for a long struggle. Indeed, their first advice 
was for the machinists to call off the strike and return to work. A 
strike ~o1as a long-term affair, and, in their present state, the men 
could not support one. The only alternative was to organize, a 
suggestion offered not only by the A.F.L. representatives but by a 
20 few South Bethlehem residents as well. 
18 
19 
"The Struggle for Industrial Democracy," The Outlook, Vol. 95, 
July 16, 1910, pp. 306•308. Report on Strike, p. 17, Brody, 
Steelworkers in America, p. 161. 
Report on Strike, p. 17, see also "Executive Committee State-
ment," ibid., p. 38, and "Statement submitted by the Company," 
~., P• 23. 
20 SoutP Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 7, 1910, p. 3, Feb. 8, 1910, p. 1. 
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From the start, an executive committee of thirty machinists 
controlled the strike. The organizers from the national unions worked 
with the committee and gave advice, but were regarded as distinctly 
subordinate to it. For the most part, the union representatives 
confined themselves to organizing the various trades and helping to 
formulate demands. The committee maintained its authority by holding 
daily mass meetings, presenting speakers, giving suggestions, planning 
fund-raising activities, and, above all, keeping the strike peaceful. 
The strike began over a question of working conditions, and could 
have been settled easily. The machinists' original demand of time 
and a half for overtime work was made in the hope that such a pay scale 
would be so prohibitive as to result in the total abolition of Sunday 
21 
and other overtime work. Since the machinists enjoyed the highest 
wages an? shortest hours in the plant, th~J had to include the demands 
of men from other departments before new strikers would join their 
ranks. The organizers assumed the task of drafting proposed wage 
and hour scales for each department in the works, In most cases they 
suggested both increased wages and reduced hours. Drafting such proposals 
took time, and it was not until the strike was more than a month old, 
that specific requests for wage increases were presented to the 
22 
company. 
Although the machinists made their decision to strike without 
21 . . 
Report·on·strike, p. 17. 
22 See !bid., PP• 26-32 • 
.......... 
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reference to other workmen in the plant• they soon gained allies, 
Within a few days, they were joined by 500 unskilled immigrant 
laborers who left the plant en masse, They were followed by 150 
molders and 200 riggers. These recruits joined the strikers ranks 
23 
even before any wage demands were formulated, 
For the strike to succeed, public support was a vital necessity, 
and the strike leaders made the greatest effort to avoid violence. 
The executive committee advised the men against gathering on street 
corners or in saloons to discuss their grievances, The strikers were 
also warned against fighting or even th~ mere discussion of violence. 
The committee chairman, David Williams, announced that he, personally, 
would report to the Chief Burgess the name of any striker carrying a 
weapon. The company, he counselled, desired an excuse to bring the 
State Constabulary to Bethlehem to break the strike. Those who 
advocated violence 't-7ere sure to be in the pay of the company, he said, 
24 
and should therefore be avoided. The striker's self-policing 
activities were successful, and for several weeks, the strike was free 
from even minor incidents. In fact, a newspaper in a neighboring 
town characterized the strike as "one of the most orderly labor struggles 
25 
in the history of the country." South Bethlehem was, in the words 
23
south Bethlehem'Globe, Feb. 7, 1910, p. 1, Feb. 8, 1910, p. 1, 
see also 11Executive Committee Statement" in·Report·on·strike, 
p. 38. 
24
south·Bethlehem·Globe, Feb. 8, 1910, p. 3, Feb. 22, 1910, p. 1. 
25Allentown Democrat quoted in "Testimony of Mr. David Williams," 
in Final'Report·and·Testimony, Vol. XI, p. 10945. 
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26 
of one resident, "About like an ordinary Sunday morning - quiet." 
The arrival in South Bethlehem of organizers from the radical 
Industrial Workers of the World nearly upset the executive committee's 
plans to keep the strike peaceful. The I.w.w. representatives were 
given permission to address the strikers on the condition that they 
not advocate violent action. However, this was exactly what they 
did advocate, much to the committee's alal~. As a result, the 
committee requested the Chief of Police to refuse the Wobblies the 
use of the Municipal Hall where the strikers normally met. Undaunted, 
the men from the I.w.w. spoke to a meeting of the foreign-born 
strikers the next night and again suggested that the men pursue a 
course of violent action to obtain their rights. fheir arguments 
were diluted, however, when they were followed by the remarks of a 
local Hungarian strike leader who reminded h~s audience that violence 
would result in the "Cossacks", that is, the State Constabulary, 
being brought to South Bethlehem. Having made little headway, the 
Wobbly organizers left town shortly thereafter, much to the committee's 
relief. 27 
The peaceful nature of the strike in part reflected the support 
which residents of South Bethlehem, in general, gave to the striking 
26 
27 
"Cyphers Testimony," in·ibid., p. 10612. 
-
South·Bethlehem·Globe, Feb. 22, 1910, p •. l, Feb. 23, 1910, p. 
1. 11Williams Testimony", in'Firtal·Report·an.d·Testimony, Vol. 
XI, PP• 10946-10947. For the .r.w.w., see Melvyn Dubofsky;:we 
Shall Be All: ·A·History·of·the·rndustrial·workers·of·the·wot1ld, 
Chicago, 1969. 
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steelworkers. The borough council, one of whose members was himself 
on strike, permitted the strikers use of the Municipal Hall for 
meetings and headquarters space free of charge. Moreover, the local 
police sympathized with the strikers, and winked at minor infractions 
of the law. Indeed, the local police made only one strike-related 
arrest, and it was of a strike-breaker for threatening people with 
a revolver. The open sympathy of the police for the strikers was, 
28 
of course, a source of exasperation for company officials. 
That local authorities gave support and sympathy to the strikers 
and not the company was not surprising. As Herbert G. Gutman has 
pointed out, this was often the case in small industrial communities 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Inhabitants of small 
towns did not share the hostility toward labor prevalent in large 
metropolitan centers. In the small town, social relationships were 
still face to face; the town's middle-class, its businessmen, lawyers 
and other professionals, had direct contact with the workers and 
knew their problems, Outside the large cities the impersonal ideology 
of an industrial society did not take immediate hold, and the small 
town's reaction to labor conflicts was based more on moral con-
siderations than on economic ones, Thus the inhabitants of the small 
industrial community judged the situation in terms of a value system 
28 
"Statement of Mr. Hugh Kelly, Ex-Chief of Police," in Report 
Ort'Strike, p. 43, "Company Statement," irt'ibid., p. 24, see also 
ibid,, p. 21-for i'• the opinion of the Labor 'BUreau investigators 
~erning police sympathies. 
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rapidly becoming outdated. Believing in the sanctity of private 
property and free enterprise, they also assumed that an employer 
had a moral duty to treat his employees fairly. They expressed little 
or no sympathy for the concems of the industrialist seeking to 
29 
rationalize production by use of impersonal rules and sanctions. 
The political structure of the small town likewise encouraged 
local officials to side with strikers in an industrial conflict. 
In a one or two industry town, workingmen had a great political in-
fluence because they made up a large part of the electorate. More-
over, a system of ward representation required that a councilman 
live in the ward he represented. Since wards often had definite 
socio-economic characteristics, a councilman from a working-class 
ward, if he were not a workingman himself, would almost surely share 
their values and aspirations. Consequently, employers often had to 
reach outside the local community for authority to impose their will 
30 
on striking employees. 
Such conditions prevailed in South Bethlehem. Local businessmen 
encouraged the strikers to organize themselves into unions, and a 
member of the strikers' executive committee also served as a member 
31 
of the borough council. Moreover, Charles M. Schwab's status in 
29 . 
See Herbert G. Gutman, "The Workers' Search for Power," in H. 
Wayne Morgan, Ed.; 'The'Gi1ded·Age, Revised Edition, Syracuse, 
New York, c. 1970, pp. 31-53. 
30Ibid., PP• 33, 37. 
-31see·south·Bethlehem Globe, Feb. B, 1910, p. 1. 
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the local community was ambivalent. Although he possessed great 
wealth and economic power, he did not also possess the moral authority 
which had formerly belonged to the Fountain Hill industrialists. In 
seeking to break the strike Schwab was not able to rely on the local 
police, but would have to rely on the State Police; an organization 
whose authority did not derive from the local community and whose 
values were those of an impersonal society. 
Ethnic diversity and hostilities might have been expected to 
hinder a widespread community support of the strike but this was not 
the case. The large numbers of immigrant ~-1orkmen participating in 
the strike from its start encouraged the feeling that the strike was 
truly a community affair. The native Americans welcomed the immigrant 
strikers into their ranks, and treated them as equals; both groups 
attended the same meetings where speakers addressed the audience in 
both English and Hungarian. Grateful for this recognition, the 
immigrants responded enthusiastically, and South Bethlehem's ethnic 
communities, not just individual workmen, supported the strike. In~ 
deed, coming from village societies which encouraged a sense of group 
solidarity, immigrants made better strikers than their more individual-
istic American fellows. At a meeting of Hungarian women, for example, 
single girls took a pledge that they would not marry "scabs". Rather 
than go to work as strikebreakers, many men either left town for 
employment elsewhere or took the opportunity to return to Europe. 
Of 121 individuals named as "scabs" in a circular handed out by strikers, 
only 11 '\-7e:ce Eastern Europeans. That their names were supplied by 
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other immigrants can be seea in the phonetic spelling of the men's 
addresses: Mekenek St. for Mechanic St. and Skuloli St. f.or School 
32 Alley. 
Only the local clergy expressed disapproval of the strike. Early 
in the strike, David Williams had exhorted his followers to appeal to 
their clergymen for support. "Go to your pastors and priests," he 
stated, "and tell them that it is in their interest to come to your 
aid; that the conditions robbing you of the rest needed and the work 
33 
on Sundays have been fixed by one man -- C.M. Schwab." Such 
appeals had little effect, however. In the opinion of the Federal 
Council of Churches, "7hich sent observe~s to South Bethlehem, the 
Protestant ministers were too far removed from the workers to under-. 
stand their problems. Most of them ministered to middle-class 
congregations, while many of the men employed by the company were 
Catholics: there was little contact between the two. Having spoken 
with Schwab, the ministers were convinced that the strikers' charges 
of excessive Sunday work were unfounded, and some expressed the 
opinion that workmen, in any case, abused their Sundays and holidays 
32 South Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 8, 1910, p. 1, Feb. 28, 1910, p. 3, 
Mar. 4, 1910, p. 1, Mar. 7, 1910, p. 1. "Notorious Scabs," 
South Bethlehem, Pa., March, 1910, circular in author's 
possession. For discussions of the effectiveness of Eastern 
European immigrants as strikers, see Brody, ·steelworkers in 
America, PP• 138-140, Victor.R. Greene.;.The·slavic'Community 
on·strike: ·rmmtsrant·Labor·in·Pertrtstlvartia'Artthracite, Notre 
Dame, Ind., 1968, pp. 95-110, and John N. Ingham, 11A Strike in 
the Progressive Era, McKee's Rock, 1909,"'Pertrtstl~artia·Masazine 
of History artd'Biography, Vol. xc, 1966, pp. 353-373. 
33south Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 11, 1910, p. 1. 
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by drunkenness, ballgames and the like. Although some ministers did 
attend strike meetings, they did not go to offer aid; they went to 
34 
persuade the men to return to work. The sympathies of the local 
ministerial association were made clear in an open letter to the 
strikers published in the South Bethlehem Globe: 
Only the officials of the company can accomplish 
the righting of existing wrongs •••• Is it 
reasonable to expect that by attacking your 
employer, you can persuade him to deal generously 
and magnaimously with you?35 
Similar questions were not addressed to the company. 
The only clerical support the strikers received came from the 
Catholic priests whose parishioners were unskilled immigrant 
36 
laborers. They were of little standing outside their ethnic 
communities, however, and of the two priests who did exert a community-
wide influence, one was a personal friend of Schwab's while the other, 
who originally encouraged the strikers, withdrew his support after 
37 being persuaded by Schwab that the strike was being led by Socialists. 
34 Graham Taylor, "The Rapprochment of the Church and the Working 
World," The Survey, Vol. 24, July 2, 1910, p. 577, John A. 
Fitch, "Bethlehem: the Church and the Steelworkers,'! The Survey, 
Vol. 27, Dec. 2, 1911, p. 1296, "Will Bethlehem Follow Pitts-
burgh," Literary Digest, Vol. 41, July 16, 1910, p. 204. 
35~outh Bethlehem Globe, Apr. 20, 1910, p. 4. 
36Fitch, "Bethlehem: The Church and the Steelworkers,"·The Survey, 
p. 1296. South·Bethlehem·Globe, Feb. 7, 1910, p. 3, ~b. 8, 
1910, P• 1. Feb. 14, 1910, p. 1. 
37 
"Williams Testimony, " .. Final'Report ·and ·Testimony, Vol. XI, p. 
10958; ·south·Bethlehem'Globe, Feb. 15, 1910, p. 1, Mar. 1, 1910, 
p. 1. Apr. 8, 1910, p. 1. For a discussion of the attitude of 
the Catholic Church toward Socialism, see Ma~c Karson; American 
Labor Unions and Politics, 1900•1918, (Beacon Press Edition) 
Boston, 1965, PP• 212-284. 
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As a whole, .the response of the clergy was disappointing to the 
strikers. As an A.F. of L. Organizer declared, "We had expected 
that the ministers of the Gospel would remain at least neutral 
38 
instead of coming to the rescue of this greedy corporation." 
186. 
For the strike to succeed, the plant had to be closed. This, 
however, required organization which the strikers initially did not 
have. For the next three ~-7eeks, therefore, departmental committees, 
created by the A.F. of L. organizers, worked feverishly to unite the 
men still at work. When the men were sufficiently organized, those 
still within the works were to come out in a body, and the plant 
shut down. 
On Feoruary 24, the strikers felt strong enough to display both 
their organization and their numbers by holding a parade in South 
Bethlehem. The parade, led by a Hungarian band, stretched for four 
blocks, and the marchers were orderly in spite of their numbers. 
Only two minor incidents marred the ev~nt: a worker had his dinner 
pail taken from him, and a young boy threw a brick through superin-
39 
tendent Buck's window. 
38 Ibid., Feb. 14, 1910, p. 1, "The Struggle for Industrial 
"i5eiii0cracy," The Outlook, pp. 306-308. 
39 See "Kelly Statement" in Report on·strike, p. 40. "Company 
Statement," in ibid., p. 23, "Cyphers Testimony" in Final 
Report·and TestTtii'Oiiy, Vol, XI, p. 10615, and "Williams Testi-
mony,"'ibid., p. 10947. Williams quotes from the South 
·Bethleh~lobe of Feb. 25, 1910, to indicate the orderly 
nature of the parade, copies of which are unavailable. 
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The parade marked the climax of a successful organizing campaign, 
and the next day the strikers moved to close the works. Crowds of 
striking workmen gathered at the plant entrances to prevent anyone 
from entering or leaving. Threats wer~ made, stones thrown, and 
workers had their dinner pails taken away. To enable men to leave 
the plant, the company had to put them in box-cars and take them out 
by rail. The attitude of the local police was particularly irritating 
to company officials. Although the Police Chief and most of his force 
were present, not one striker was arrested. Aided by this polif!e 
40 
inaction, the strikers succeeded in closing the plant. 
Company officials reacted quickly to the strikers' action. The 
first step was to inform the borough government that it would be held 
41 
responsible for any damage done to company property. Shortly there-
after, the burgess and chief of police met with company officials. 
When pressed to defend the inaction of his meu, Hugh Kelly, the 
police chief, replied that his small police force could not handle 
large crowds. This was an admission the company had been waiting for, 
42 
and they demanded outside protection. The borough council then 
43 
requested the assistance of the Northampton County Sheriff. 
Upon his arrival in South Bethlehem, Sheriff Robert Person went 
40 
"Company Statement," in·Report·on·strike, p •. 24, "Kelly State-
ment," in·~·, p. 40, ·south ·Bethlehem·Globe, Feb. 26, 1910, 
P• 1. 
41Eugene Grace to Burgess, Feb. 25, 1910, in·Report·on·strike, 
p. 51. 
42
"Kelly Statement," in·ibid., pp. 40-41, see also "Company 
'' -4 Statement, in ~·• p. 2 • 
43 Minutes of Special Council Meeting, Feb. 25, 1910, in ~·• 
P• 51. 
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to the offices of the Bethlehem Steel Company where company executives, 
not borough officials, described the situation to him. As a result 
of this meeting, Person sent a telegram to the governor in which he 
declared his fear of an outbreak of violence that evening, and re-
44 quested the State Constabulary to assist him. The governor replied 
that the situation did not warrant use of the State Police, and he 
reprimanded Person for not even attempting to exercise his powers 
45 
as sheriff. In answer to this, Person wired back that the whole 
town was in a lawless state and he could not control the situation. 
Serious rioting and bloodshed had already occurred, he said, and the 
46 State Police were necessary to prevent its repetition. Person's 
description of conditions in South Bethlehem bore little relation to 
the actual circumstances. The crowd which closed down the plant 
had been disorderly and annoying, but no rioting had taken place and 
there had been no bloodshed. Indeed, the sheriff later testified in 
court that, at the time of his request for the State Police, the only 
violence he knew about was of a stone being thrown through an office 
47 
window. Nevertheless, Person's telegram convinced the governor of 
the situation's urgency, and he dispatched a troop of the constabulary 
to South Bethlehem. 
44
sheriff Person to Governor Stuart, Feb. 25, 1910, in·~., 
p. 56. 
45 Governor Stuart to Sheriff Person, Feb. 25, 1910, in~., 
p. 56. 
46 Sheriff Person to Governor Stuart, Feb. 25, 1910, in·~., 
PP• 56-57. 
47south Bethlehem Globe, Apr. 15, 1910, p. 7, "Cyphers Testimony," 
Final Report·and·Testimony, Vol. XI, p. 10615, Report on Strike, 
p. 21. 
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Formed in 1905, the Pennsylvania State Police were notorious 
48 
among union organizers for their strike-breaking activities. They 
replaced the Coal and Iron Police, an organizat:f.on armed with police 
powers but paid by corporations. Called Cossacks by strikers, the 
tax-supported State Police provided corporations with well-trained 
strike-breakers~ Although the constabulary claimed to be impartial 
in labor disputes, critics pointed out that, in every case, the State 
Police operated out of corporation property, never from strike head-
49 quarters. In a sense, the Pennsylvania State Police acted as 
agents of the newly-emergent nrban-industrial society. It was their 
task to impose order in situations disruptive of the proper functioning 
of that society. Highly trained and well-disciplined, the Constabulary 
had no local ties. As a result, they partook of the same value system 
as did the corporation, and so keeping the peace and breaking strikes 
came to mean nearly the same thing. The presence of the State Police 
in South Bethlehem was more than just a challenge for the strikers; it 
was also a challenge to the integrity of the local community and its 
50 
values. 
48 See, "Testimony of Mr. James H. Maurer," in Final Report and 
Tes-timony, Vol. XI, pp. 10931-10942, see also James H. Maurer, 
·The American Cossack, Reading,Pa., 1914, for an unfavorable 
49 
account of the Pennsylvania State Police from labor's point of 
view. 
"Testimony of Major John c. Groome," in·Final Repore·and Tec;ti-
mony, Vol. XI, p. 10981. 
5
°For a discussion of the State Constabulary as a necessary part 
of an industrial society, see Herbert Crolye ·The·Promise of 
American Life, (Capricorn Books Edition), New York, 1964, pp. 
144, see also Katharine Mayo, Justice to all: 'The·story of the 
Pennsylvania State Police, 5th edition, New York, 1920, pp. 
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A troop of State Constabulary reached South Bethlehem by train 
on the morning of February 26, and to the townspeople they, not the 
strikers, seemed to be the embodiment of lawlessness. Upon their 
arrival, the troopers -:-1ent to the offices of the Bethlehem Steel 
Company where they were assigned quarters and received breakfast. 
By this time, news of the Constabulary's presence had spread, and a 
large crowd gathered to get a glimpse of them. Acting on the 
principle that "'There is no innocent bystander,' and when the order 
came 'Get your man,' you pick anybody,'" the troopers rode their 
51 
horses into the crowd. Unable to get out of the way quickly enough, 
many members of the crowd were beaten, with women and children being 
52 
knocked down and trampled, among them the wife of the police chief, 
Rather than dispersing the crowd by their actions, the troopers 
only enraged it, What had been a curious but peaceful group of 
onlookers became a mob, and the non-existent rioting of the day before 
now became a reality, The mounted troopers were pelted with bricks, 
stones, and chunks of ice, while they, in turn, rode down their 
antagonista and clubbed them with truncheons. The violence lasted 
for most of the day and the single troop of police sent to the borough 
188-195, for an account of the State Police's role in South 
Bethlehem in just such terms. 
51The quotation is from an interview with a State Trooper re-
ported in the Allentown.:Democrat.and included in "Williams 
Testimony,"·Firtal'Repote·and·Testimony, .Vol •. XI, p. 10949, 
see also, "Kelly.Statement11 in·Report·on·serike," p. 42, 
South·Bethlehem·Globe, Feb. 26, 1910, p. 1, 
52 
"Williams Testimony," Final Report and Testimony, Vol, XI, 
p. 10949, South Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 26, 1910, p. 1. 
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could not handle the situation. Reinforcements had to be sent 
from Philadelphia and with their arrival the 91 troopers were able 
53 
to restore order by nightfall. 
During the events of the 26th, a trooper shot and killed a man. 
Because the dead man had done nothing to provoke the trooper, the 
incident became something of a local cause celebre. As the crowd 
was being chased off the streets, one trooper rode his horse up 
the steps of the Majestic Hotel, and fired several shots into the bar-
room. Two of the patrons, neither of whom had taken part in the 
events outside, were hit; one was wounded in the mouth and the other 
killed. The Chief of Police considered the shooting to be a deliberate 
act of terrorism. The Majestic Hotel, he noted, was the headquarters 
of the A.F. of L. organizers, and he believed the shooting to have 
. 54 been premeditated. 
The trooper was arrested on manslaughter charges and held over 
to the county court. He was acquitted, however, when witnesses could 
not identify him. The number on the trooper:' s collar during the 
trial was not the one witnesses said he had been wearing at the time 
of the shooting. Although the witnesses' descriptions matched the 
defendant's features, the numbers did not, aud the man was set free. 
Labor leaders were incensed by this action, and pointed out that 
5311Statement of Captain in charge of State Police," in·Report 
on Strike, p. 44; ·south·Bethlehem·Globc, Feb. 26, 1910, p. 1, 
Feb. 28, 1910, p. 1. 
54 
"The Killing of Joseph Szambo," in Report·on·strike, pp. 48-49, 
"Kelly Statement," in~., pp. 41 .. 42. 
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inability to match numbers and descriptions often happened during 
labor disputes in which members of the constabulary were charged 
55 
with criminal behavior. 
The actions of the State Police had the immediate effect of 
driving the community closer to the strikers. It was well known that 
troopers beat people without provocation. On several occasions, it 
was reported that the Constabulary themselves provoked incidents by 
having troopers in plainclothes mingle with crowds and shout "scab". 
The result would be beatings from the uniformed troopers and in-
discriminate arrests. Those individuals arrested were held in Steel 
Company offices, sometimes for days without hearings. When hearings 
were arranged, they were held in Charles M. Schwab's office and were 
closed to the public. The strikers and their sympathizers claimed 
56 
that these hearings indicated frame-ups. 
Nearly everyone in South Bethlehem resented the presence of the 
Constabulary: strikers, residents, businessmen, police, and most 
borough officials. In response to petitions drawn up by residents 
55 South Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 28, 1910, p. 2, Apr. 9, 1910, p. 1, 
June 15, 1910, p. 1. The report of the officer in command at 
South Bethlehem to his superintendent stated that the trooper 
had been acquitted after the prosecution could not prove the 
shooting had been unjustified. Captain Robinson to Superinten-
dent, June 16, 1910 in·Final·Report·and·Testimony, Vol. XI, pp. 
11004-11005, see also "Testimony of Mr. John G. Sebald," in 
ibid., p. 10988. 
5Rstatement of Michael Lynch, Chief of Police," in Report on 
Strike, p. 43,"Kelly Statement,llin ~·• pp. 41-43 11 "williams 
Testimony," Final·Report·and·Testimony, Vol. XI, pp. 10948-
10949, 10952, "Cyphers Testimony," in~., pp. 10612-10616. 
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and businessmen, the borough council passed a resolution asking the 
sheriff to have the constabulary withdrawn. Sheriff Person refused 
tl1eir request. Shortly thereafter, Police Chief Hugh Kelly resigned 
his position in protest over the lack of cooperation from the 
Sheriff and the Constabulary. Retail businessmen indicated their 
dislike of the troopers by refusing to deal with them while at the 
57 
same time extending cred:f.t to strikers. 
In spite of the Constabulary, the strikers remained unintimidated. 
Although the State Police kept the plant open, some 3,800 men remained 
on strike. They were organized into t't-7elve unions. Since all but 
800 of the strikers were skilled workers, they knew themselves to be 
indispensible to plant operations and were thus confident of ultimate 
58 
success. As a result, the company resorted to more traditional 
methods of breaking a strike. They blacklisted strikers who left town 
for work elsewhere, and threatened to annul the contracts of appren-
tices unless they returned to work. At one point the Company attempted 
to evict strikers who rented houses from it, but this expedient failed 
because of a state law requiring landlords to give tenants 55 days 
notice before eviction. Local newspapers reported that troopers con-
57 South Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 28, 1910, p. 1, Mar. 15, 1910, p. 
1, Burgess to Sheriff, Mar •. 15, 1910 and Sheriff to Burgess, 
Mar. 16, 1910, in·Re-port·on Strike, pp. 54-55, "Kelly State-
ment," in ~·, pp. 42-43, .captain .. Rob1.nson to Superintendent, 
!-far. 10, 1910, in 'Firtal·Report artd ·Testimony, Vol. XI, 
P• 11006. 
58 Report on Strike, p. 19. 
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confronted strikers in their homes with the option of returning to 
59 
work or being arrested. 
The strike continued, regardless of harassment, and on March 
5, the strikers presented their demands to the company. Although 
specific demands were made for each department, in general, they were 
requests for increased wages and shorter hours. Sunday and overtime 
work were to be compensated for at a rate of time and half, and 
holidays such as Christmas and Thanksgiving would merit double time. 
Abaent from the striker's demands was any request for union 
recognition. All they desired, the strikers said, was an end to 
60 Schwab's insistence that no employees be union men. 
Schwab's answer to the striker's communication came the next 
day. The company had a special Sunday edition of the Bethlehem Times 
printed at its expense which contained Schwab's reply. It was short 
and subject to no ambiguities. It was a refusal: 
We desire to notify the men who have left our 
employ as well as the general public, that we can 
give no consideration to the communication, since 
it does not emanate from men working in our plant. 
It must be understood that under no circumstances 
will we deal with men on strike or a body of men 
representing organized labor. 
59
south Bethlehem Globe, Mar. 7, 1910, p. 1, Mar. 12, 1910, 
p. 1, 11Kelly Statement," in·Repott'on·strike, pp. 42-43, 
"Lynch Statement," in'llbid., pp. 43-44. 
-
60
"Executive Committee Statement," in·ReP~rt·on·sttike, p. 
39, the strikers demands are given in·ibid., pp. 26-32. 
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Having thus defined our position 'l:-7e shall 
refrain from further statements ot acknow-
ledgements of any sort whatever.61 
195. 
Other statements in this issue of the paper urged the men to return 
to work, but nothing was said about hours or wages. 
After receiving Schwab's refusal to negotiate, the strikers 
tried a new tactic: they sent letters and petitions to President 
William H. Taft, various Congressmen, and the Washington embassies 
of foreign countries. In these letters they stated that, because of 
the strike by the company's skilled machinists, the work being done 
at South Bethlehem in fulfillment of contracts was defective. Unless 
the strike were settled, these contracts should be cancelled, they 
advised. They also urged President Taft to launch a full-scale 
investigation of the strike and conditions in the pla.nt: the strikers 
were sure that such an investigation would reveal the intolerable 
62 
working conditions to be found at South Bethlehem. 
The strikers' petition met with a favorable response in Congress. 
A. Mitchell Palmer, later to become Attorney General under Woodrow 
Wilson, represented the area in Congress. He expressed sympathy for 
the strikers plight, and persuaded Taft to order an investigation 
of the strike by the Bureau of Labor. Schwab, claiming that the 
company had nothing to hide, gave public assurances of cooperation with 
61south·Bethlehem Globe, Mar. 7, 1910, P• 3. See also Report on 
Strike, pp. 25-26. Copies of the Bethlehem·Times have not 
been preserved on microfilm or otherwise. 
62 South·Bethlehem Globe, Mar. 10, 1910, p. 1. Mar. 11, 1910, 
p. 1, Mar. 12, 1910, p. 2, Report on Strike, pp. 129-130. 
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63 
the federal investigation. Shortly afterwards, however, he made 
his greatest effort to date to crush the strike. 
On the evening of March 30, a number of South Bethlehem's 
leading businessmen were summoned to a meeting with Schwab. He told 
them he was incensed by the letters the strikers had sent to Congress 
and various foreign governments ~rging them to cancel contracts they 
had made with Bethlehem Steel, and reminded the businessmen of the 
company's importance to the town. He was particularly indignant 
that these letters had borne the return address of the Municipal Hall, 
for this made it seem as if the community supported the strike. Unless 
some overt action were taken to remove the impression that the town 
backed the strikers, he would close down the plant permanently. As one 
of the businessmen present later reported; "Mr. Schwab criticized the 
municipal authorities for permitting the use of Municipal Hall by 
socialist agitators who had no interest in the town ••• and who besides 
64 
were daily abusing and insulting Mr. Schwab." 
Schwab's threat had the intended effect. The Commercial League 
met the next day and its members passed a number of resolutions 
condeming the strike led by "socialist agitators", and suggesting 
they be denied the continued use of the Municipal Hall. More importantly, 
they went on record supporting the company: 
63south ·Bethlehem '.Globe, Mar. 16, 1910, p. 1. Stanley Cohen, 
A. 'Mitchell'Palmer~ ·politician, New York, 1963, p. 24. 
64south·Bethlehem'Globe, Mar. 31, 1910, p. 1, see also Hessen, 
"schwab" p. 72. 
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We bear testimony to the business honor and 
integrity of the Bethlehem Steel Company ••• 
and point with pride to ••• the honest and 
efficient work of our fellow townsmen and its 
worldwide reputation for excellence of 
material and workmanship and our entire con-
fidence in the maintenance of its reputation 
under Mr. Schwab's administration,65 
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A delegation of businessmen carried copies of the resolution with 
them when they travelled to Washington the next day to meet with 
d id T f h ' behalf. 66 Af congressmen an Pres ent a t on t e company s ter 
the meeting was over, Schwab who was in attendance, stated that he 
had not sought to influence the businessmen to end the strike, and 
thanked them for their kindly feelings toward him. 67 
The day following the actions taken by the Commercial League, 
the borough council held a special meeting. By a vote of 9 to 6, 
68 
council instructed the strikers to vacate the Municipal Building. 
The votes themselves reflected the degree to which Schwab's threat 
split the community, South Bethlehem had five wards which ran 
consecutively from West to East. The character of the borough's 
population changed from old-stock and middle-class in the first and 
second wards to recent immigrant and working class in the fourth and 
fifth with the third ward being transitional in this respect. Of the 
nine councilmen favoring the ejection of the strikers, three each 
65south Bethlehem Globe, Apr •.. 1, 1910, P• 1. 
66.!1?.!2,., Apr. 1, 1910, P• 1, Apr. 2, 1910, P• 1. 
67 tbid •• Apr. 1, 1910, P• 1. 
-68 4, 1910, 1 • 
.!E.!!!·' Apr. P• 
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came from the first and second wards, two from the third, and one 
from the fourth. Moreover, three of these men had signed the 
Commercial League resolutions def~nding the company against the 
strikers' charges. The others were businessmen with much to lose 
if Schwab closed the plant. On the other hand, none of the council-
men supporting the continued use of the Hall by the strikers had 
signed the resolutions and one of them, in fact, was himself a 
striking machinist. 
The withdrawal of business support weakened the striker's 
effectiveness. The strike dragged on inconclusively during the month 
of April while both sides waited for the government to publish the 
results of its investigation. In the meantime, however, more and 
more men returned to work, and by early May, only 540 men remained 
69 
out. 
On May 4, the government published its report and the remaining 
strikers were momentarily heartened by its vindication of their 
claims of long hours and low wages. Although the report resulted in 
a storm of criticism being directed at Schwab, it did not improve 
70 
the strikers' position, which had become hopeless. Schwab was, in 
any case, eager to bring the strike to an end, and so enlisted the 
69tbid., May 10, 1910, P• 1. 
70 F'or reactions to the report see,. IIInvestigations of the Strike 
in the Bethlehem Steel Works,"·The·outlook, Vol. 95, July 16, 
1910, pp. 544-545. "To Put an End to Seven Day Work?"· ·The 
Survey, Vol. 24, June 18, 1910, pp. 475-478, seeLalso HeB'Se"n, 
"Schwab," pp. 342-349. 
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aid of J, Davis Brodhead, a former congressman from the district, 
to act as an intermediary between him and the remaining strikers. 
Brodhead was making a bid for a return to C~ngr.ess, and Schwab in-
dicated that Brodhead would achieve publicity and praise if he 
achieved a settlement, Schwab desired Br,odhead as an intermediary 
because Brodhead's opponent in the Democratic primary would be the 
incumbent A. Mitchell Palmer, and Palmer's advocacy of the strikers' 
cause had annoyed Schwab. Brodhead met with the executive committee 
while its chairman, and driving force, David Williams, was in 
71 
Washington, and on May 18, the strike was declared ended. 
The terms of the settlement indicated a total victory for the 
company. The men were permitted to return to their jobs, but not 
those who had damaged either the company's property or its integrity, 
There was to be no union recognition but workmen would be allowed to 
approach company officials as individuals if they had any grievances, 
There were no increases in wages, The situation thus remained the 
same as it had before the strike, The only concession made by the 
company was that Sunday and overtime work would be optionalu Howeve;, 
since wages had not increased, those who did not work overtime or 
72 
Sundays would face a loss in income. 
The 104 day strike was a failure, The men went back with the 
promise that overtime work was optional, but a year and a half later, 
71
south Bethlehem Globe, }~y 18, 1910, p, 1, Coben, Palmer, 
PP• 24-28, 
72 South Bethlehem Glob~i May 18, 1910, p. 1. 
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the situation was the same as it had always been. If a man refused 
overtime work, he risked dismissal. There had been some impro·vement 
in wages. Men who received 12 1/2 cents an hour in January of 1910 
earned 13 cents an hour in November of 1911, and those who had 
made 13 1/2 cents were now paid 15 cents. On the other hand, men 
paid by the ton had actually suffered a reduction in wages during 
73 
the interval. The strike had accomplished little. 
The strike had consequences of more than local significance. It 
received national publicity, which, in turn, focused attention on 
the conditions of labor in the American steel industry. The t'\'7elve-
hour day and the seven-day week was called a disgrace to civilization, 
and a campaign to establish an eight-hour day on government contract 
work gained support. The Senate passed a resolution calling for a 
full-scale investigation of the steel industry and the House in-
structed the Attorney General to begin an investigation of the u.s. 
Steel Corporation -- an investigation which eventually led to an 
74 
anti-trust suit. 
For labor leaders, the South Bethlehem strike was a revelation. 
It indicated that immigrants from Eastern Europe could be unionized, 
and that, in fact, immigrants had a greater capaci.ty to carry on a 
prolonged strike than most native Americans. Prior to the strike most 
73John A. Fitch, "Bethlehem: The Church and. the. Steelworkers," 
The·survey, p. 1297, Brody; ·steelworkers·in·America 1 p. 164. 
74 .. . . .. 
"Will Bethlehem Follow Pittsburgh?"'Liter~try'Digest, p. 204 11 
Brody, ·steel~orks·in·America, pp. 161-162. 
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labor leaders had believed the "Runkies" too docile to be effective 
union members. The lessons learned from the South Bethlehem strike 
led to a drive to organize all steel workers, skilled or unskilled, 
15 
native or immigrant under a single jurisdiction. 
For South Bethlehem, the strike was a rude shock. Before the 
strike, the community's residents assumed that Charles M. Schwab was 
the heir to the Fountain Rill industrialists of the recent past. It 
was believed that Bethlehem Steel was a local operation with roots 
in the community; a company whose officials would always take local 
values and local needs into account. The strike revealed that this 
was not the case. Schwab and his subordinates had no loyalties to 
South Bethlehem as such: to them, South Bethlehem represented little 
more than a labor pool. It was only by chance that Schwab had located 
there; the company was in, but not of, the community. If Schwab and 
his associates were, in the future, to interest themselves in local 
social and political affairs, it was for the purpose of ensuring 
that a similar strike never reoccurred. Thus, the defeat of the 
strikers meant the defeat of a value-system based on a belief in the 
community's ability to manage affairs within its own boundaries. Al-
though South Bethlehem had been an industrial community from the 
beginning of its existence, and thus part of an emerging national 
economy, its inhabitants had not fully adopted their values to the new 
system. The company's victory marked the overthrow of the older set 
of values by one more attuned to the needs of a complex, urban-
industrial society. 
75Ibid., PP• 139-142. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION 
In 1917, Bethlehem and South Bethlehem abandoned their identities 
as separate communities and united to form the city of Bethlehem. Al-
thoagh local boosters had long sought consolidation, it became a 
reality only after Charles M. Schwab added his support to the movement. 
City status meant the adoption of commission government, and Schwab 
knew that such a government tended to institutionalize the values of 
corporate industrialism in local affairs. Schwab thus led the drive 
to provide the community with a municipal administration responsive 
to the needs of business and industry. The success of the consolida-
tion movement therefore guaranteed that the Bethlehem Steel Company 
would possess unquestioned influence over municipal affairs in the 
" future. 
In purely local terms the consolidation of the Bethlehems was 
a result ·of the strike of 1910. The strikers had experienced an 
initial success because they had the support of the community and 
controlled the borough government as well. The strike failed when 
Charles M. Schwab refused to accept the standards and values of the 
local community as a guide in his dealings with the strikers. His 
actions were a shock to local residents for it made them realize just 
102. 
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how much their lives were dependent upon forces beyond their control. 
Local businessmen were especially impressed with the degree to which 
their fortunes were tied to the actions of the Bethlehem Steel Company, 
for they recognized that another such confrontation between company 
and community would result in their ruin. Their own self-interest thus 
demanded that they act to remove political power from the hands of 
those hostile to Bethlehem Steel and the values it represented. 
Bethlehem Steel, for its part, came to a similar conclusion. Schwab 
saw ~hat future conflicts could be avoided o~ce local residents be-
came convinced that the community's interests and those of the 
company were identical. Like the business community, he recognized 
that a municipal government, sensitive to the company's needs, was 
1 
essential to the preservation of labor stability on the local scene. 
Thus, when Schwab and local businessmen joined forces in a consolidation 
campaign, they were acting to bring to the Bethlehems a system of 
municipal administration which incorporated the bureaucratic values 
of an industrial society in its approach to governmental affairs. 
If consolidation of the Bethlehems had its immediate, local causes, 
it also took place in the context of a wave of reform movements which 
swept the country in the early years of the twentieth century, and which 
has helped to give the period from 1900 to 1920 the title of "The 
1 Sidney B. Whipple, "Notes on Mr. Schwab's Life," Unpublished 
typescript, 2 vola., 1935, on deposit in the Charles M. Schwab 
Memorial Library, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Bethlehem, Pa., 
P• 220. 
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Progressive Era." Although the terms "Progressivism" and "Progressive 
Movement" have been used to cover a multitude of changes and reforms 
. 
in American life during these years, there was never a unified move-
ment responsible for all these activities. The various reforms were 
the products of a wide variety of distinct groups each with its own 
goals, and membership in one reform group did not necessarily mean 
2 
membership in, or even sympathy for, another. What many different 
reform groups did share was the application of similar techniques to 
their different problems. Almost all reformers saw the tasks con-
fronting them in terms of administration and organization, and bureau-
3 
cratic principles came to dominate most aspects of reform. Seeking to 
apply to society what they believed were the natural laws of organiza-
tion, many reformers adopted the values and techniques of scientific 
management for use in their programs. Efficiency became the standard 
of judgement, and method, not morality, united reformers in their 
4 
efforts to establishi'their visions of the good society. 
2samuel P. Hays, The Response to Industrialism: 1885-1914, Chicago, 
1957, pp. 140-162. Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A 
Study of the Progressive Movementp Cambridge, Mass., 1962, pp. 
10-15. 
3 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920, (American Cen-
tury Series Edition), New York, 1968, pp. 154, 169-208. Samuel 
Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Pro-
gressive Era: '1890•1920, Chicago, 1964, pp. 75-116. 
4 Wiebe, ~ch for Order, p. 168, Haber, Scientific Management, pp. 
xi, xii, 8, 9, 19, 59, James Weinstein, The·corporate'Ideal'in 
the Liberal State: 1900•1918, Boston, c. 1968, pp. ix, xiv, 3-
39, Barry Dean Karl, ·~xecutive Reorganization and Reform in the 
New Deal: The Genesis of Admanistrative Management, 1900-1939 1 
Cambridge, Mass., 1963, pp. 17-19, 50-53. 
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Municipal reform movements fit into this pattern. Originating 
in almost every case with local businessmen who pictured the ideal 
city as an extension of their commercial values, reform campaigns 
sought to xestructure local governments and make them conform to 
the standards of efficient business enterprise. Thus, reform aimed 
at the centralization of authority and the application of impersonal 
managerial techniques to the problems of local government. Planning, 
efficiency, cm1tinuity, and economy, came to be the desired goals of 
government, and, as these were the values expressly espoused by the 
business community, a reformed government identified the needs of 
business as its own. The organizational procedures of the factory 
were now being applied to society, for, as Samuel P. Hays has ob-
served, the new system of municipal administration was but "the 
elaboration of the processes of rationalization and systematization 
5 inherent in modern science and technology." 
The commission plan met the requirements of most reformers for 
a municipal government sensitive to the needs of business and industry. 
It was devised in Galveston, Texas in 19Cl after a great tidal wave 
left the city in ruins. Proposed by a committee of businessmen, the 
commission plan proved capable of quick and efficient action in re-
building the devastated city. Significantly, the plan was based on 
~ 
·samuel P. Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government 
in the Pr~gressive Era," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. LV, 
October 1964, pp. 157-169, the quotation is from p. 168. 
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the most efficient organization known to its developers, the 
6 business corporation. 
206. 
The Galveston plan called for a five-man commission vested with 
the powers of a mayor and a board of aldermen with each member head-
ing a city department. Performing both the legislative and adminis-
trative functions of government, the commission could act promptly 
on matters affecting the city. With the later addition of the office 
of city manager and the introduction of non-partisan elections, the 
plan's original weaknesses were remedied, and it became the perfect 
vehicle of reform for businessmen seeking greater influence in 
7 
municipal affairs. 
Commission government appealed to businessmen and industrialists 
because it gave them political power while removing power from the 
hands of the community's working class citizens. The Galveston 
system abolished parochial ward politics and made the entire city a 
political forum. At-large elections for positions on the new councils 
almost always assured the business element of success because a city-
wide campaign demanded more economic resources than the ward politician 
could obtain. Moreover, the business or professional man would be 
better-known on a community-wide scale, and could therefore present 
himself as concerned with the welfare of the entir~ community, not just 
one ward. Such candidates could also argue that a business-like 
6George K. Turner, "Galveston: A Business Corporation," McClure's, 
Vol. 27, October 1906, p. 612. 
7This and the next paragraph are based on Hays "Municipal Reform," 
pp. 157-169, Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, pp. 92-116, and Wiebe, 
Search for Order, pp. 177-178. 
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government would provide the city with mor.e and better services at 
a lower cost than the old-style ward politicians could. Such argu-
mente were effective, and by the First World War, some 600 cities 
had adopted commission governments. 
Although the consolidation of Bethlehem and South Bethlehem 
which introduced the commission plan into local government took place 
in 1917, proposals to unite the boroughs were nothing new. Consolida-
tion had been brought up at ~arious times since the early 1890's. To 
local boosters, Bethlehem, South Bethlehem, and West Bethlehem, in-
corporated in 1886, seemed to comprise on large community, with the 
8 fortunes of one borough tied to those of the others. By the first 
years of the century, two more local boroughs had been incorporated, 
Fountain Hill in 1894 and Northampton Heights in 1901. The former 
adjoined South Bethlehem on the west and the latter on the east. 
To local businessmen, the consolidation of all these ~ommunities, 
or, at the very least, of Bethlehem and South Bethlehf:m, would be 
very desirable and beneficial for all. A consolidated community 
would attract nel-7 industry and new people; real estate vall\e would 
increase; businessmen living in a manufacturing city would be able 
to secure better credit which, in turn, meant a larger variety and 
quantity of goods. Consolidation equalled propP.erity in the arguments 
of its advocates. Seeking to gain the support of South Bethlehem 
residents, proponents of consolidation pointed out that local pros-
8 ~etblehem Daily Times, Sesqui-Centennial Industrial Edition, 
June, 1892, p. 28. 
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perity resulted from the Bethlehem Steel Company's location in that 
borough, but Bethlehem was given the credit. Consolidation would 
remedy this inequity. 9 Above all, consolidation meant progress. 
Bethlehem supported consolidation; it was South Bethlehem which 
presented the stumbling block. Only the borough's businessmen 
favored the move. For most of South Bethlehem's residents, Bethlehem's 
advocacy of consolidation was cause for suspicion. They believed 
that the middle-class, residential borough on the north side of the 
Lehigh River sought only to take advantage of South Bethlehem's 
prosperity. It was the residents of Bethlehem who first called South 
Bethlehem "Shanty Hill" a councilman opposed to consolidation pointed 
out. "They look upon us as the great unwashed," he continued, "and I 
10 
think we should wash ourselves of them." 
To proponents of consolidation, such remarks iudic~ted selfish 
motives on the part of local politicians. In thH event thm: the 
11 boroughs achieved consolidation, such men would be deprived of power. 
To a degree, this accusation contained some truth. Yet, if the local 
politicians were deprived of political power, they would not be the 
only ones to suffer. Their worki~g-class constituents, with whom 
they identified• would likewise become powerless. Where businessmen 
9 South Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 5, 1902, p. 2, Mar. 12, 1903, p. 4, 
June 13, 1903, p. 5, Dec. 4, 1905, p. 1, Dec. 8, 1905, p. 1. 
10Bethlehem Times, Jan. 19, 1892, p. 1, South Bethlehem Globe, 
Oct. 1, 1893, P• 4, Apr. 3, 1902, P• 5. 
11Bethlehem Times, Jan. 19, 1892, p. 4. South Bethlehem Globe, 
Aug. 4, 1904, p. 1. 
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saw only advantages in consolidation, their opponents saw only the 
opposite. As a councilman from South Bethlehem's strongly working-
class and immigrant fifth ward noted in 1905, he opposed con-
solidation "because it would increase the taxes and rents of the 
poor and would afford no compensating increase of wages fol.' the 
workingman. Adam Brinker [a pro-consolidation politician and 
businessman] and others would be benefitted by consolidation, for 
they could increase the rents of their buildings and tenements. It 
is all right for the rich and all wrong for the poor."12 
The first serious attempt to consolidate "the Bethlehems" was 
launched by local business leaders in 1903 when they persuaded the 
boroughs of Bethlehem, South Bethlehem and West Bethlehem to create 
13 
consolidation ccmmittee~ to discuss the feasibility of a merger. 
The main thrust, the unification of Bethlehem and South Bethlehem, 
proved abortive. The opposition forces in South Bethlehem were too 
great to overcome, but the meetings were not totally without results. 
In 1904, after an energetic campaign supported by local businessmen, 
West Bethlehem's population of nearly 3,500 was added to Bethlehem's 
14 7,300. Bethlehem now had the distinction of being the only borough 
in Pennsylvania to be located in two counties: Lehigh and 
Northampton. 
In contrast to South Bethlehem, West Bethlehem's population was 
l~Ibid., Apr. 21, 1905, P• 1. 
13Ibid., Sept. 8, 1903, p. 1, Nov. 3, p. 1, Nov. 15, P• 4, Nov. 
26, P• 1. 
14Ibid., July 28, 1904, p. 1, Aug. 4, p. 1, Aug. 5, p. 1, also 
~fth Census of the United States, Vol. 1, Washington, 1901, 
PP• 632-641. 
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similar in character to Bethlehem's. It had grown up largely as a 
suburb of Bethlehem, and its people were predominantly native-
American. Only 210 foreign-born individuals lived there in 1900. 
There was little opposition to consolidation in West Bethlehemo 
With 85 percent of the borough's voters going to the polls, West 
15 Bethlehem favored the merger 690 to 157. 
In South Bethlehem, the leaders of the move to enlarge the 
210. 
borough's boundaries and population remained undaunted. Thwarted in 
their efforts to merge with Bethlehem, they sought union with the 
boroughs of Fountain Hill and Northampton Heights. The South 
Bethlehem Commercial League, composed of ~etail merchants from 
the three boroughs, began agitation for unification in November of 
1905. The only question in their minds was whether the new community 
should be a borough or a city. By December. the League had convinced 
the three borough councils and school boards to send representatives 
16 to a meeting where the issues would be discussed. 
The efforts of the Commercial League to combine the three boroughs 
on the south bank of the river failed. Consolidation advocates 
attempted to make their proposal as appealing as possible. They 
argued that the merger would attract new industry and the added employ-
ment would minimize the adverse effects of a depression in the steel 
industry upon the community. Moreover, consolidatio11 meant increased 
15 South Bethlehem Globe, Aug. 10, 1904, p. 1. 
16 ~., Nov. 14, 1905, p. 4, Dec. 8~ p. 1. 
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retail trade and improved real estate values. It would also 
facilitate municipal ownership of the new community·'s water and 
electric power supplies, However, these arguments did not convince 
the proposed merger's opponents, and on December 18, the Fountain 
Hill council voted against consolidation. The benefits which the 
proponents of consolidation had said would result did not appear to 
. u 
be enough to offset the borough's loss of independence, 
Events outside the immediate area altered the conditions under 
which all future attempts at changing the nature of local government 
would take place, In 1910, Pennsylvania business elements launched 
a campaign to introduce the commission form of government into the 
state, Three years later, their efforts bore fruit, On June 27, 
1913 the governor signed into law a bill requiring all third-class 
cities, those with populations between 10,000 and 100,000 to adopt 
18 
commission charters, 
The new state law provided the opportunity for which local 
businessmen had been seeking, Ever since the failure of the con-
solidation efforts of the previous decade, proposals had been made 
19 
that South Bethlehem itself incorporate as a city. On August 4, 
17Ibid,, 14 1905 1 19 1 Dec, , , P• , Dec, , p. • 
18 Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 94, Laws of the General Assembly 
19 
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Passed at the Session of 
1913, Harrisburg, Pa., 1913, pp. 586-631, for the definition 
of a third class city see General Laws Passed by the Legis-
lature of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania During the Session 
of 1874, Harrisburg, Pa., 1874, P• 230, 
South Bethlehem Globe, Apr. 22, 1907, p. 6. 
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1913, less than five weeks after the new state law took effect, 
135 South Bethlehem community leaders signed and presented a 
petition to the borough council calling for n special election 
20 
to determine if the borough should become a third-class city. 
212. 
The next day, the Sou~h Be~hleh~m Globe ran an editorial 
giving enthusiastic support to a third-class city movement as "ex-
pressive of a progressive spirit.'; South Bethlehem had outgrown 
borough status, and the change would be the first step in the 
establishment of commission government, "the success of which is 
acknowledged in several cities, prominent among which are Memphis 
and Denver." Of particular benefit to the community, the editorial 
continued, would be the abolition of ward representatj.on which was 
21 inefficient, uneconomical, and time-consuming. 
When no election date had been set by August 13, another 
editorial appeared in the Globe, this time reprimanding the borough 
council for its tardiness. Action was taken the vexy next day at a 
special council meeting where the borough solicitor gave an opinion 
on the incorporation laws. Act No. 367, approved by the Governor on 
June 27, 1913, required a vote on city status to be taken at a general 
election with notification being made in local newspapers four weeks 
before the event. However, Act No. 391, approved on July 7, seemed 
to permit voting at a special election with announcements in the news-
20 The petition and the names of the signers are reprinted in 
~., Aug, S, 1913, P• 1, 16. 
21Ibid., A 6 1913 6 ug. , , P• • 
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papers one week before the election. Since South Bethlehem was 
seeking city status under the second act, which the borough attorney 
felt took precedence over that of June 27, a special election was 
22 
set for August 22. 
The Globe published a notice of the city charter in its next 
edition. It also ran an editorial commending the council for acting 
to correct "its late dilatoriness," and pointed out that South 
Bethlehem had double the population necessary to become a third-
class city. The borough had been operating under a system made 
23 inefficient by the municipality's gro.wth. During the following 
weeks, the Globe published a number of articles and editorials 
favoring the change in government. 
The proposed re~orm did not arouse the enthusiasm of South 
Bethlehem's inhabitants. Only 42 percent of the eligible voters 
bothered to appear at the polls on August 22. Of these 59 percent 
favored the change. The returns by wards, as certified on August 
23, and published in the Globe, showed that middle-class residential 
dist~icts favored commission government, but working-class areas 
did not. Wards One and Two supported the proposal by votes of 312 
to 68 and 240 to 98. The Third Ward which was closely balanced 
between middle-class and working-class elements favored the change by 
147 to 117. Wards Four and Five, strongly working-class and immigrant 
22 Laws of the General Assembly, 1913, pp. 568-631, 649-696, South 
Bethlehem Globe, Aug. 15, 1913, p. 1. 
23Ibid., Aug. 15, 1913, P• 6. 
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did not approve. They voted against city status 158 to 71 and 146 
to 58.24 
The ultimate goal of the reformers was to achieve consolidation. 
By eliminating ward representation, the new system would produce an 
efficient government, and this, it was believed, would induce 
Bethlehem and Fountain Hill to seek a merger. The new city would 
thus not long remsin a third-class city, but as its population 
25 passed the 100,000 mark it would become a city of the second class. 
In the opinion of one South Bethlehem citizen, the elimination of 
the ward system would overcome the obstacles to consolidation. 
"~-7ith the prospt~ct of a city council under the old method divided 
by politics and ward representation, property owners and plain folks 
generally preferred to endure the known :tlls they borep" he stated. 
Hm-1ever, with "businesslike" methods of government in existence, 
26 
consolidation was inevitable. 
The prospects of ultimate consolidation appeared good, at least 
for a while. Six days after the South Bethlehem council received 
the petition requesting city status for the borough, a similar 
petition was presented to the Bethlehem council. Unfortunately for 
the advocates of reform, Bethlehem, as a result of its 1904 merger 
with West Bethlehem, was located in two counties, and the state laws 
24~ •• Aug. 23, 1913, P• 1, Sept. 3, p. 1. 
25Ibid., 
-
Aug. 22, 1913, P• 6, Aug. 23, P• 6, Sept. 11, P• 8. 
26Ibid., Aug. 25, 1913, P• 6. 
-
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governing the incorporations of cities required that a community 
27 
seeking city status be located in one county. 
215. 
In South Bethlehem, preparations for the establishment of the 
new city government got off to a good start. A city charter was 
obtainedD primary elections held, and on November 5, tl1e date of the 
gener~l election, a mayor and four councilmen were chosen as the new 
city's commissioners. They were all business or professional men. 
The mayc·;: was. a physician and the council was comprised of an 
architect, a banker, a chemist, and a department store owner. This 
was the kind of leadership the reformers had been seeking,and they 
28 
were sworn into office on the first of December. 
The establishment of a commission government in South Bethlehem 
did not go unchallenged. When the Chief Burgess applied for the city 
charter in Harrisburg in September, he was informed that a telegram 
had been received from Peter J. Sheehan, a South Bethlehem saloon 
keeper and politician, declaring that the August 22 election had not 
been in accordance with the law. Although opponents of the election 
claimed that it was unconstitutional, state officials, nevertheless, 
granted the charter. 29 
27 ~·• Aug. 26, 1913, p. 1, Sept. 9, p. 1, Laws 6f the 
General Assembly 1913, PP• 568-631. 
28south Bethlehem Globe, Dec. 1, 1913, p. 1. Semi-Centennial: 
29 
The Borough of South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania: ·souvenir·History, 
South Bethlehem, Pa., 1915, p. 17. 
South Bethlehem Glo~, Apr. 6, 1914, p. 1. 
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On January 12, 1914 proceedings contesting the validity of the 
August 22 election were begun in the Northampton County Court. The 
petitioner, Thomas Scott, was a former borough councilman who had 
had two years to serve when the charter was granted. He was also 
the proprietor of a small hotel in the Fourth Ward, and had been a 
keen supporter of the strikers while serving on the council in 1910. 
Scott's petition was vehement in tone, and he denounced the new city 
30 
officials as "usurpers". 
The case was hearli on September 15, 1914. The judge's decision 
set aside the charter, and removed the city officials on the grounds 
that the August electio1l was unconstitutional. The vote, he said, 
should have been taken at a general election, and Act. No. 391, 
which permitted voting on city status in a special election, was in 
direct contravention of Article 15, Section 1, of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution. The verdict was appealed to the State Supreme Court. 
On March 22, 1915, the Court upheld the lower court's verdict; it 
ordered South Bethlehem returned to borough status, and the former 
31 borough officials to resume their positions. Several weeks of 
confusion ensued as city officials refused to give up their posts 
until officially notified. Meanwhile, the borough officials con-
tinued to claim that they represented the only legitimate local 
30 ~., Feb. 2, 1914, p. 9, Mar. 2, p. 9. 
31Ibid., Sept. 16, 1914, p. 1, Mar. 22, 1915, p. 1. "Common-
wealth v. City of South Bethlehem", in Pennsylvania State 
Reports Containing Cases DP;cided by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania January Term 1915, Vol. 248, Phila., 1915, 
pp. 581-584. 
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government. 
217. 
The movement for a business government had suffered a set-back, 
but its advocates remained undaunted. In 1915 they tried again. In 
both Bethlehem and South Bethlehem, petitions were presented to the 
borough council. The South Bethlehem petition was once again 
primarily a middle-class document. Thomas Scott, who had brought 
the suit against the cit' charter and had since returned as council-
man, pointed out that the petition was not representative of the 
whole town. Of 272 signers, only one lived in the part of the 
borough east of Elm Street in the middle of the Third Ward. Scott, 
representing the old ward system clearly did not approve, but in 
November of 1915, the voters in both boroughs decided to seek city 
33 
status. Nothing was done for the next year and a half, however. 
Other, more effective paths toward a new municipal government were 
being followed. 
In 1912, a joint recreation committee of the boroughs suggested 
inter-borough cooperation in order to improve local playground 
facilitie~. When the committee was reorganized two years later, it 
did a complete survey of the boroughs' recreational facilities, and, 
again, recommended collaboration. In 1916, Dr. Cyrus L. Stimson, 
field secretary of the Playground and Recreation Association of 
America, was asked to do a study of the Bethlehems. At this point, 
32 South Bethlehem Globe, Mar. 29, 1915, p. 1, Mar. 31, p. 1, 
Apr. 13, P• 1. 
33Ibid., Sept. 5, 1915, p. 1, Nov. 3, p. lw 
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the newly organized Rotary picked up the theme, and suggested 
consolidation. Stimson's report and the Rotary Club suggestions 
were presented to Charles M. Schwab in June of 1916. After 
examining these reports, Schwab met in October with Stimson, 
Robert s. Taylor, and A.c. Dodson, two prominent Bethlehem residents, 
at which time he voiced agreement with the recommendation, and 
34 
promised to support a consolidation movement. 
The playground report ~o1as not Schwab's first involvement in 
activities tending toward consolidation. He had, in fact, spoken 
out in favor of consolidation on a number of occasions. In 1913, 
during the campaign to make South Bethlehem a city, Schwab had 
stated that "the interest of the community soon will see the ultimate 
necessity of consolidation into a second class city." Only con-
solidation would promote industrial and commercial progress and 
35 
ensure civic unity, he said. Ultimately, it was Schwab's 
participation in the inter-borough campaign to build a "Hill-to-Hill" 
bridge that made consolidation a reality. 
The hostility of many South Bethlehem residents to merger with 
Bethlehem had not been the only factor keeping the two boroughs 
~part. Geography was also important. To the advocates of consolida-
tion, the Lehigh River seemed to be, both literally and figuratively, 
the greatest obstacle to be overcome. Only two bridges crossed the 
34Ibid., June 22, 1916p p. 6, Nov. 28, p. 1. 
35
rbid., Sept. 5, 1913, P• 8. 
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river between the two communities. One, the New Street bridge, a 
steel structure built in 1867, was a toll bridge. The only free 
bridge was a covered wooden structure in poor shape, subject to 
periodic damage by the Lehigh's spring floods. Besides its poor 
conditionp the free bridge also had the disadvantage of a bad 
location. There were railroad grade crossings at each end of the 
bridge. This was dangerous, and people sometimes met with fatal 
36 
accident&. 
To those seeking merger of the two boroughs, the need for a 
more adequate link across the river was obvious. A free bridge, 
by improving communication between the boroughs would increase 
understanding and lessen hostilities. The hoped-for result would 
be consolidation. 37 
Although proposals for replacement of the wooden bridge by a 
more modern structure were put forward as early as the 1890's, 
38 
progress was slow. The situation changed, in 1911, with the 
creation of a Joint Bridge Commission composed of leading business 
39 
and political figures from the two boroughs. The committee studied 
36Ibid., Feb. 26, 1898, P• lp Apr. 18, 1902, P• 5. 
37w.J. Donald, "Bethlehem Builds Two Bridges," National Municipal 
Review, Vol. 7, Sept. 1918, p. 484. 
38 Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce, Hill-to-Hill Bridge: Bethlehem, 
Pennsylvania, Bethlehem, Pa., n.d., p. 6. 
39 Rollin R. Keim, Hill-to-Hill Bridge, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania: 
Historical and Pictoral, Bethlehem, Pa., 1924, pp. 12-13. 
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a number of bridge designs, and finally came up with a plan for a 
concrete structure to span the Lehigh, and eliminate the various 
railroad grade crossings. Having acquired an adequate replacement 
for the wooden structure, the committee next turned to the problem 
of financing construction. By 1916~ the committee had almost 
achieved its goal. Both Lehigh and Northampton count~es, the two 
boroughs, and the railroads concerned, all agreed to donate various 
40 
sums. In the eyes of the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission, 
however, the amm!ut was insufficient. An additional $200,000 had 
to be raised with.tn 30 days or the conunission would not give its 
approval. In respot:se, the two boroughs launched an intensive fund-
raising drive which not only produced the needed amount, but also 
41 
made consolidation a reality. 
The Hill-to-Hill Bridge campaign became a major community effort. 
In over-all charge of the campaign was Archibald Johnston, formerly 
president of the Bethlehem Steel Company and now a vice-president of 
the parent corporation. A "Major" headed up the drive in each borough. 
Each in turn appointed "Captains" to direct teams of 15 to 20 members. 
The boroughs were divided into districts with a team to each district, 
and the team workers were given lists of the people they were to 
approach for donations. No amount was too small. Even school chil-
42 
dren were encouraged to donate their small sums. 
40 Chamber of Commerce, Hill-to-Hill, pp. 13-14. 
41 Keirn, Bridge, p. 17. 
42 A. George Schaffner, "Bethlehem's Hill-to-Hill Bridge," 
American City, Vol. 29, Oct. 1923, p. 412. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
221, 
The results were gratifying to the project's supporters, The 
campaign brought in $450,000 -- more than twice the required amount, 
The Bethlehem Steel Company alone pledged $100,000, and Charles M. 
Schwab, a member of the Joint Bridge Commission, pledged an 
43 
additional $50,000 of his own. Indeed, Schwab's participation 
in the bridge campaign was of crucial importance in making the long-
sought consolidation of the Bethlehems a reality, In a speech 
delivered at the conclusion of the fund-raising drive, Schwab made it 
clear that he did not view the bridge as an end in itself, but as a 
step toward consolidation. He urged the committee which had raised 
the money to begin the task of consolidating the two boroughs. '~e 
have," he said, "reached a new era of civic P,ride, and the Bethlehem 
Steel Co. [sic] will help with money, influence and anything possible 
44 to aid the city," 
Schwab did not limit his support of consolidation to mere 
encouragement, On November 27, 1916 he gave a banquet in the 
Colosseum, a large South Bethlehem Hall. In attendance were 800 
local business and political leaders. They all belonged to 
organizations with an interest in consolidation: the South Bethlehem 
Chamber of Commerce, the Industrial Commission of Bethlehem, the 
Joint Bridge Commission, the members of the bridge campaign, and the 
two borough councils, Aided by two of his top executives, Archibald 
43Keim, Bridge, PP• 18-19, 
44south Bethlehem Globe. Oct, 9, 1916, p, 1, 
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Johnston and Eugene Grace, Sch~ab used the occasion to launch a 
consolidation campaign. In an after-dinner speech he suggested 
that those present lead a consolidation drive. Schwab's remarks 
were followed by those of Grace and Johnston, as well as by D.F. 
Stimson, Field Secretary of the Playground and Recreation Associa-
tion, and Roy s. Smith, Vice-President of the American City Bureau 
of New York. 45 Each speaker in turn urged consolidation. 
The banquet guests were not a hostile audience. They responded 
with enthusiasm to Schwab's suggestions. One member of the audience 
went so far as to propose Schwab for the consolidated city's first 
mayor. The audience gave its approval to Schwab's proposal that a 
committee of three prominent citizens be chosen ~hich would, in turn, 
appoint a committee of fifty to later meet with Schwab and discuss 
consolidation. The committee of fifty was to be divided into two 
groups. A Legal Consolidation Committee, chaired by Archibald 
Johnston would initiate plans for merger. With Charles M. Schwab at 
its head, the Committee for Civic Improvements was to establish an 
46 
amalgamated Chamber of Commerce. 
Consolidation became a legal possibility on May 25, 1917, when 
the governor of Pennsylvania signed two bills relating to the political 
status of boroughs. Act No. 143 allowed boroughs to hold special 
elections for the purpose of deciding on city status. Act. No. 159 
45Ibid., Nov. 28, 1916, P• 1, P• 9. 
46tbid., Nov. 28, 19lo, p. 1, Nov. 30, p. 1. 
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permitted two or more contiguous boroughs to form a third-class city 
47 
without regard to county boundary lines. 
The change in state regulations signaled the beginning of an 
all-out campaign to consolidate the boroughs. On May 20, a petition 
signed by 400 voters calling for a consolidation election as soon 
as possible had been presented to the South Bethlehem Council. The 
Bethlehem Council received a similar petition on May 28. Each council 
appointed delegates to serve on a joint consolidation committee which 
48 
would work out the final details. 
Meeting on June 1, the committee set July 10, 1917, as the date 
for a special election. The committee also decided that tax rates 
would be uniform, and that the new city would retain the existing 
ward boundaries of the two boroughs as well as assume their bonded 
49 
:1i.~~ fl<"'ilting debts. The borough councils approved the committee 
report: South Bethlehem on June 4, and Bethlehem on June 11. The 
next step was to convince the voters to accept the proposed change. 
Coming when it did, the consolidation campaign benefited from 
the outpouring of patriotic sentiment engendered by the entry of the 
United States into World War One. The consolidation movement was 
presented to the people of the two boroughs in such a way as to 
47 Laws of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
48 
Passed at the Session of 1917, Harrisburg, Pa., 1917, pp. 
262-265, 296-297. 
South Bethlehem Globe, May 20, 1917, p. 1, May 29, p. 1. 
49~., June 2, 1917, p. 1. 
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identify it with the American war effort and thus with patriotism. 
A week long Red Crosa fund-raising drive, begun on June 15, and 
organized in the same fashion as the Hill-to-Hill Bridge campaign, 
became linked with the merger movement, The personnel and 
organizational structure of both drives were idetltical, and people 
were informed th&t by supporting the Red Cross and consolidation 
campaigns, they were doing their part to make the nation stronger 
50 
and more united in its battle against Germany. 
The official consolidation drive began on July 3 with a banquet 
at the Colosseum. The Lese of the week was taken up with meetings, 
speeches, and, on July 7, a huge parade, The local newspaper printed 
articles and editorials supporting the merger. A straw vote taken 
by the South Bethlehem Globe, favorable to consolidation, served as 
51 
a major propaganda device, 
The proponents of consolidation sought as much support for 
their program as possible. To gain it, they appealed to the leaders 
of various social groups and classes in the community by granting 
them status as representatives of their constituents in return for 
their support of the merger. Thus, the prestigious consolidation 
committee included not only steel executives, businessmen, and 
professionals, but also the clergymen and other recognized leaders of 
the various immigrant communities -- men who had received little 
50 
51 
Ibid,, June 28, 1917, p. 1, July 3, p. 1, July 9, p. 1, see 
also Raymond Walters, The Bethlehem Bach Choir, Boston, 1923, 
P• 78, 
South Bethlehem Globe, July 3, 1917, p, 1, July 7, p. 1. 
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52 previous acknowledgement from the community at large, South 
Bethlehem's ethnic communities became the subject of a great deal 
of attention, Men such as Archibald Johnston, who as a vice-
president of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, normally had few deal-
ings with immigrants, addressed them at meetings called for the 
purpose of gaining their support, Over 2,500 members of the various 
ethnic groups participated in a consolidation parade held on July 7. 
In almost every case, advocates of consolidation identified their 
cause with loyalty to the American flag, and support of the war 
53 
effort, 
The campaign was an overwhelming success, On July 10, the 
citizens of the two boroughs voted in favor of consolidation .~,988 
to 169, On July 17, the Governor of Pennsylvania granted a charter 
54 for the new city of Bethlehem, 
The achievement of city status did not mean the end of efforts 
to change the local political structure. To be Rttre: the newly 
instituted commission government pleased the reformers, At the same 
time, if the wrong people came to power, the whole point of con-
solidation, the placing of political authority in the hands of the 
community's major economic interests, would be nullified, Selection 
52 For examples of this see the biographical sketches of the 
consolidation committee leaders in Fred L, Shankweiler, ~ 
of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1918. 
53
south Bethlehem Globe, J 1 3 1917 1 J 1 9 1 u y ' ' P• ' u y ' P• ' P• 6. 
54Ibid,, July 11, 1917, Po 1, July 18, P• 1~ 
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of officers for the new government could not be left to chance. 
The problem of staffing a new government had arisen in other 
municipalities when the business community introduced the commission 
plan. It had been found necessary to circumvent the existing 
political processes and prevent candidates supported by the regular 
political parties from entering office. As representatives of the 
"old politics" such men would be hostile to the values of those 
responsible for the new system, and defeat the purpose of reform. 
55 
The solution appeared in the form of the non-partisan election. 
The non-partisan ballot, coupled with the at-lat'ge ~lP.r..t:l.on of 
city officials, made it unlikely that any but well-known individuals--
usually business or professional men--could be elected. Moreover, 
~ithout the financial resources of a political party behind them, 
few candidates who did not have the support of the business 
community had much chance of success. Short of funds, a candidate 
lacking support from the business community was, in turn. unlikely to 
obtain the publicity or press coverage needed to win a city-wide 
campaign. 
Bethlehem's first municipal election followed this pattern. No 
sooner was the consolidation campaign over, t:han a follow-up campaign 
to elact city commissioners began. At a July 30 banquet given for 
consolidation campaign workers, Archibald Johnston was proposed as 
mayor of the new city. In the primary election of September 19, he ran 
55This and the following paragraph are based on Hays, "Mun:f.cipal 
Reform," P• 160• Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, ·pp. 110-111. Karl, 
Executive Reorganization, pp. 92-97. 
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unopposed. The four remaining members of the council chosen in the 
regular November election were James E. Mathews, Manager of 
Ordnance of the Bethlehem Steel Company, August W. Schmich, retired 
superintendent of the steel plant, Alexander c. Graham, prominent 
real estate dealer and hosiery mill owner, and Thomas F. Rowan, a 
56 
hotel proprietor. 
Although consolidation had long been sought by local businessmen, 
it had been realized only wlth the backing of the Bethlehem Steel 
Company. The company saw the advantages of a commission form of 
government. A centralized municipal government, staffed by men 
aware that the local community was but a small part of a larger in-
dustrial society, would be responsive to the company's needs. No 
longer would the political power of working class voters force the 
local government to oppose the company as it had in 1910. Sharing 
the same vision of the proper functioninr, of society in an industrial 
nation, company and city officials could now coo~erate in attempting 
to give concrete form to that vision on the local level. 
For the city government and the Bethlehem Steel Company to be 
effective allies, both had to deny the existence of any undue influence 
by the company on city affairs. Thus Archibald Johnston found it 
necessary to repudiate charges that the company would dominate the new 
city administration. "As to the interest of the Steel Company," he 
56south Bethlehem Globe, July 31, 1917, p. 1, Nov. 7, p. 1, for 
biographical information see Shankweiler, Men of Bethlehem, pp. 
6, 18, 20, 28, 29. 
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stated, "my only complaint is that they have never shown enough 
interest. Past evidence shows that the interests of the Steel Com-
pany have always been in behalf of its employees, and I have failed 
to see any selfish motive in any of its dealings with the community. 
Mr. Schwab and the officers of the Steel Company have Bethlehem's 
interest at heart and are constantly planning to improve con-
57 ditions." Schwab concurred in Johnston's assessment. "The thought 
is furthest from my mind that the so-called steel interests shall in 
any way be dictators in our conununity," he announced. "We are happy 
to be plain citizens, lending our efforts to the advancement of 
58 Bethlehem." Schwab was undoubtedly sincere in his desire to improve 
life in Bethlehem, but his assertion that the company's role in local 
affairs was minimal lacked conviction. In a brief description which 
he made of the consolidation campaign some years later, Schwab ad-
mitted ·as much: "We were interested in combining Bethlehem's ••• 
boroughs, t~ make a unified city and to stimulate a community pride. 
59 
Arch Johnston was made, by main strength, its first mayor." 
Historically, l-7hen large corporations have become involved in 
public affairs, they have generally preferred to remain in the 
background. To do this and still retain their influence over events, 
57 
South Bethlehem Globe, Sept. 20, 1917, p. 5. 
58 Quoted in Walters, Bach Choir, p. 194. 
59 Whipple, "Notes," p. 220. 
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60 
they often created front organ:l.zations. In Bethlehem, the Steel 
Company worked through the Chamber of Commerce. This presented 
little difficulty for the company since those most likely to join 
were businessmen, aware of the company's importance to the community 
and in sympathy with its values. Indeed, the consolidation campaign 
was linked from the start with a drive to create an Amalgamated 
Chamber of Commerce whose members would come from both sides of the 
Lehigh River. 
Two committees had been formed at the banquet given by Schwab 
on November 27, 1916, which launched the consold.dation drive. One 
of these committees, headed by Schwab, had as its task the establish-
ment of a Chamber of Commerce, but the consolidation campaign, being 
the most important, received priority. Only in December of 1917, 
after consolidation had becom~ an established fact, did the effort 
to organize a Chamber ~f Commerce get underway. 
Originally designated the Greater Bethlehem Association, the 
proposed Chamber of Commerce was presented to the public as a 
"citizen organization to bridge over the gap between the official 
61 governing body and the citizens at large." As such, the new organiza-
tion would be more than a mere businessmen's associationo Functioning 
as an unofficial ~artner of the new city administration, the Chamber 
60
see ~dward c. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, Citv Politics, 
(Vintage Books Edition), New York, 1963, pp. 29-30. 
61nonald, "Two Bridges," p. 486. 
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of Commerce would aid in solving the problems confronting the city. 
Its goal was the betterment of the whole community. 
The Civic Improvement Committee met in Schwab's office on 
December 14, 1916 to sketch a preliminary design for the organiza-
tion of the Greater Bethlehem Association. Its first act was to 
hire experts from the American City Bureau, which specialized in 
creating civic organizations such as Chambers of Commerce, to con-
duct a m~mbership drive and outline a program of work for the 
62 
association. However, the membership drive did not begin until 
the following December. The campaign was launched on December 5, 
1917 when Schwab addressed what the local newspaper described as 
"the greatest mass meeting of Bethlehem's Progressive men and 
women•"63 During the next week the campaign became the center of 
public attention. Each day the newspaper published a listing of the 
number of members signed. The stated goal was an organization of 
800 members paying annual dues of $25, and having a budget of $20,000. 
A week's campaigning produced a membership of 2,200 and an income of 
64 $60,000. 
On the evening of Dec.ember 22, 1917, the Greater Bethlehem 
62 Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce, 
Vol. I, Dec, 22, 1916, Jan, 5, 1917, for the American City 
Bureau see, "New Factor in the Vitalizing of Commercial and 
Civic Organizations," American City, Vol. 8, May 1913, pp. 
465-466. 
63south Bethlehem Globe, Dec, 6, 1917, p. 1, 
64 Donald, "Two Bridges," p. 486, 
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Association was officially dissolved and replaced with the Chamber 
of Commerce. Officers and a board of directors were chosen. Three 
of the board's 15 members, including Schwab himself, were connected 
with the Bethlehem Steel Company. Moreover, the only woman member 
of the board, Alma Tobias, was married to a company executive. 
Acting through the chamber's officers, the board had the power to 
appoint all committee chairmanships. The chairman of the v~rious 
committees, in turn, had the right to select.the men with whom they 
65 
desired to work. 
The Chamber of Commerce had close ties with both the city 
administration and the Bethlehem Steel Company. Members of the 
organization held important posts in the city government. They 
included the Mayor, the City Solicitor, the City Treasurer, the 
head of the Civil Service Board, as well as all five members of the 
City Planning Commission among whom were Charles M. Schwab and 
Eugene Gracec Clearly, the Bethlehem Steel Company was now in a 
position to exert whatever influence it chose ove·r the future develop-
ment of the city. 
Local businessmen had sought to unite the boroughs of Bethlehem 
and South Bethlehem into a single city for decades and by the end 
of 1917 consolidation became a reality. Seen in the context of the 
nation's development, consolidation was a local manifestation of a 
65 Chamber Minutes, Feb. 23, 1918, South Bethlehem Globe, Dec. 
11, 1917, P• 1. 
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trend toward institutionalizing the values of an industrial society. 
The advantages of the commission form of government, efficiency, 
stability, economy, and centralized decision-making, were precisely 
the values espoused by the advocates of scientific management in 
the factory and the business corporation. In many respects, however, 
the new administrative forms were destructive of traditional American 
66 
concepts of political democracy. Municipal reform tended to remove 
~ffective political power from the.hands of lower-middle and working-
class voters with their narrow parochial interests and place it in 
the hands of business and professional men whose perspective was that 
of the entire city. The reformers' claim that commission government 
would be mcr.-e responsive to the needs of "the people" was true, but 
only if one defined "the people" as those aware of the needs of an 
industrial society. Officials of the Bethlehem Steel Company were 
cognizant of the possibilities inherent in the new system and threw 
their weight behind the consolidation effort. The new government 
would be responsive to the Company's needs, not because of any 
sinister collusion, but because the men who staffed both organiza-
tiona partook of the same values and shared the same vision of the 
good society. 
66Hays, "Municipal Reform" pp. 167-169, Weinstein, Corporate 
Ideal, pp. 108-110, Karl, Executive Reorganization, pp. 91-
97, Melvin s. Rolli, Reform in Detroit: Hazen s. Pingree 
and Urban Politics, Nel-7 York, 1969, pp. 171-181. See also 
Lawrence J.R. Henderson, "1'he Lost World of Municipal Govern-
ment," American Political Science Review, Vol. LI, June 
1957, pp. 330-345. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER NINE 
WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS 
Stability and o~der were requisite elements in the continued 
functioning of an industrial society both inside the factory and 
outside its gates. To prevent a repetition of the disruptive 
events of 1910, officials of the Bethlehem Steel Company, aided by 
the city government they had helped to create, worked to convince 
local residents that their interests were identical to those of 
the company. Since most of its employees were local residents, 
the company's efforts to improve working conditions in the plant, 
combined with an active involvement in civic and cultural affairs, 
did much to eliminate many of the antagonisms remaining as a 
result of the strike. Moreover, the company took advantage of 
the Americanization drives of the First World War to gain the 
loyalty of its many foreign-born employees -- the very men who had 
been its most steadfast opponents in 1910. The company's efforts 
proved their worth in 1919 when neither the ~ommunity nor the 
majority of employees aided those strikers who sought to close the 
plant as part of the nation-wide steel strike of that year. In 
other words, Bethlehem Steel had become an integral part of the local 
community, and in the process, the residents of Bethlehem had accepted 
the values of an industrial society. 
233. 
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Even before consolidation gave the Bethlehem Steel Company 
undisputed influence in local affairs, Charles M. Schwab en-
deavored to convince local residents of his concern for their 
welfare. Between 1904 and 1910, Schwab had shown little interest 
in matters of local concern, but after the strike the reverse was 
true. His involvement in community musical activities illustrates 
this. 
In 1900, J. Fred Wolle, a local resident, organized the 
Bethlehem Bach Choir to present public performances of the choral 
works of Johann Sebastian Bach. 
The Bach Choir ceased to exist in 1905 when Wolle departed to 
accept a position as chairman of the Music Department of the 
University of California at Berkeley. In 1911, during a business 
trip to San Francisco, Schwab stopped in Berkeley to speak with 
Wolle, and persuaded him to return to B·etfileheni.'"anct·resume direction 
of the Bach Choir. 1 
Schwab's action in bringing Wolle back to Bethlehem endeared 
him to community leaders, because the Choir was more than just a 
musical organization. It was also a favorite institution of the 
local community's upper-class, as its lists:-.of officers and 
executive committee members indicated. Moreover, Schwab displayed 
a continuing interest in the Bach Choir by becoming its chief 
1Raymond Walters, The Bethlehem Bach Choir, Boston, 1923, 
pp. 90-91, 214-215. 
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financial backer. He made up half the Choir's annual deficit. He 
would not assume the entire liability, Schwab explained, because 
then the Choir would be a private, rather than a community activity, 
and people would lose interest in its annual Festival. In 1919, 
upon the retirement of the Choir's president, Henry s. Drinker, the 
2 
members of the Choir elected Schwab to the post, 
Besides the Bach Choir, Schwab also aided other musical 
organizations, He gave financial support to the Lehigh Valley 
Symphony Orchestra which was located in Bethlehem, He also started 
the Bethlehem Steel Company Band in September of 1910, Led by a full-
time director, the Band was composed of company employees. Schwab 
provided the Band with all the necessities: instruments, uniforms, 
and a rehearsal hall, At the Company's expense, the Band performed 
on civic occasions and even provided free public concerts during 
3 
the summer months, 
Although Schwab's involvement in the musical life of the 
community gained him the thanks of the middle and upper-classes, a 
large segment of the local population cared little for such 
cultu~al activities, Of far more interest to these people was the 
Bethlehem Steel Company's sponsorship of a professional soccer team 
2 
3 
Ibid., PP• 40-46, 230-238, 
South Bethlehem Globe, June 22, 1918, p. 1, William J, Heller, 
History of Northampton County, 3 Vola., New York, 1920, Vol. 
III, pp. 396-397, Raymond Walters, Bethlehem Long Ago and Today, 
Bethlehem, Pa., 1923, pp. 115-116, Walters, Bach Choir, pp. 
32-33. 
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in 1914. To gain players, Schwab raided many of the crack soccer 
teams in the country for stars. The team was successful, even to 
the point of going on European tours, and local sport fans followed 
its fortunes with avid interest. For the use of the team and 
company employees, Schwab also built an athletic field and gymnasium 
costing $50,000. In addition, Schwab earned the gratitude of local 
sports fans by his contribution of $50,000 toward the completion of 
4 
an athletic stadium at Lehigh University. 
Of greater importance to the community were Schwab's efforts to 
further the health and safety of both company employees and local 
residents. The Bethlehem Steel Company emerged from the 1910 strike 
with a bad reputation for the dangerous conditions under which many 
of its employees were forced to work, and for the many accidents 
5 
~esulting from those conditions. In response to the adverse 
, publicity it received, Bethlehem Steel joined the growing number of 
6 
corporations instituting industrial safety programs in their plants. 
4 New York Times, Aug. 2, 1914, III, P• 4, May 22, 1916, P• 12, 
5 
South Bethlehem Globe, Oct. 1, 1919, p. 8, Bethlehem Fabricators 
Inc., Bethlehem the City of Steel and Memories, n.p., n.d., p. 
24, Catherine Drinker Bowen, ~istory of Lehigh University, 
Bethlehem, Pa., 1924, p. 78. 
United States Bureau of Labor, Report on the Strike at the 
Bethlehem Works, Washington, 1910, p. 121, 11Will Bethlehem 
Follow Pittsburgh?"P Literary Digest, Vol. 41, July 16, 1910, 
p. 204, David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era, 
Cambridge, Mass., p. 161. 
6 For a discussion of the industrial safety movement, see Gerd 
Korman, Industrialization, Immigrants and Americartizers: The 
View from Milwaukee, 1866-19ll, Madison, Wise., 1967, p·p. 110-
135, see also Brody, Steelworkers, pp. 165-168. 
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In October of 1913, Bethlehem Steel announced the creation of 
a Safety and Welfare Department. Under its auspices each department 
in the plant was to have a safety committee of four men. A foreman 
would serve as the committee's permanent chairman, while its other 
three members would come from the rank and file. The latter would 
change at regular intervals, giving all members of a department 
opportunity to serve. Recommendations would be submitted to a plant 
safety committee which would in turn inform the appropriate company 
7 
agencies of needed feforms. 
The establishment of a Safety Department was followed the next 
year by the building of a $75,000 dispensary. Staffed by full-time 
physicians and nurses, the dispensary could treat all but the most 
serious cases. Before this time, the plant had possessed no medical 
facilities of its own, and it was necessary to take injured em-
ployees to St. Luke's Hospital. "This new method is designed to 
keep the company in touch with injured employees," a company official 
announced. When an injured worker's condition improved he would be 
given light employment at full pay, and upon full recovery, assigned 
8 to his former position. 
Under the direction of the Safety and Welfare Department, em-
ployees were given first-aid training, and each department had its 
7south Bethlehem Globe, Oct. 15, 1913, p. 12. 
Bwilliam L. Estes, Jr. Ed., l~illiam L. Estes, 1855-1940; The 
First Superintendent, Director and Chief Surgeon·of·st. Luke's 
Hospital: An Autobiographx1 Bethlehem, Pa., 1967, p. 80, South Bethlehem Globe, July 20, 1914, p. 1. 
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own first-aid team. Moreover, to generate interest in the program, 
as well as to sharpen its team members' skills, the company 
sponsored annual first aid meets. At first, competition was 
limited to teams from the various departments, but later, as the 
company expanded operations, teams from plants in other locations 
9 
took part as well. 
The concern of the Bethlehem Steel Company for its employees' 
health did not limit itself to the confines of the plant. During 
World War I, the Bethlehem Steel Company donated the cost of an 
entire ward to St. Luke's Hospjtal, and Schwab paid one half the 
10 
cost of another. Also, South Bethlehem's large immigrant population 
benefitted from Schwab's financial support of a Raby Health Center. 
The initiative for establishment of the Health Center came from 
Ernesta Drinker, daughter of the president of Lehigh University. 
Appalled to learn that the infant mortality rate in South Bethlehem 
was the highest in the entire state of Pennsylvania, she resolved to 
do something about it. Supported by the director of the local 
hospital, she approached Schwab with the idea for a baby health center. 
Schwab recognized the project's humanitarian value as well as its 
public relations potential and agreed to have the Bethlehem Steel 
9
"A Worker's Army of First-Aid Experts," Literat"7 Digest, Vol. 
68, Jan. 1, 1921, PP•· 54-57, "Safety in Industryf First Aid and 
Accident Prevention in a Great Manufacturing Plant," Scientific 
American, Vol 84, Dec. 22, 1917, pp. 392-393, South Bethlehem 
Globe, Sept. 26, 1916, p. 1. 
lOEstes, Autobiography, pp. 90-92, South Bethlehem Globe, Aug. 
23, 1917, p. 1, Archibald Johnston, ·Message·of Archibald 
Johnston, Mayor of the City of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1920, 
p. 320. 
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The Baby Health Center opened its doors in the summer of 1915, 
and began dispensing pasteurized milk for infants at a low cost. 
Within a short time, the center had developed into a child care 
clinic where the services of physicians and nurses were available 
free of chargee In 1920, the Health Center had three branches on 
Bethlehem's south side. In that year, physicians treated 12,959 
cases and 59,879 quarts of milk were sterilized and dispensed. 
In 1921, the Health Center's services were expanded to include a 
pre-natal clinic. The operation's principal financial support 
carne from the Bethlehem Steel Company which also provided the 
12 buildings free of charge. 
The chief beneficiaries of the clinics were the children of 
South Bethlehem's immigrants. The project's chief function, 
, .. 
according to Archibald Johnston, ~·1as to educate "those in our midst 
...... ~ ..... 
who do not know as well how, and where to secure assistance in main-
taining the health of the babies of those of longer residence among 
.. 13 
us. In keeping with the educational function, a local physician 
11catherine Drinker Bowen, Family Portrait, Boston, c. 1970, 
p. 131, South Bethlehem Globe, May 23, 1917, p. 1. 
12Archibald Johnston, Message of Archibald Johnston, Mayor of 
the City of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1919, p. 53~ Message 
of Archibald Johnston, Mayor of the City of Bethlehem, 
Bethlehem, Pa., 1921, pp. 21-23; Message of·Archibald 
Johnston, Mayor of the City of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1922, 
p. 53, South Bethlehem Globe, Jan. 26, 1915, p. 1, Oct. 5, 
1917, p. 9. 
13Johnston, Hessage, 1921, p. 24, South Bethlehem Globe, Hay 17, 
1916, P• 1. 
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gave bimonthly instructions, in their own languages, to immigrant 
midwives. The success of the station's medical staff in gaining 
entry "into many homes in the poorer quarters of the city," re-
14 
sulted in improved public health conditions among the immigrants. 
In his annual message of January 1921, Mayor Archibald Johnston 
pointed with pride to the fact that the infant mortality rate among 
the immigrant populE don was lower than that of "the districts 
15 
inhabited by our prosperous citizens," not served by the clinic. 
1be existence of the clinic was of great public relations val~e 
to the Bethlehem Steel Company. Mention of the Center was always 
accompanied by references to the company's support of it. }wreover, 
the company urged that the families of its employees take advantage 
16 
of the clinic's services. In this fashion, the Baby Health Center 
forestalled the company's critics from claiming that it cared little 
for the welfare of the community, and it also served to ensure worker 
loyalty. Few parents who had obtained free care for their children 
at the clinic were likely to consider their employer totally un-
concerned about their well-being. 
Although the Baby Health Center received most of its support from 
the Bethlehem Steel Company, it was technically a service of the city 
government. Such cooperation between the two was not an isolated 
14Ibid., Oct. 3, 1917, P• 9. 
15 Johnston, Message, 1921, p. 23. 
16Bethlehem Steel Company, Bethlehem Booste~, No. 8, AuguSt 
15 ' 1918, p. 16 • 
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incident. Indeed, the prospect of such close relations between the 
city administration and the company had been the reason for the 
company's support of consolidation in the first place. 
Archibald Johnston assumed his post as Bethlehem's first Mayor 
in January, 1918. He brought to the office a set of values shared 
by many other municipal reformers of the period. In his mind, the 
role of the mayor was that of an administrator, and he considered 
it his task to introduce the business methods of the contemporary 
corporation into local government. A new bookkeeping system, a 
civil service system to abolish political patronage, the hiring of 
a professional city managP.r and a city planner, as well as the 
creation of a city planning commission were part of an approach to 
17 
municipal government sl~ ·~~by many of his contemporaries. Thus, 
in a public message delivered after his first full year in office, 
Johnston stated that his most important accomplishment was t~ intro-
18 duce a modern bookkeeping system in the city government. Three 
years later, he announced that he was "more than ever convinced of 
the necessity of conducting civic affairs along modern business 
19 lines." City government, he continued, should be placed in the 
17 Archibald Johnston, Message of Archibald Johnston, Mayor of 
the City of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Fa., 1918, p. 3, Message, 
1922, p. 4. South Bethlehem Globe, Jan. 7, 1918, p. 1, Jan. 
8, P• 1, July 6, P• 1, July 24, P• 1, Sept. 10, P• 1. For 
a general discussion of this attitude see, Melvin G. Rolli, 
Reform in Detroit: Hazen s. Pingree and Urban Politics, New 
York 1969, PP• 161-181. 
18 Johnston, Message, 1919, p. 14. 
19 Message, 1922, p. 4. Italics in the original. 
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hands of "citizens of business ability," and removed from those of 
professional politicians. Strong party affiliations resulted in 
election promises and patronage obligations, and these were fulfilled 
only at "the expense of successful, efficient and economical conduct 
20 
of the city's affairs." 
Within the limits imposed on him by the values he brought to 
government, Archibald Johnston was an effective l·1ayor. If the 
introduction of new bookkeeping methods reflected an approach to 
city administration conditioned by a desire to make government more 
businesslike, such a reform was Gorely needed. An audit of the books 
of the boroughs of Bethlehem and South Bethlehem revealed bookkeeping 
systems which were, at best, haphazard. For example, the South 
Bethlehem Borough Sinking Fund was found to be $100,000 in arrears 
because funds had not been put aside to pay off municipal bonds. 
Thus, one of the new adti\inistration' s first tasks was to pay South 
21 
Bethlehem's creditors. Other projects had to be delayed until a 
sounder financial footing could be established for the city. 
In his inaugural message, Johnston indicated his awareness of 
the problems arising out of urban conditions. High on his list of 
priorities was providing the city with an adequate supply of pure 
water, for part of Bethlehem's water supply came from an unhealthy 
source: thP. Lehigh River. The river water was contaminated with 
human and industrial wastes dumped into it from the towns, mines, and 
20tbid., PP• 4-5. 
21 South Bethlehem Globe, Dec. 4, 1917, p. 1. Johnston, Message, 
1919' p. 11. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
243. 
factories up-stream. Although the borough of Bethlehem possessed 
a municipally-owned water supply dependent on wells outside the 
town limits, South Bethlehem was serviced by the Bethlehem City 
Water Company which drew its water from the Lehigh. As a result, 
South Bethlehem was periodically swept by typhoid epidemics in 
spite of the ctJmpauy's attempts to filter the water. At Johnston's 
urging, the city purchased the water company's frqnchise for 1.7 
22 
million dollars in September of 1918. 
Johnston's four years in office saw the beginning of an ex-
tensive program of street paving and an expansion of sewerage 
facilities. In March of 1919, Bethlehem had 147.6 miles of streets 
of which only 15.9 were paved. In addition, the city had only 12.7 
miles of sanitary sewers, and 4.2 miles of storm sewers under those 
streets. Baci streets and the lack of sewerage facilities had been 
the subject of chronic complaints for years, but prior to con-
solidation, the local governments had done little to improve con-
ditions. Johnston's administration replaced the cesspools and 
privies so dangerous to public health with a city-wide network of 
sanitary sewers~ Shortly thereafter, macadamized streets were 
22Johnston, Message, 1918, pp. 5-6, 11, "Report on the Water 
Supply of Bethl~hem," in United States Housing Corporation, 
Project Book, Bethlehem, Pa., Record Group 3, Records 
of the United States Housing Corporation, National Archives, 
~Jth Bethlehem Globe, Hay 3, 1898, p. 2, Mar. 10, 1903, 
P• 1, Aug. 6, 1913, P• 22, l1ay 17, 1918, P• 11, Sept. 
4, P• 1. 
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23 introduced on a wide scale. 
The creation of a municipal park system was a matter of 
244. 
particular pride to Johnston. In the teeming immigrant quarter of 
the city, only saloons existed as recreational centers, and there 
were no municipally owned and supervised playgrounds for children. 
Such facilities were not totally absent, however, for during the 
summer months, the Bethlehem Steel Company provided supervised 
24 
playgrounds on lots which it owned in South Bethlehem. This was 
clearly inadequate, and Johnston took advantage of his close ties 
with the Steel Company to secure the establishment of a 92 acre 
park along Saucon Creek in the sparsely settled southeastern section 
of the city, When a public fund raising campaign raised the money 
to purchase 46 acres of land, the company announced the donation of 
an equal amount of land, In addition, the Company provided the park 
with a bandstand seating 1,200 people, extensive flower beds, the 
materials and labor for a suspension bridge across the creek, and 
25 $13,500 for the first year of the park's upkeep. 
Acting as an unofficial liaison between the city and the com-
pany, the Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce also functioned as an agency 
23 
"Bethlehem Water Supply," u.s .H.C,, Pro.1ect Book, Johnston, 
Message, 1919, p. 9. South Bethlehem Globe, Jan. 14, 1895, p. 
2, June 2, 1906, Frank Koester, City Planning Report for the 
City Planning Commission; Bethlehem, Pa., (mimeograph), New 
Yor.k, 1919, PPo 18, 78, City Ordinances of Bethlehem, Pa. 1 Nos. 
1-258 1 Jan. 14 1 1918 to May 16, 1921, Bethlehem, Pa., 1921, 
PP• 406-467, 
24
south Bethlehem. Globe, Oct. 3, 1918, p. 1, B.S. Co., Booster, 
No. 10, Sept, 16, 1918, P• 1, 
25 
South Bethlehem Globe, Nov. 7, 1918, pp. 1, 15, Johnston, 
Message, 1920, pp. 10-11, 14. 
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educating local citizens about the realities of life in an indus-
trial society, and in the process weaning them from their adherence 
to an older, small-town, value system. The Chamber's task was both 
helped and hindered by the nation's participation in World War I. 
To fulfill the $150,000,000 in wartime contracts which it had 
obtained, the company increased its local work force from 10,000 
26 
to 30,000. This increase in population, however temporary, put 
a severe strain on the physical and psychological resources of the 
community. Moreover, this took place just at the time that 
Bethlehem's social and political leaders were seeking to transform 
27 
Bethlehem into a model industrial city. In the midst of all this, 
the Chamber of Commerce sought to convince the city's permanent 
residents of the benefits to be derived from the Bethlehem Steel 
Company's presence in the community, for ultimately the company's 
activities affected almost every aspect of life in the new city. 
In Bethlehem, public transportation was provided by the trol&eys 
of the Lehigh Valley Transit Company. Because Bethlehem was part of 
a large interurban network covering the entire Lehigh Valley, the 
transit company considered Bethlehem's local traffic of minor impor-
tance and ignored the pleas of residents for improved service. The 
26 Koester, City Planning Report, pp. 34, 67. United States De-
partment of Labor, Report of the United States Housing Corpora-
tion, 2 Vola. Washington, 1919, Vol. II, p. 111. South 
Bethlehem Globe, June 23, 1915, p. 1, Robert A. Hessen, "A 
Biography of Charles M. Schwab, Steel Industrialist," un-
published Ph.D. dissertation Columbia University, 1969, pp. 
352-388. 
27Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce, 
Vol. I, Feb. 23, 1918. 
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increased demands of wartime, resulting from an expanded labor 
force at the steel mill, did not produce an increase in service. 
On the contrary, during the winter of 1917 and 1913, the Lehigh 
Valley Transit Company actually discriminated against the Bethlehem 
28 
service in the distribution of its available car facilities. 
The result was a series of daily incidents, some of which achieved 
near-riot proportions. At the end of their shifts, steel workers 
mobbed the few available trolleys, and fist-fights among those 
seeking seats were common. Moreover, steelworkers from areas to 
the north of Bethlehem often waited in vain for streetcars to take 
them home, and when none appeared walked to the north side of town 
to obtain transportation. To add insult to injury, when they 
finally boarded a streetcar, the conductors would not accept their 
29 pass books, and made them pay regular fares. These seemingly 
minor episodes became a major problem as service deteriorated. 
Complaints directed tm~ard the police department were passed on to 
the City Council with appeals that it take the matter in hand. How-
ever, the Public Safety Committee of the Council merely recommended 
30 
that fares be kept at five cents. 
In the absence of action by the City Council, the Chamber of 
Commerce stepped in. It obtained the services of Delos Wilcox, the 
28 Delos F. Wilcox, Report on·the Transit Problem·of·Bethlehem, 
Pa., and Vicinity, (mimeograph), Bethlehem, Pa., 1918, p. 7. 
29Bethlehem City Council Minutes, Vol. 1, Feb. 4, 1918. South 
Bethlehem Globe, Dec. 31, 1917, p. 1. 
30 Council Minutes, Vol. I, Jan. 29, 1918. 
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country's foremost public transportation expert, and asked him to 
report on Bethlehem's needs. The result was a sober document 
describing the failures of the Lehigh Valley Transit Company, and 
recommending public ownersh1.p of transportation facilities as well 
31 
as the immediate inauguration of bus service. Although the City 
Council expressed an interest in Wilcox's report, it did not adopt 
his proposals. Instead, the Council used the report to goad the 
Lehigh Valley Transit Company into improving its local service. 
Anxious to have its franchise extended into the recently annexed 
East Bethlehem area of the city, the Transit Company agreed to meet 
32 
the Council's demands. 
The Chamber of Commerce came into existence at the height of 
World War I, and, from the start, most of its activities involved 
the war effort. The Chamber involved itself in raising money for 
the local War Relief Fund, promoting war gardens, publicizing the use 
of substitute foods, and assisting in Liberty Loan campaigns. 33 Many 
of its wartime activities were carriud out in cooperation with the 
Bethlehem Steel Company. In two areas, especially, housing and 
Americanization, the efforts of the two organizations were so closely 
allied as to make it difficult to discover where the activities of 
one ended and those of the other began. 
31 Wilcox, Transit, pp. 7-8, 22. 
32 Council Minutes, Vol. I, Jan. 29, 1918. 
33 Chamber Minutes, Vol. I, Feb. 23, 1918. 
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Housing was a matter of important local concern during the war. 
The number of additional workers the company could employ to meet 
wartime demands depended largely on the housing available. Un-
fortunately~ Bethlehem suffered from a chronic housing shortage, 
and even in the best of times there were employees who had to commute 
34 to work from nearby communities. To help alleviate the situation, 
the Chamber staged rallies to acquaint residents with the problem, 
and convince them that patriotic duty required renting spare rooms 
to war workers. In addition the Cha1nber undertook a house-to-house 
survey to determine the available facilities in the town. In all 
this the Chamber of Commerce acted as the Steel Company's junior 
partner. In fact, when the United States Housing Board requested 
the Chamber to act as its agent in determining housing needs, the 
Chamber refused and directed the Housing Board to the Company which 
35 
already had charge of such matters. 
The Bethlehem Steel Company, recognizing the existence of a 
housing shortage, planned an ambitious home building program. 
Through its subsidiary, the Saucon Land and Improvement Company, 
Bethlehem Steel purchased 480 acres of land east of Bethlehem where 
it proposed to build 1,500 houses for its workers. 36 However, in 
34Koester, City Planning, p. 41. 
35
south Bethlehem Globe, Oct. 27, 1917, p. 1, Nov. 10, 1917, p. 1. 
3611Conference of Representatives of Housing Committee and 
Bethlehem Steel Co., Jan. 10, 1918, in Report on the Abandon-
~ent of the Bethlehem Project, Feb. 10, 1919. Typescript in 
Record Group 3, Records of the United States Housing 
Corporation, National Archives. 
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1917, passage of the War Revenue Act, an excess-profits bill, con-
vinced company officials that such an undertaking was financially 
impossible. As a result, Bethlehem Steel, which normally resented 
government interference in business, appealed to the Federal Govern-
37 
ment for aid. 
The Bethlehem Steel Company sold the properties it had acquired 
for a housing project to the United States Housing Corporation for 
$367,000. The government planned the construction of some 2,000 brick 
dwellings on the site along with such public facilities ae schools, 
38 
churches, stores, and a movie theatre. The war ended before this 
ambitious project could be completed, and only 277 houses had been 
built when the program was terminated in 1919. 39 
Although the housing project was undertaken to provide housing 
for war workers, the results were not intended to be temporary, but 
rather permanent additions to the community. In consequence, Housing 
Corporation agents were instructed to act in cooperation with both city 
and Steel Company officials. It soon became obvious that the govern-
ment was dealing primarily with the company. In a report on a 
conference with the Bethlehem City Solicitor about the cost to the 
37 
Minutes of the War Industries Board from August 11 1917 to 
38 
39 
December 19 1 1918, WaRbington, 1919, pp. 59-60. 
Dept. of Labor, u.s.H.c. Report, Vol. II, p. 111, also J.D. 
Lippincott, ~ed States Housing Corporation, Bethlehem 
Project Closing Report, Feb. 8, 1919, (typescript), P• 18, 
in Record Group 3, Records of the United States Housing 
Corporation, National Archives. 
U.S.H.C., Abandonment Repo~, p. 50. 
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city of laying water mains at the project site, a government official 
stated that the Solicitor "pointed out that the majority of the City 
Council is composed of officers of the Bethlehem Steel Company, which 
has direct interest in facilitating the work of this Bureau." The 
cost of the mains, the lawyer stated, would be met by an upward 
reassessment of local properties from $22,000,000 to $71,000,000. 
The city could thus increase its bonded indebtedness without having 
to submit the proposal to a referendum as required by state law~ 
40 
"This submission he [the cit'}7 solicitor] desired to avoid." Another 
government agent reported in apparent amazement that "This company is, 
41 in fact, the entire city practically," 
The Bethlehem Steel Company's involvement with the government 
housing pro~ect indicated its concern with more than the housing of 
temporary wartime employees~ From the start, the company intended 
the houses for use by its machinists and other skilled employees. 
By providing such workers with permanent housing, the company sought 
42 
to reduce labor turnover, and ensure labor stability. Since home-
owning employees would be unlikely to jeopardize their jobs by 
engaging in union acti•lity, the company put into effect a prop,ram 
designed to aid its workers"in the purchase of their own homes. In 
4011Kerr Report, Sept. 10, 1918," in U.S.R.C., ,EEo,1ect Book. 
41c.s. St. John to Dr. James Ford, Nov. 13, 1918, in ~· 
42 
"Conference of Representatives of Rousing Committee and 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Apr. 13, 1918," in U,S .. H.C., 
Project Book, see alae "Conference" Jan. 10, 1918, in ib:f.d_. 
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1917, for example, the Company loaned its employees $1,100,000 to 
purchase homes. In addition, the company loaned another $1,600,000 
to employees seeking to build homes. A total of 77 houses were sold 
to employees without any down payments in lease purchase agreements. 43 
Skilled workers were not the only subjects of the Company-a 
efforts to insure worker loyalty. Taking advantage of the patriotic 
fervor sweeping the country, the Company strove to convince employees 
of the importance of their work to the war effort. Patriotic rallies, 
flag-raising ceremonies and Liberty Loan campaigns were used to re-
inforce patriotic loyalty to the nation, and, more importantly, to 
44 the company. Even though many of the company's employees were 
immigrants from Eastern Europe, appeals to their patriotic loyalty 
were not without sense. Although Poles, Slovaks, and Magyars were 
technically citizens of Germany and Austria, they were often hostile 
to their governments, and, in fact, local Poles and Slovaks contri-
buted men and money to Polish and Slovak contingents fighting with 
45 the Allies. Moreover, when the United States declared war on 
Austria-Hungary in December, 1917, it decided not to classify such 
immigrants as enemy aliens, an action which gratified local 
43 Lippincott, Closing Report, p. 7, B.s. Co., Booster, No.1, 
May 1, 1918, p. 16. 
44 
45 
Brody, Steelworkers, pp. 190-197, South Bethlehem Globe, Apr. 
7, 1917, P• 1, BoS. Co., Booster, No.4, June 15, 1918, p •. 3, 
No, 7, Aug. 11, 1918, p. 23, No. 13, Nov. 1, 1918, p. 1. 
South Bethlehetn Globe, Apr. 24, 1918, p. 1, May 22, 1918, p. 1. 
See also John Higham, Stran era in the Land Patterns of 
American Nativism 1860•1920 Atheneum Edition , New York, 
1965, P• 217. 
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46 foreigners. Thus, the company's foreign-born employees needed 
little encouragement to form "Loyalty Leagues" declaring their 
adherence to the American cause, or to participate actively in 
47 Liberty Loan campdigng, If loyalty to the United States became 
252. 
identified with loyalty to the Bethlehem Steel Company, it was not 
by accident. Such loyalty would hinder immigrant participation in 
activities which the company designated as unpatriotic, namely, 
union membership. The company was aideu in this by the Americanize-
tion drives of the wartime period. 
Americanization programs grew out of a realization that a large 
proportion of the residents of American industrial centers were 
aliens. Given the emotional atmosphere created by the United States' 
entrance into World War I, this caused a certain amount of appre-
hension among native Americans. As a result, Americanization efforts, 
supervised by the United States Bureau of Naturalization, soon made 
48 
their appearance in communities with large immigrant populations. 
Bethlehem, where 12,000 of the 18,000 local registrants for the draft 
49 
were aliens, was no exception. 
46 
'•7 
South Bethlehem Globe, Dec. 13, 1917, p. 6. 
Ibid., Apr. 2, 1917, P• 6, May 22, P• 1, Dec. 31, P• 1, Apr. 
~1918, p. 2, June 15, p. 6, B.s. Co., Booster, No. 1, May 
1, 1918, p. 6, No. 4, June 15, 1918, pp. 15-16, No. 19 0 Feb~ 
3, 1919, P• 7. . 
48 Higham, Strangers, pp. 215-217, 243-250. 
49Jacob c. Schaeffer, The Record of Service·l917•1927 1 Edward F. 
Ackerman Post No. 397; The American·tegion; ·Hellertown, Pa., 
Allentown, Pa., 1927, pp. 13-14; south Bethlehem Globe, Dec. 
6, 1917, p. 20. 
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In large measure, the Americanization movement represented a 
desire to accommodate the immigrant to an industrial society. It 
was designed to break down the immigrant's strong group loyalties 
and thus eradicate his ethnic identity. By teaching the immigrant 
the fundamentals of English and Civics, the proponents of 
Americanization assumed that the foreigner would acquire the values 
and aspirations of native Americans. As such, then, Americanization 
grew out of the same desire to create a homogeneous, disciplined 
society required by an industrialized nation that had produced the 
50 
municipal reform movement. Recognizing the applicability of 
Americanization to local conditions, Bethlehem Steel encouraged such 
efforts among its workmen. 
Americanization activities began in Bethlehem in the fall of 
1915, under the direction of J. Mark Frey, head of the Young Men's 
Christian Association of Lehigh University. The Y.M.C.A. had begun 
a program of English language instruction for immigrants on a 
national scale in 1907. The Robert's method of instruction, used 
by the Y.M.C.A., was designed specifically for use among the immi-
grants employed in American industry. Stressing the familiar and 
concrete, the lessons related to the men's industrial environment 
and emphasized such things as good work habits, discipline, and 
50 Edward F. Hartman, The Movement to'Americartize·the·Immigrant, 
New York, 1948, pp. 24, 56-63, 91-97, Higham, Strangers, pp. 
238-242, Maurice R. Stein, The Eclipse of Community: An 
Interpretation of American Studies, (Harper Torchbooka 
Edition) New York, 1964, p. 54, Korman, Industrialization, 
pp. 136~166. 
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51 
safety. When Frey found himself unable to interest local school 
authorities in such a program, he turned to the Bethlehem Steel 
Company for help. Convinced of the program's utility, Company 
officials obtained the use of public school facilities for night 
school classep by promising to meet all the expenses involved. 
Supervised by Frey, seventeen Lehiglt University students, paid by 
the company, began giving instructions in English in November, 1916. 
Classes were open to all aliens in the community whether or not 
52 
they were employed by Bethlehem Steel. 
On the whole, the response to the English language teaching 
program was favorable. In the 1916-1917 series of instructions, 
some 2~000 studunts representing 64 nationalities attended classes. 
Another 1,200 students enrolled in the 1917-1918 session. Although 
the program became coupled with the Americanization movement sponsored 
by the Bureau of Naturalization, company officials limited its 
activities to English language instruction, and declined to hold 
classes preparing aliens for citizenship. Although willing to place 
the school under the nominal supervision of local school authorities 
in order to obtain government assistance and teaching materials, the 
company refused to participate in a wartime naturalization drive. 
51 Bowen, Lehis~,p. 27, Korman, Industrialization, pp. 141-146, 
52 
Glazier to Chief Examiner, Naturalization Service, Phila., 
Jan. 6, 1916 in Record Group 85, Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, File E-520, National Archives. 
Glazier to Chief Exaruinet:, Jan. 6, 1916 in ibid, 
-
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An Americanization drive sponsored by the Bethlehem Chamber of 
Commerce had almost destroyed the English language night school, 
company officials explained, for many of its immigrant employees 
feared that filing a declaration of intent to become a citizen 
made them liable to conscription. In the face of wartime labor 
shortage,, the company feared that a naturalization drive would 
53 
cause many aliens to seek work elsewhere. 
With the coming of peace,- the company's attitude toward 
naturalization drives changed. Continuing its English language 
classes, the company expanded its program to include classes 
255. 
preparing aliens to pase naturalization examinations. Bethlehem 
Steel officials were aware of the value of company sponsored 
citizenship drives in helping their workmen to confuse loyalty to 
the company with loyalty to the nation. When the war ended, and 
labor shortages were no longer a problem, the company launched a 
54 
naturalization campaign. 
For several weeks before the start of a new series of English 
language classes in December, 1918, great stress was placed on the 
desirability of the attendance of aliens at citizenship classes. 
Company representatives approached all the unnaturalized foreigners 
53 
South Bethlehem Globe, Oct. 9, 1917, p. 1, J.M. Gurnett to 
Commissioner of Naturalization, Washington, D.Co, Nov. 4, 
1918, Naturs.lization Records File E-520, for the seriousness 
of Bethlehem Steel's wartime labor shortage see William Hard, 
"Cannon, Whose Fault?" New Republic, Vol. 14, Apr. 1918, pp. 
377-379. 
54 H. Wilson to Chief Naturalization Examiner, Jan. 28, 1919, 
Naturalization Records, File £-520. See also Brody, Steel-
wor~, p. 189. 
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in the plant, and encouraged them to seek citizenship. Employees 
who attended the school would receive pay raises and promotions, 
but those who did not would be dismissed when work slacked off 
55 
with the completion of war contracts. To make things as easy as 
possible for prospective citizens, papers for filing a Declaration 
56 
of Intent could be obtained in the company offices. As a result 
of the campaign, some 5 1 500 men enrolled in the English and 
57 
citizenship classes in the December, 1918 series of instructions. 
If the company made use of the patriotic fervor of wartime to 
gain the loyalty of its employees, unions likewise used the oppor-
tunity to step up their recruitment activities in the American steel 
industry. Because military needs demanded uninterrupted production, 
the federal government needed the cooperation of organized labor in 
its efforts uo win the war. In return for their support, labor 
unions obtained government recognition of their right to organize. 
The reault was a spurt in unionizing activities because organizers 
58 
could claim that joining a union was a patriotic act, At 
Bethlehem Steel, a drive to organize the company's machinists met 
with enough success to produce a walkout in April, 1918. 
55 J.M. Gurnett to Commissioner of Naturalization, Jan. 5, 1919 1 
Naturalization Records, File E-520, 
56 See "Free Night School for Non-English Speaking Men," a fl~er 
in~. 
57 J.M. Gurnett to Director of Citizenship, Dec. 1, 1919, in~· 
58David Brody, Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919, Phila., 
c. 1965. PP• 50-53, 72-74. 
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The grievances voiced by the striking machinists in 1918 were 
similar to those which had led to the strike in 1910. They com-
plained of an unfair bonus system, substandard wages, and inadequate 
overtime pay. In addition, the machinists stated thnt the company 
manipulated draft deferments to eliminate union men from the ranks 
of its employees. Because of Bethlehem Steel's important role 
in the production of war material, the National War Labor Board 
h~ard the case. After listening to the witnesses, the N.W.L.B. 
announced its decision on July 31, 1918. It ordered the bonus system 
to be eliminated, and replaced by pay scales conforming with the 
minimum hourly rates of the War and Navy Departments which included 
time and a half for work over eight hours and double time for 
holidays and Sundays. In addition, the company was ordered to meet 
with shop committees elected by the employees to discuss all future 
59 
grievances. 
The Bethlehem Steel Company was unhappy with the decision and 
did nothing to implement it. On November 17, Eugene Grace, president 
of Bethlehem Steel, informed a War Labor Board examiner that, since 
the war was over, the company was no longer bound by the board's 
decision. The company would not pay higher wage rates, and if the 
59 
"Democracy in Bethlehem," New Republic, Vol. 16, Aug. 1918, 
pp. 36-38, United States Senate Committe on Labor and Educa-
tion, Investigation of Strike in the Steel Industry, 66 Cong. 
1st Session, Washington, 1919, p. 1008, "Hearing: the 
Bethlehem Steel Company Controversy, June 18, 1918," "Award 
of the National War Labor Board Aug. 1, 1918" in Bethlehem 
case, docket 22, Record Group 2, Records of the National War 
Labor Board, National Archives. 
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N.W.L.B. wanted the machinists to have the back pay it said was 
m~ed them, the board could find the money itself. The shop 
committees elected under N.W.L.B. supervision were ignored, and 
60 
their members discharged during postwar production cutbacks. 
After a public rebuke by ex-president William H. Taft, co-
chairman of the N.w.L.B., Grace backed down and agreed to 
258. 
negotiate a new bargaining plan with the remaining committeemen. 
On April 3, 1919, a new plan was adopted which, on paper, gave 
the employees' representatives unusual independence. However, the 
men had little reason to believe in the company's good faith and 
in this they were justified. The compc.·rty refused to adhere to the 
back pay provisions of the N.W.L.B. award and the intransigence 
61 
of company officials made the collective bargaining plan useless. 
When the National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel 
Workers called an industry-wide walkout for September 22, 1919, 
Bethlehem was not included. Indeed, the National Committee desired 
to keep Bethlehem in operation. By applying competitive pressure 
on the struck companies, Bethlehem Steel would act as a de facto 
62 
ally of the unions. 
60 
'E.B. Woods "Memorandum on Bethlehem Situation," Nov. 17, 1918, 
E.B. Woods "Report" Nov. 19, Dec. 21, 1918, Eugene Grace to 
William H. Taft, Dec. 12, 1918, "Hearing Jan. 15, 1919," 
R.G. Gregg to E.L. Mandel, Mar. 5v 1919, Bethlehem Case, 
Docket 22, National War Labor Beard Records; New York Times, 
January 16, 1919, p. 18, Jan. 19, Po 14, Feb. 5, p. 18. 
61 ~ke Investigation, pp. 1010, David Williams to W.L. Lauck, 
62 
Mar. 3, 1919, Bethlehem Cases, Docket 22, National War Labor 
Board Records. 
Brody, Crisis, pp. 180-182. 
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The local union leaders at Bethlehem were willing to abide by 
the National Committee's order not to strike, but the men were not. 
Frustrated by the company's refusal to give them the back pay awarded 
by the N.W.L.B., as well as by the failure of the collective bargaining 
systemD the men wanted to strike. They were encouraged by the initial 
success of walkouts in other areas, and wanted the American Federation 
of Labor to represent them as a bargaining agent. It seemed parti-
cularly galling to them that the company recognized unions and paid 
standard wages in its ship yards, but would not do so in its steel 
63 
mills. 
In the face of rank and file discontent, and fearful of losing 
members if they failed to actw local union leaders decided to call a 
strike. On September 21, they asked the National Committee to re-
quest a conference with company officials for the purpose of 
negotiating an agreement to abolish company unions, recognize the 
A.F. of L. as ~ bargaining agent, establish standard rates of pay, 
and discuss outstanding grievances such as the back pay award. If 
the company did not reply by 4 P.M., September 25, the National 
64 
Committee was to issue an order for a strike on the twenty-ninth. 
The call fot a conference was a tactic to gain public support, 
for the company's anti-union stance was well known. Acting on the 
63 R.B. Gregg to E.B. Woods, Dec. 9, 1918, Bethlehem Case, 
Docket 22, National War Labor Board Records, Strike Investi-
gation, p. 1010. 
64 South Bethlehem Globe, Sept. 18, 1919, p. 18, New York Times, 
Sept. 22, 1919, p. 2. 
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assumption that no reply would be forthcoming, union leaders set 
about making preparations for a strike, and printed cards asking 
the men to stage a walkout. This was a tactical mistake, for it 
gave Grace the opportunity to accuse the union of a lack of good 
faith. In a public letter to the National Cnmmittee, Grace refu1;ed 
to confer with A.F. of L. representatives because, he saidp the 
company already had a collect:l.ve bargaining system, and were it 
defective, employees would certainly have informed the management. 
Since he had never received any complaints about the system, Grace 
65 
stated that he therefo,:e saw no need for a conference. 
The walkout came on September 29, 1919 at 6 A.M. By all 
accounts, it was a great deal less than hoped for. Out of a work 
force of some 13,500, only about 2,500 men struck. Most of the 
strikers were machinists and there were few unskilled workers in 
their ranks. Unioni2ing activities had been concentrated on the 
machinists. It was assumed that a strike by machinists would 
paralyze the company, and when the unskilled men saw that the com-
66 
pany had been hurt, they would soon follow. This was not to 
happen. 
65 See "Williams Statement" in ibid., Sept. 22, 1919, p. 2, 
also Sept. 30, 1919, p. 2. -----
66william z. Foster, The Great Steel Strike ·and 'Its l.eseons, 
New York, 1920, pp. 104, 181; ·~rike·Investigation, p. 1011, 
South Bethlehem·Globe, Sept. 22, 1919, p. 1; ·New·York Times, 
Sept. 30, 1919, p. 1, Easton Express, Oct. 1, 1919, p. 5. 
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In spite of the machinists claim to have crippled the company, 
their absence was not immediately apparent to observers. Although 
the company was more handicapped than offic1.als admitted, the noisy, 
.:nnol<~e-pronw:·ing activities in departments other than machine shops 
continued. The continued activity within the plant had an adverse 
psychological effect on the determination of strikers to remain out, 
67 
as well as on potential strikers still at work. 
Company officials were aware of the machinists' strategic impor-
tance, and kne·w that it would not be long before their absence 
would noticeably affect production. Thus, despite claims that all 
was well, officials made a concerted effort to persuade the men to 
return. Supervisors visited the homes of striking machinists and 
offered them bonuses ranging from $25 to $100 to return. For those 
men fearing violence if they came back the company announced it 't-Tould 
send automobiles to bring them to work. In the meantime, the com-
68 
pany voluntarily raised the wages of men still at work. 
The Company's efforts to end the strike were successful. Al-
though many men stayed out longer, the strike was effectively over 
in little more than a week. The ranks of the strikers were thinned 
't-Then the steam engineers returned to work in a body~ The next blow 
67 South Bethlehem Globe, Sept. 30, 1919, p. 1, Easton Express, 
Oct. 1, 1919, P• 1. 
68 South Bethlehem Globe, Sept. 30, 1919, p. 1, Oct. 4, p. 14, 
Easton Express, Oct. 1, 1919, p. 1. 
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came when the railroad men on the plant system voted not to strike. 
This, added to the failure of the unskilled men to come out, meant 
the end of the strike. After this, the resolve of the strikers was 
broken, and in spite of the efforts of their leaders, there was a 
69 
steady stream of deserters from the rank of the union men. 
Perhaps the major reason for the strike's lack of success was 
the failure to include the unskilled immigrant workers, for without 
their staying power the strike had little chance of success. The 
absence of immigrant participation marks the major difference be-
tween this strike and the one which occurred in 1910. The 
individualistic native American strikers were subject to pressures 
which immigrants, receiving the support of their ethnic communities 
.. 
were not. In 1910, the strike went on for months, as it did else-
where in 1919. In Bethlehem, the strike of 1919 was shortlived in 
the extreme. 
If it appears obvious that immigrants should have been in-
eluded in the strike for it to succeed, it remains to be asked why 
they were not. The answer seems to lie in the absence of dis-
70 
crimination by the company against immigrants. War time propaganda 
about "enemy aliens" coupled with the normal prejudice against 
immigrants appears to have affected the skilled American workers 
69Foster, Strike, p. 182, South Bethlehem Globe, Sept. 30, 1919, 
P• 1, Oct. 1, P• 1. 
70 Strike Investigation, PP• 1021. 
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greatly. At any rate, statements made by the striking machinists 
indicated a resentment of the fact that "alien enemies and other 
71 
noncitizens," received the same wages they did. The union did 
not want such men in their ranks, and therefore made no effort to 
organize them. Even during the strike no effort was made to welcome 
foreign-speaking workmen. The leader of the union forces in 
Bethlehem was, in factt prQud to declare that "tl.dre was no foreign 
72 
strike in Bethlehem; it was an American strike." 
In addition to the ma(~hinists' hostility, other factors contri-
buted to the failure of the immigrants to strike. Quite obviously 
the wartime emphasis on patriotism and the Americanizstion program 
had borne fruit. The immigrants had assimilated the idea that loyalty 
to the United States meant loyalty to the company. Moreover, the 
preparations made by the local police department for the strike re-
inforced this belief. The city hired 35 recently returned veterans 
as special police. These men wore their army uniforms with only a 
small button to indicate that they were police. This, it was said, 
was a deliberate attempt to intimidate foreigners by making them 
believe that regular soldiers were on guard, and that the national 
73 
government opposed the strike. 
In 1910, the strikers had the support of the entire community, 
71Ibid., PP• 1011, 1021. 
72 
.ill!·' p. 1015. 
73 New York Times, Sept. 30, 1919, p. 2. 
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but this was not the case in 1919. By 1919, the company had 
succeeded in its goal of integrating itself into the midst of 
community life. Moreover, since consolidation, the company, not 
strikers, had a large influence in the local government, and on 
September 28, the Mayor, Archibald Johnston, prohibited picketing 
74 
and public, that is union, meetings. Since the strikers were 
thereafter forced to meet in neighboring Allentown, the company 
took the opportunity to arottse connnunity spirit on its behalf. 
The company denounced the strikers as non-residents and outsiders, 
75 
and labelled the walkout an "Allentown strike." This was a 
telling argument and it struck horne. There was little, if any, 
overt support for the strikers in Bethlehem, and no need to denounce 
strikers as Bolsheviks and radicals or to resort to the repressive 
violence which took place elsewhere in 1919. 76 
The company's policy of good community relations had proved 
its worth, It had made a point of doing things for the·community 
which were both l':onspicuous and pleasing. In the space of a month, 
during the same period as the strike, the local newspaper carried 
notices concerning company activities. On September 29, for 
example, the city council publicly thanked the Bethlehem Steel Company 
Band for providing free Sunday .concerts during the sunnner and for 
74 Council Minutes, Vol. I, Sept. 28, 1919; South·Bethlehem Globe, 
Sept~ 29, 1919, P• 1. 
15 New York Times, Sept. 27, 1919, p. 3, Sept. 30, 1919, p. 2, 
76 Brody, Crisis, pp. 119-159, 
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77 playing gratis at street dances. Articles on the sports pages 
noted the activities of the Bethlehem Steel Soccer Team and spoke 
78 
of local boxers who were in training at the company's gymnasium. 
Yet another article noted that the Bethlehem Steel was providing 
the furnishings and would pay the rent for a chess and checkers 
79 
club in the city. Events had come to such a point that, on 
October 28, 1919, a candidate for city council was forced to defend 
himself in print by ~o;~riting a letter to the newspaper in which he 
angrily denied that he had even been hostile to the Bethlehem Steel 
Company or that he had ever said "Charles Schwab and his lieutenants 
80 ~Y'ere a positive detriment to this connnunity." 
Bethlehem's reaction to the steel strike of 1919 indicated the 
degree to which its residents had accepted the values of an industrial 
society as their own. Because the local citizens were in symp~thy 
with the often exp~essed desire of the Bethlehem Steel Company for 
a stable and orderly local society, little support for the striking 
machinists was forthcoming. Whereas local residents had judged the 
strike of 1910 from the standpoint of a value system hostile to 
industrialism, their views were now determined by the benefits they 
derived from living in an industrialized community. In large measure, 
this change in attitude was the direct result of the concerted efforts 
77 . South Bethlehem Globe, Sept. 30' 1919 ' p. 1. 
78Ibid., Oct. 1, 1919, P• 8. 
79~ •• Oct. 25, 1919, p. 8. 
80 
~·· Oct. 28, 1919, p. 10. 
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of the Bethlehem Steel Company to transform the potentially volatile 
local community into a stable, labor pool. In the process of con-
vincing local citizens that the Bethlehem Steel Company had the 
community's best interest at heart, the company also brought 
Bethlehem to full acceptance of the values of an industrialized 
society. By 1920, it had become a modern industrial city, integrated 
into the life of an industrial nation. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the years between 1741 and 1920, Bethlehem changed from a 
religious commune into an industrial city. In the process, the 
standards by which the inhabitants lived also changed. The values 
and imperatives of an industrial society replaced those of a 
Moravian village, and the Bethlehem Steel Company, not the Moravian 
Church, was the community's dominant social institution. In the 
course of nearly two centuries, Gesellschaf.t had supplanted 
Gemeinschaft, 
In the eighteenth century, the religious values of the 
Moravians influenced every aspect of life in Bethlehem. The 
village's social and economic institutions reflected the Moravian 
emphasis on the importance of communal piety for salvation, The 
choirs carried out the social functions usually associated with· the 
family, and also provided their members with food, clothing, shelter, 
and employment. Individual economic activity was forbidden, and, 
in accord with the tenets of a Christian communalism, production 
and consumption were shared by all, Moreover, seeking to keep the 
distracti.ng influences of the outside world at arm's length, the 
Church aut.horities permitted none but Horavians to settle within the 
limits of the town, 
267. 
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The attempt to insulate Bethlehem from the rest of the world 
ended in failure. Eighteenth century Pennsylvania proved to be 
neither the time nor the place to establish a medieval, Christian. 
utopia. Western society was becoming increasingly secular and 
individualistic, and its values gradually penetrated into 
Bethlehem, altering the lives of its inhabitants. By the middle 
of the nineteenth century, there was little about Bethlehem to 
distinguish it from any other American community of similar size. 
To be sure, most of Bethlehem's inhabitants gave their allegiance 
to the religious beliefs of their predecessors, but their lives 
were governed by a spirit of secular individualism rather than by 
the standards of communal pietism. 
The spirit of secular individualism which brought an end to 
Bethlehem's exclusively Moravian existence, also gave birth to 
South Bethlehem as an industrial community. Social cohesion was 
at a minimum in South Bethlehem, for the members of the town's 
heterogeneous population had little in common except for a desire 
to achieve a measure of economic success. Motivated more by 
competition than cooperation, the inhabitants of South Bethlehem 
were divided into a variety of social and ethnic groups each 
possessing its own traditions and standards. Only the local elite's 
involvement in community affairs brought a sense of cohesion and 
continuity to the town. 
By 1920, the local community had once again undergone a trans-
formation in values. This time t.he shift was from an unrestrained 
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individualism to a sense of membership in a corporate whole. The 
need for order and stability in a complex, urban-industrial society 
led to the emergence of a value system based on bureaucratic 
principles of organization, and cooperation replaced competition 
as the ideal form of social behavior. As Bethlehem's dominant 
social institution, the Bethlehem Steel Company most fully embodied 
these standards, and it ~~as through the comp&ny'q involvement in 
community affairs that such a value system be~ame part of the lives 
of the town's residents. The acceptance of this bureaucratic ethic 
marked Bethlehem's absorption by an integrated national society. 
It was the culmination of a process which had begun in the eighteenth 
century when Bethlehem was founded as a religious commune. 
To the degree that the specific events which comprise 
Bethlehem's history are not repeated in the history of any community, 
its story is unique. Yet, seen in a broader context, Bethlehem's 
history is in many ways representative of the national experience. 
Bethlehem's transformation from a Moravian commune to a secular in-
dustrial city did not take place in a vacuum, for the forces which 
influenced Bethlehem's development were general forces affecting 
the nation as a whole. In this sense, then, an understanding of 
how one particular community became an industrial city can also help 
us to better understand how the United States became an industrial 
nation. 
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